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1.

INTRODUCTION

Market performance
is not only a function of demand structure and cost configuration
of
the companies which serve a transport service. It also depends on the existence of differem
types of barriers obstructing
free competence
between operators.
Some of them come
directly from the regulation conditions imposed by the governments
but others do not
depend of this, although can have been generated as a consequence
of past regulation
policies and that remain even after deregulated process. So, for example, one company can
have a dominant position in a deregulated coach market if it keeps the monopoly access to
an important coach station. The existence of this type of barriers can be affecting
generalised cost carried by the users, and therefore the level of welfare they obtained.
Among

the different

state member

we can find barriers

which

obstruct

the

the free competence

in the transport sector. In the rail market we can find many different types of barriers. In
this line, one of main which is common in many state members is the existence of a
regulation which obstruct the free entry of new operators in the market. Other barriers are
different electric system or track gauge system. In the air sector again the regulation
obstruct in some countries the free entry of new operators. Another important
limited capacity
of airports, this affects directly to the slot distribution,
determine

even the presence

barrier is the
which can

of one carrier in some airports.

The regulatory intervention
has been a common place in the transport policies, but the
situation has changed in the last years. Kay and Thompson (1991) identify three groups of
circumstances
under which market failures and inappropriate
regulatory regimes can be
categorised:
Competitive
solutions may not exist in circumstances
monopoly and high-sunk costs of market entry.
Competitive

solutions

may exist but may not be achieved

where

because

may be able to successfully
deter market entry, encourage
acquiescence
of competitors and establish a dominant position.
Competitive

solutions

may exist and be achieved

arrangement

of production

cannot

is natural

incumbent

the exit,

but their outcome

considered
desirable:
this outcome is particularly
true when
(environmental
problems),
where
information
asymmetries
participants
are important, where social concerns are considered
a more efficient
market entry.

there

firms

merger

or

may not be

externalities
exist
between
market
relevant, or where

be sustained

in the face of

It is important to appreciate
the difference
between unavoidable
failures that follow
directly from the economic characteristics
of the sector being regulated and escapable
failures, which follow from the adoption of inappropriate
methods of regulation. Salop
(1979) distinguish between 'innocent' barriers to entry, those that arise when incumbent
pursue policies that maximise short-run profits and the 'strategic' barriers, those activities
that subtract from short-run profitability but that are undertaken in the belief that they will
deter entrants and add to profitability in the longer term.
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blari_etliberalisationandthe withdrawalof the statehavefeaturesof virtually every
transportmarketoverthepastfifteenyears(ButtonandKeeler,1993).Thevariouseffects
of thesechangeson transporthasbeenmuchstudied.Nevertheless,
theunderstanding
of
thenatureof whatareoftentermed"deregulation"- with no or very,little regulationof
tares,entry,andexit - is still remarkablylimiteddespitethe considerable
experience
we
have.Thederegulation
of express
coachingin 1980(UK) andthe deregulation
of aviation
in theUnitedStatesin 1978initiallyresultedin substantial
farereductionsassociated
with
newmarketentry.However,theseinitial effectsof deregulationin reducingpriceshave
beenfollowedby increasing
concentration
in theindustW andpriceshaverisensteadilyin
teattermsandarenowsubstantially
abovethe levelsto whichthey fell in the inmediate
aftermathof deregulation.
Doesthismeanthat

deregulation

has failed? We are sure this is not the case. However,

we

can argue that some competing hypothesis are not really fulfilled (Jaffer and Thompson,
1986), imperfect
forms of competition
and contestability
(tbr example,
Morrison
and
Winston, 1987), oligopolistic
structures (Kahn, 1988) or the existence of an empty core
problem (Button, 1996). It is interesting to remark that the intellectual position is not stable
and some of the leading figures who initially suggested
that aviation may naturally be
contestable
by trucks,
transport"

have subsequently
changed their minds. "We now believe that transportation
barges and even buses may be more highly contestable
than passenger
air
(Baumol

The concepts

and Willig,

of competition

1986).

and contestability

are fundamental

in the study of the debate

of the regulatory reform in transport policy. Baumol (1982) argued that contestabiiity
is a
generalisation
of the concept of perfect competition.
Perfect
contestability
is not a
description

of reality

Barter

(1992)

market

obstructing

but a benchmark

describes

As structural

two general

for desirable

types of barriers

the free competence
barriers:

industrial

between

Hub airport

As strategic

barriers:

Airlines

that we can find in a deregulated

operators:

dominance:

airports by incumbent carriers and restricting
handling monopolies,
the control on computer

organisation.

structural
this means

the access
reservations

with large networks

air

and strategic

barriers:

the control

of major

for new entrants,
systems

can offer selectively

ground

lower fares

in response to new market entry, on contested routes and raise fares on uncontested.
Also incumbent
airlines can response to new entrants with collusive
policies in
prices and/or

2.

THE

The regulation

capacity.

DEREGULATION
of civil aviation

POLICY

IN THE

in many

countries

US AND EUROPE
sought

to control

entry

and exit of

carriers on routes and to set the prices, frequencies
and capacity offered by the carriers.
This system became to be highly criticised as inflexible and incredible protective of those
they were supposed to control. This was the cause that the regulation came under scrutiny
among airlines and authorities. The changing of the system was possible
market to be reformed. In Europe the difficulties were harder because
-2-

depending on the
of the subsidiary.

principle,by whichtheneedof agreement
betweenthedifferentgovernments
of theState
Membersis obliged.
The pressurefor deregulationwas very high in the seventies,and the Aviation
Deregulation
Act became
lawin 1978.Thelawsuppressed
themajorityof thecontrolsthat
Civil AviationBoardhad,aswell it prepared
for theabolitionoftheCAB in 1985.
Restrictionon routeaccesswas relaxed.It had a dramaticincreaseon the numberof
carriersprovidingscheduled
services.Theoverallconcentration
fell, but theconcentration
indexwasnot too differentto the previousperiodbecausethe newentrantweresmall
operators.Somenewoperatorswereexistingintrastateoperators,but often the entrants
werenewin theindustry.
Theavailabilityof discountfareswaspermitted.In thiscasethebenefitsof deregulation
to
consumers
consistednotjust in a reductionof faresto existingtravellers,
butthepromotion
of a big increasein traffic figures.Trafficrosedramaticallyandin 1985theincreasewas
about50 per cent respectto 1978,in spiteof the existenceof a stableperiodin the
recessiontime. Due to the increased
availabilityof discountfares,morethan 80%of
passengers
in 1984weretravellingondiscounttickets.
Many of the favourableoutcomesof deregulation
predictedby observersof the airline
industryhavein factbeenrealised,
andthereexistsa consensus
to agreethatthebenefitsof
deregulationhaveoverweighedthe costs.Althoughthe designersof deregulationand
economistsin generalappearedto havepredictedaccuratelythe directionof welfare
change,they did not predictaccuratelythe presentstructureof the airline industry.
Deregulation
hasenabledairlinestoreduceoperatingcosts,increase
loadfactors,increase
theavailabilityof discounttickets,andincrease
thenumberof flights,all withouta serious
declinein serviceto smallcommunities
or safety.However,thehub-and-spoke
methodof
delivery,complexpricingstrategies,
thedominance
of manyairportsby singlecarriers,the
controlof computerreservation
systems,andthegrowthof devicesthatinduceloyaltyin
theagents,suchasfrequentflyer programsandtravelagentcommission
overrides,didnot
exist in the regulatedairline industryand were not predictedin advance.This fact
demonstrates
thattheregulationtaperedthepossiblebehaviourof theindustry.
The deregulationof civil aviationin the US since 1978was takenplacein different
circumstances
fromthoseof Europe,but someremarkable
lessonscanbelearntaboutthe
potentialgainsof a singlemarket,aswell assomeof thecostsincurredin the absence
of
the former regulation.Anyway it is well known that some lessonsof American
deregulation
arequitefarawayfromEuropean
case.Samecountry.,
samemarketconfersa
relativesuperiorpositionto thepotentialgainsin theAmericancasein termsof revenue
passengers.
A greatquantityof USdomestictraffic fallsinto thecategory"visitingfriends
andrelatives".Thisevidence
canbeseenaspartof culturalbarriersthatlimit theprogress
of thedevelopment
of thesinglemarketinsideEU. Averagejourneyslengthsareshorter,
whichmeansthattake-offandlandingcostsrepresent
a largerproportionof totalcostsand
competitionfrom othermodes(suchas high speedtrains)is muchgreaterthanin the
Americanmarket.
Thepre-deregulation
situationin Europewasa resultof international
bilateralagreements
betweensomeMemberStateswithin EU andevenwith countriesoutsideEU, specially
-3-

with US. Theseagreements
determinedboth the procedurest'or
maximum share of capacity that can be
agreements
permitted
carriers to prepare
majority of occasions, agreements prevent
The need for both governments
to agree

setting tares
offered by airlines of each country.
a joint schedule and to pool revenue.
route entry by any company except flag
any change in the accord has reduced

and the
Bilateral
In the
carriers.
possible

global retbrms inside Europe. Proposals for reform of the industry were being made in a
situation similar to the American
deregulation,
but this approach was firstly opposed by
most European governments
with self-interests
in their own flag carriers.
So it was
necessary to introduce more flexibility and competition
into the existing system without
ruining it.
The following liberalisation
market before its complete

agreements
deregulation.

(see Button and Swarm, 1991) were set out in the
These have been like trials preceding to the full

deregulation
and some airlines have used these experiences
to operate in freer conditions.
In the sample that we have extracted it is observed that UK comprise the major agreements
achieved.

Table 1. Bilateral agreements.
Countries

Pre-deregulation

era in the aviation market in Europe

Year

Terms of agreement

UK and Netherlands

1984

permitting free, route access and capacity.

UK and Netherlands

1985

airlines were left to set their own fare.

UK and FR of Germany

1984

Permitting free route access, fares and capacity.

UK and Luxembourg

1985

permitting free, route access, fares and capacity.

UK and Belgium

1985

permitting free, route access, fares and capacity.

UK and Switzerland

1985

permitting free, route access and capacity.

UK and Italy

1986

permitting free, route access and capacity.

France and Germany.

1986

permitting free, route access and capacity.

The European liberalisation
process has been divided in three packages.
It permitted to
achieve carriers to set freely fares and to operate in any European country since April of
1997. The
governments

Commission
proceeded
carefully
because
of the opposition
of national
that took actions protecting their national flag carriers in spite of the observed

differences
in their performance.
Most countries do not allow competition
with the flag
carrier on domestic
trunk or international
routes. In effect, except in the UK, the
Netherlands and the Republic of Ireland, no flag carrier had in the past faced competition
on any route.

-4-

Thefirst packageadoptedon December
of 1987cameinto forceon 1 January1988.it
includedsomemeasures
to introducesomekind of flexibility in the aviationsectorand
establishedthe basisto obtaina gradualliberalisation.Airlines may offer fareswith
discountsbetween65 and90 percent
of economyclassfor ticketswith certainconditions
andanothertype of discounted
faresbetween45 and 65%of economyclass(Council
Decision601/87).A secondCouncilDecision602/87whichpermitteda capacitysharefor
oneairlineuntil 60%in 1990betweentwo countriesleavingthe equitablemarketshare.
Also a secondoperatorcanenterinto the marketundercertainlimits of traffic. As a
consequence
of thispackage
somesmallerairlinesentersomeimportantintra-Community
routes(CAA 1993).This reformalsopointedto focus on ownership.Somecountries
introduced
or increased
theshareof privatecapitalin theirflagcarriers.
ThesecondpackagecameintoforceonJune1990,includedmeasures
onmarketaccess
on
intra-community
scheduled
routesandcapacityshare.Third andfourthfreedoms
rightsare
appliedallaroundEuropean
Community
and fifth freedomwitha maximumof 50%of the
capacityof the planeandfor flights with origin or destinationin the county of the
company.The packageincorporated
someimportantpromisesfor the future.Member
Stateshavelegallyboundthemselves
to full liberalisationby January,
1_'1993.Oneof the
principalmeasures
to ensurewasthe endingof capacity-sharing
arrangements
between
governments,which hithertoguaranteedsome shareof traffic on particularroutes
independently
of the efficiencyof the companies.On fares,the packageincludesmore
flexibleconditionsallowingtodecrease
thedeepdiscountfareswithouttherequirement
of
government
approval.Thelowerlimit wasreducedto 30percentof thereference
economy
fare,comingfromthe45 per cent established in the first package.
Finally the third package entered into force in January 1_' 1993. It is formed by three acts
which constituted
the completion of the deregulation
in the aviation European
market.
Airlines are free to set fares and stated conditions
in which are going to be used. Until
April 1s' 1997 carriers could make cabotage into one state member up to 50% of capacity,
unrestricted
from that date. The intention of this measure is to open the national markets,
allowing EU airlines to compete freely in a single market.
Perhaps the main barriers that exist yet to competition
in the European market come from
the lack of slots at airports and which obstructs
the enter of new competitors
in same
conditions of the incumbents that hold them. This affects also to airports where is possible
to achieve slots in off-peak demand periods. The Commission
therefore felt that rules are
needed on the allocation of slots to ensure that liberalisation
is not undermined by barriers
against new entrants at congested airports. The actual regulation
based on a Council
Regulation
CEEC no 95/93 permit the existence
of 'grand father rights" which is the
method
it'.

that dominate

in the European

airports

establishes

also the principle

'use it or lose

So the slot control in the airports is now a way to limit competition
and to establish a
stronger position of incumbents in the market. The effectiveness
of the deregulation
policy
depend on the measures that the Commission could design in order to regulate this airport
service. It is absolutely necessary, that these kind of facilities which are limited would be
allocated in the way most conducive to competition.

increasingcapacityairportst_ so.vethis prob'.:m doesnot seemto be the correctway,
because
tl:isrequiresheavyfir moralinvestrnerwithenvironmental
consequences
too,and
otherproblemcanariseastr::.ff: control.Lara is a scarce commodity that imposes very
restr'ngent
limitations.
The sk provision p: zsents the problem of peak demand. The
airport landing charges do not c mtribute to ef.iciency since they do not reflect the costs of
de!ays to other aircraft (costs o congestion),
t has been estimated by the International
Air
Transport Association
(IATA) nat the delay,_ for more than 15 minutes due to congestion
are going

to increase

in figur

',veil above

ae 25 per cent of the total flights in the next

years.
in Europe, the Civil Aviation _.uthority in I TK proposed a mechanism such that incumbent
airlines with a set of slots ab,.ve a threshol, would be required to surrender a proportion to
the scheduling committee w_'.c,h would port,nit the entry of new carriers to operate in the
market (see, European
Corr nission,
1997). In the United States the Federal Aviation
Administration
suggested as ,iternative tc create a market based on the willingness to pay
of the carriers to acquire the slot. These ::'stems include differential pricing and auctioning
of slots rather than the prose "t system of fllocating them.
As consequence
different

of the

strategies

liberalisation

process,

the

in order .:o achieve a good position

European

companies

have

adopted

in the market.

One of these has been all. races and mergers. Fundamentally
seeking increase the network
operated exploiting
so ti e economies
of density derived.
With this strategy
also cost
reductions are produced because ofjc ,nt services. Also, this is the way to entry in markets
where the slot allocation
So as exanlple,

British

m: 2e no po sine to enter in the market.
Ai

rays ac_ aired 49,9%

of TAT,

10% of DAN Air and 100% of

British Caledonian
in 19 ',. Air France acquired 100% of Inter, UTA or Swissair that
acquired 49,5% of SABE ,A in lC95. Or the agreements between Lufthansa and SAS on
route network, schedules • cketing frequent flyer program and cargo services.
The pricing strategies ha- been very important in this process, implementing
a wider range
of discount fares to try to share tl-.e demand as much as possible fixing higher discounts for
more etastic segments. "-.'his may have could
between different operators in or.e market.

been used as an instrument

of competition

Finally this process has required that companies adjusted their cost structures overall flag
carriers twing to increase in efficiency in order to compete with potential or existing in fact
new entrants in the m xrk,:t. In fact, it has been observed important labour reduction in
many carriers during t! is :ericd.

3.

DATA

DESCF

_PTION.

Given the present der ;utation of the airline industry, in which an ample pace of reform
has been introduced,
a lo,:gical question to answer is how this reform has affected the
overall performance
c :he industry. In order to do this, we are going to focus our attention
in how global deman, and prices have responded to this new state, trying to discuss how
-6-

competition,airportdominance,
existenceof alternativeflightsandothervariablesaffect
pricesanddemand.
This sectiondescribesthe selectionof the sampleto analysethe effectsof the airline
deregulation
processinsidetheEuropean
Union.In theexistingliteraturetheobservation
thatis commonlyemployedis theroute.Averagefares,or percentileyieldsareemployed
wheneveris possible, global demand, geo-economicvariablesrepresentingthe
characteristics
of theoriginandend-pointcitiesof therouteareamongthemostcommon
variabiesappearingin models.The principalinconvenient
of this kind of studiesis that
they do not take into accountthe big heterogeneitythat can exist in the firms
characteristics,
suchassizeof companies,
airportcontrolin citiesof the routes,costsof
airlines,amongothers.For this reason,in additionto theroutelevelunit of observation,
observations
toroute-aMine
levelareconsidered
in thispaper.
Wehaveemployeda crosssectionof theyear1994.Thisyearwasthelastone,for which
we could obtainthe principalvariableswhich our modelincorporate.We pretendto
maintainthesampleasa basisforfuturestudiesthatcanbefulfilledusingmultipleyearsof
dataconforminga panel.
In the selectionof

the sample, a three stage method was carried out. The criterion
employed in the first stage was used to decide which airports (origins and end-points of the
routes) are going to be selected. The sample includes 33 European clues (more airports are
involved, because some cities like London, Paris or Milan have more titan one airport). The
selection of the cities was done by the importance of the airports, selecting airports of all
the countries of the European Union and Switzerland.
Once the cities were selected, the
second stage focused the attention in the selection of the routes. With 33 cities 528 pairs
can be formed, but for some pairs a direct flight did not exist in the year 1994. We selected
the largest routes for each city, and once a pair was selected, the symmetric pair was
automatically
is included. Some routes were also included at random and in this way we
formed a sample of
least had a flight per
Basically, two cross
other at route-airline
The differences

414 routes. Finally in the third stage we selected the airlines that at
week in the route, forming a sample of 919 route-airline
observations.
sections can be used in the modelling work, one at route level and
level.

between

the two groups

of observations

are that in the route level we use

variables representing
global concepts, like demand, average business class fare, average
high discounted
fare and average tourist class fare. In the observations
at route-airline
level, the individual demand of each firm and the differentiated
fares if exist are used. To
capture the effects of actual competition,

we include a dummy variable

of the two firms is below a threshold figure.
variables can be observed in the models.
The variables were obtained from different
Traffic by Flight Stage (1994) (publication
and OAG
information

A more detailed

if the concentration

of the description

of the

sources. The principal sources that we used are:
from International Civil Aviation Organisation)

World Airline Guide (March, 1994) (a monthly publication
on prices and timetable). Data as distance, number of operators,

with detailed
were obtained

from the ICAO publication Traffic by Flight Stage. Flight frequency, and the number of
indirect alternatives
to any route and the fare in this case was obtained from the ABC
publications.
-7-

4.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGSONDEMANDANDPRICE RESPONSES.

In this sectionwe presentand discussthe resultsof our analysisof the effectsof
concentration
of the market,airport concentration and other factors on demand and air
tares.
On the demand side, the study requires a number
can separate these assumptions
in two different

of input assumptions.
In some sense, we
groups: external issues like population,

income, transport substitutes,
etceteras; and internal issues like price, travel time, waiting
time, size of the plane, etceteras.
Both components,
of course, are important
in the
estimation
made.

of the demand.

It is usual to distinguish

travel by the purpose

for which

it is

There are two principal reasons to do that, first of both, there are some situations in which
institutions play an important role of certain kind of trips. To begin with this, think of the
business market segment. Business fares are mostly paid, not by the travellers themselves,
but by their companies, for whom expenditure
on air travel is a pro-tax price, meanwhile
excursion fares are usually paid personally
by holiday travellers out of post-tax incomes.
This was one of the reasons why airlines originally takes businessmen as a market segment
being in some kind indifferent to pay higher fares. Secondly, the
prices and time varies according to the purpose of the trip. Some
mandatory,
for example
travel by work, than others that can
travelling for holidays. For the same person, the time and space
different.

sensitivity to changes in
kind of trove! are more
be more discretionary,
alternative sets are quite

Air industry is almost an ideal place to study concentration
and prices. There
works touching the topic of concentration
and prices relationship
with respect

are many
to the air

industry. Keeler (1990) was one of the pioneers. Our contribution
to the subject follows
man?, patterns of the preceding papers. We try to explain how the concentration
measures
raise prices and competition
lower them. Our work supports these conclusions
as other
studies that have been reviewed, but we focus our attention in the different contribution
of
the concentration
of the route, concentration
of the airport
indirect routes. This last item is very important because

and possible competition
of the
we firmly believe that there is

likely to be an increasing interest on hubbing as European airlines
policies to compete effectively in the Single European Market.
Hubbing offers an airline a great number of
the transport industry in Europe. The most
new markets that can be served for a fixed
present the following result: an airline with

influencing

demand

are divided

strategic

competitive
advantages in the new situation of
obvious one is the dramatic increasing of the
volume of output. Doganis and Dermis (1989)
a network based on hubbing with one hundred

spokes can offer service in over five thousand
Factors

must adopt

city-pair

markets.

into geo-economic

and service-related,

the former

belong to the group of external variables, although airlines may be still able to control
by selecting alternative markets to serve, the latter are internal to a given market.

them

The most common geo-economic
variables used in the studies of demand are population,
income and distance. It can be seen in the literature review that there is no a uniform result
relating

to the population

effect.

In some cases, as in Fridstr6m

-8-

and Thune-Larsen

(1989)

and Fleming and Ghobrial(1994),populationelasticities
areabove one. in others,as in
Rendarajuand Thamizh-Arasan (1992)populationelasticity
isunder one.Anyway, thisis
nota surprising
resultbecausemany different
characteristics
of thedemand and population
can exist in the studies analysed. Some differences can also exist in the specifications
of
the equations to estimate these results.
Something
Calderon
different
holidays

similar

occurs when income

elasticities

are observed

(1995) suggested there exist some differences
type of travellers. Business travellers tend
travellers,

The distance

rellecting

is a variable

also their different

but in this case as Jorge-

on income sensitiveness
across the
to be less income sensitive
than

price elasticities.

that has a large influence

in the determination

of the demand.

As

Russon and Hollingshead
(1989) pointed out, the distance has two important effects with
different signs. If the distance increases the air travel begins to be more convenient, due to
the higher speed, comtbrt and safety, but at the same time absolute figures tbr traffic
decreases as more distant cities have a lower degree of social and economic interaction due
among other things to the increased transport costs. It appears a well known problem of
circularity. Hypothetically
there will exist a limit figure d, for which shorter distances, the
convenience
effect will outweigh the distance decay, making traffic increase; and for
longer distances
the whole argument
will be reversed. Taking these two effec:s into
account, Russon (1990) found that the traffic maximising
distance for non-stop air trips
made by jets was about .360 miles.
The need to cross sea water has a critical
modes
of transport
in terms of travel
establishment.
geographical

influence about
times and the

the competitiveness
of other
possibilities
of the service

A current and major example of how new developments
can overcome some
constraints and alter the modal split of the traffic between two cities is the

opening of the Channel Tunnel. The introduction
tunnel has affected seriously the modal balance

of high speed rail services through the
in London-Paris
and London-Brussels

rO utes.

The service-related
factors include some quality attributes of the service and the price. You
can use a large number of variables to measure the quality of the utility, as frequency, size
of the aircraft, travel of time, number of stops, connecting time, etceteras. Note that except
for some constraints
as a limited fleet size, indivisibilities
in aircraft size, congestion of
some airports, political interference
in the objectives
function of the firms, the airlines
would set these attributes
marginal revenue.

where

the marginal

cost

of each

equals

the corresponding

The frequency is perhaps the most important factor determining
the service quality, in air
travel. A higher number of flights allows the company to be near the average passenger
desires of travel departures. The frequency has been used as a predatory device. Incumbent
airlines
starting

have been sometimes accused of responding to the entry of a rival company by
frequency wars, flooding the route with such extra capacity that the new entrant

find too difficult maintaining this new route profitable. Incumbents
try to undermine a
competitor's
service by the bracketing scheduling departures'
practice. It consists on the
scheduling
departures
to take off just before and just after the rival's flights, Hanlon
(I994).

-9-

Somerecentstudieshaveusedaircraftsizeas a qualityof servicevariable,the common
hypothesis
beingthatlargeraircraftarepreferredto smallerones.It could beexpecteda
priori thatthe sensitivityto aircraftsizevarieswith thedistance,for as the timespenton
the planeincreases
thesizecanbeusedasa proxyof thecomt'or_
utilky enjoyedby the
passenger.
The resultsobtainedby the works of Ghobrial(1993) and Pickrell (I984)
confirmthehypothesis.
Bothauthorspresentsignificantandpositiveeffectsof thesizeof
theplaneondemand.
Traveltime canbesplit in threedifferentcomponents.
Thefirst of the threeis thetime
spentgettingto the airportandfrom the destinationairportto the final destination.This
oneis "knownastheserviceaccess
time.Thetimein theairport,checkingin andwaitingto
board,andthe time in thedestinationairportto pick up the luggageis consideredasthe
handlingtime.Andfinally thetimein theplanethatit is measured
asthetime thatelapses
fromboardingthe planeto disembarkingin the final destination.
Theserviceaccess_ime
varieswith theairportlocationandairportfacilitiesrelativeto theinitial origin-destination
cities.This time is linkedwith the conceptof intermodalityin the airportsbecause
it is
l_ighiyaffectedfor themodeof transportaffordableto go to/fromtheairports.In thecase
of the airportsconnected
by railways,the accesstime is inferior becauseof the leve!of
congestion

of the roads in the majority

of the cities of the more developed

countries.

The

handling time depends on the service levels of the airports and this is usually out of the
control of the companies.
The on-board
time is a function of the speed of tf_e piane.
Nowadays
most of the jet planes travel at similar speeds and these are used uniformly
across the different routes. There are some exceptions
with the supersonic planes, but these
are more appropriate
for long-haul routes where the advantages
of their superior speed
compensate their higher average cost of the service.
Fare is the most important variable in determining
the total cost of a trip. Just as other
variables studied, the sensitivity
of demand to fare changes will vary across passenger
types. Price eIasticity will depend on the income level of the passenger as well as on the
journey purpose. Higher income passengers and those trave!ling on business who normally
obtain their
inelastic.

tickets

paid

tbr, will generally

conform

the segment

of the market

more

Airlines have responded to these different needs through marketing
different fare-types.
Anyone who has bought an airline ticket will know it is possible to pay any one of a large
number of prices to fly a given route. Fares vary with time of travel, whether peak or offpeak; with class of travel reflecting different on-board services, whether first, business or
economy; with the
of the fare, whether
Saturday night; and
and the ages of any
Limits

iength of stay at the destination reflecting in some cases the flexibility
it exceeds a certain number of days or weeks, or whether it includes a
with a whole host of other factors such as size of the travelling group
children involved.

on reservation

procedures

are also very

common,

including

requests

to make full

payment at time of reservation, and establishing
a minimum period for purchase prior to
the departure known as advanced purchase restrictions.
There are also common penalties
when you want to alter the departure time or the date after the purchase.
Further, more
focused restrictions
can be imposed
through
the possible candidates
to purchase
a
determined
fare, the eligibility conditions.
These can vary from ranging in the age, the
social status, the peripheral
regions. You can include in this group, special fares for
- 10-

children,or for peoplebelow/above
a given age,or for students,or retiredpeople,or
citizensof adetermined
peripheral
region.
The multiplicity of fare categoriesis often so greatthat for scheduledserviceby a
particularairlineon aparticularroutetherecanbemorethan50separate
farespublishedin
airlinetariff manuals.Thevariationbetweenfarescanbesuchthatit is possiblefor two
passengers
sitting nextto eachotheron the sameflight, andenjoyingexactlythe same
quaiityof in-flight service,to find thatoneis payingvery muchmorethanthe other,in
someextremescasesevenmorethandouble.
Fareelasticitiescanalsobeexpected
to varywith thedistance.
In thisrespect,thereis an
obviousphenomena
that hasbeencited manytimes,at shorterdistancesair transport
experience
toughercompetitionfromothermodesof transport,sothatasdistanceincrease
fareelasticitiescouldbeexpectedto decrease.
But evenin comparisons
of routesof the
sameor similar length,someconsiderabledifferencesexist. Within Europe,when
comparisons
aredrawnbetween
citiesin termsof thelowestavailablelevelsof business
or
standardeconomyfares,a deardistinctionemergesbetween
certain'highfare' andsome
'low fare' cities. Frankfurt,Brussels,Parisand Amsterdambelongto the first group.
Levelson routesto othercitiesin Europecanbeasmuchas50 to 75 % abovethelevels
fromlow farecitieslike Athens,London,LisbonandDublin,Hanlon(1994).Somequite
dramaticcomparisons
canbe drawnwhenthe variationin faresfor individualroutesis
combinedwith thevariationin faresacrossroutes.Thisis speciallytruewhenyoucompare
European
farelevelwiththecomparable
onesin NorthAmerica.Wecanseein theworkof
Guaschand Spiller (1996),the following tablethatcontainthe datafor explainingthe
anteriorargument.

Table 2. Fare comparison
Miles

I

of similar US and European
Route

routes in-1995
Fare ($)

[
t87

Boston-New

216

Washington-New

York
York

106
157

211

London-Paris

214

302

Houston-New Orleans

89

311

Copenhagen-Oslo

296

853

Dallas-Minneapolis

425

887

Frankfurt-Madrid

727
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4.1Specificationof tile demandandpriceequation.
In the demandequationswe are goingto analysethe effectsof marketconcentration,
concentration
of the airports,distance,income,fare,existenceof seain the route,the
competitionof the indirectroutesandthe frequencyon the existingdemandin the air
trafficof theEuropeanUnion.They are based in a cross-section estimation of the carriers'
pertbrmance
in the ),ear 1994. In some aspects this study is very similar to those described
in the previous section, except that we include the effects of competition
and in some sense
airport tmb domination.
We would like to use similar previous fare
employed the 20 'l' percentile, the 50'" percentile

variables
(median),

to the observed

but till this moment

carrier

on the observed

route,

used in Borenstein
(1989). He
and the 80"' percentile fare paid
the state of the art in

Europe is completely
different and we do not know which are the prices that user really
pay. For this reason we use the prices quite similar to those employed
for him, but of
course we limit our attention at the published fares. The interpretation
of the coefficients of
many variables is quite complicated, as it was seen in the previous section. We "know that a
single variable can have influence in more than one of the variables that are being used in
the models. In these cases we know that some of the hypothesis of the linear model are not
t'ulfi[led, the independence
of the error and the dependent
variables,
producing
biased
estimations. The umt of observation is an airline route pair in the year 1994.
In the price equation we are going to analyse
affected to market efficiency.
The data set includes

observation

how the European

of the companies

deregulation

process

have

that had more than one flight per week.

The variables describing market structure are the observed airline's share of the passengers
transported
in the market and the CR2 index, constructed
from the shares of all carriers in
the market.
airline's
structure

The

structure

of the market

at the origin-point

airports

is studied

by the

shares of passenger enplanements
and the Herfindahl
index of these shares. The
of the possible competition
of the indirect routes is measured by the number of

flights that exist in each route that have one stop.
In the equation estimated coefficents
can be interpreted as an elasticity.
We define here the variables

are measured

and the expected

in logarittunic

form and for this reason

effects are discussed:

Paxperf is the number of passengers carried by the company in the route. This variable
is expected to have a negative sign when it was used as endogenous
in the price
equation.
Distance is the non-stop kilometres from one endpoint of the route to the other. One
would expect distance to have a positive effect in the demand, but this effect is not
clear. Also in the price equation
Gdp is the gross

domestic

this variable

product

is expected

with a positive

of the origin city measured

in ratios

sign.
expressing

the

relative position respect to the average of the European Union. The basic source for this
variable is Eurostat's
1994 "Yearbook of Regional Statistics".
The per capita income
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measurechosenis the averagefor the regionin which the airport is located.The
expected
signis positivebothfor thedemand
andpriceequation.
Competis thedummyvariablethatreflectstheexistingcompetition.It is oneif the
shareof the two mainoperatorsis lessthan0.98.The expectedsignfor the demand
equationis positivebecause
we canassume
thatthedemandis higherwhenthereexist
morecompetitiveforcesin the market.In the priceequationthe expectedsignis the
oppositeexpecteingthat a higherlevel of competitionin a routemay cut taresan
increase
efficiency.
Herfaeis the Herfindahlindexof themarketsharesof theemplanements
of thestartpointairport.Theexpectedsignis negativein thedemandequationandpositivein the
priceequation,because
of thepossiblemonopolyabuseof thecompanies
thatcontrol
anairport,limitingthecompetitionof thepossibleentrantsin themarket.
Fareis measured
by two differentvariablesthatyield two differentestimations
in the
pricemodel,thehighestdiscounted
farein therouteandtheeconomicfareintheroute.
In thedemandequationit hasbeenusedthetouristclassasa returnfare.Theexpected
signsin thedemandequations
arenegativebecause
theymeasure
thepriceelasticities.
Fcis thenumberof flightswith onestopthatexistin theobserved
route.Wecanexpect
a negativesignbecause
thisis a substitute
alternative
to fly betweentwocities.
Seais adummyvariabletakingthevalueof onewhenevertherouteover-fliesthesea.
Wecanexpecta positivesignbecause
theexistence
of sealimits thealternative
modes
tobecompetitive.
Freqis the numberof directflights thatexistin the observedroutefor eachof the
companies.
Wecanexpecta positivesign.

4.2Demandequation.
Thedemandequationestimatedwith the entiresampleof individualobservations
is the
following:

logpaxperf

= 7.018 + 0.664 log dist + 0.058 log gpd + 0.212 log compet
18.5

9.70

1.06

6.68

- 0.0091 log Herfae - 0.576 log fare + 0.002 F¢ + 0.016 Sea + 1.028Freq
-2.02

The explained

variation

-5.503

-3.41

0.51

is well above of 85% in the estimation.

77.9

variable

and

the existence
of sea have not a significant
impact and sometimes
do not present
expected signs. This result is not too rare because we are using in this estimation
sample of individual firms.

the
the
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The income

i'he recuitof distanceindicatesthatthepositiveimpactin termsot"traveltimedi/ferentiais
with othermodesof transportation
outweighsthe negativeimpactof a lesseninteraction
between
thecities.Theimpactsof thevariablesmeasuring
competitionandthedominance
of theairportpresenttheexpectedsignsandtheyindicatequiteclearlythatconcentration
of theroutesandtheairport'sdominance
implylesspossibilitiesto newentrantsto capture
some market share. These results confirm the hypothesis
of the existence of barriers to
entry in the European market. How this issues must be tackled on ought to be a principal
task of the officials

of the EU transport

agency.

The number of flights with one stop present
result confirms

the expected

the idea that once an increasing

sign and is quite significant.

emphasis

on hubbing

This

in the air market

in

Europe wili be developed
for some companies,
these emerging
indirect
routes could
effectively compete with the direct-route
market. So, in spite the net effect is not too big,
we anticipate that this result can be considered as the starting point to observe a dramatic
change in the network of the companies. It is time to re-route the point-to-point
services
through a centrally

located hub in the nowadays-European

network.

The fare estimated parameters
(price elasticities) are too consistent
with the expectations.
We have obtained a range for price elasticity of-0.23,-0.57.
The elasticity of the individual
demand obtained for each firm over the week frequency
is positive and quite uniform
around one in the three estimations.
The figure is the highest elasticity in absolute values
m_d it is in the line of the previous estimations
of Jorge-Calderon
(1995), Agar_vall and
Talley (1985), Talley and Schwarz-Miller
(1988) and Ippolito (1981). They obtained
fi-equency elasticities

of 0.94, l, 0.98 and 0.86, respectively.

In fact, demand seems to present unitary frequency elasticity because of the results that we
have obtained from the Wald test for each of the three models. In the specification
of this
parameter we cannot conclude
level. This result is concordant
Talley.
Now

we can understand

that this was different from one with the 95% confidence
with the hypothesis presented
in the work of Agarwai1 and

better

the

strategic

behaviour

that

perform in order to reduce the danger of potential entrants. We
bracketing strategy of the departure's
timetable. It is certainly
interpreted in other direction, which consists in giving more
characteristics
of the sample with high income travellers being
flights.

some

companies

seem

to

have mentioned before the
true that this result can be
importance
to the market
served with more frequent

The following equation presents the results of the same structural equation using the route
as the unit of observation.
In this case, we concentrate
our attention
with a different
approach.

We are not interested

behaviour of the company,
the European market.

Iogpaxperf

in knowing

the

individual

but the overall performance

effects

of the demand

to the

in the air industry

= 6,603 + 0.689 logdist + 0.009 log gpd + 0.094 logcompet
- 0.069 logHerfae - 0.544 log fare + O.O00Fc + O.O09Sea + 1.116Freq
-I._
-4.46
-o,o46
0.277
6_,s
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level of the
in

Welosethesignificantimpactof the dominance
of theairportandthe non-directroutes.
Theseeffectsare lost in the overalldemandof the routebecauseit canbe seenas a
strategicbehaviourof the companies.
However,therestof the effectsarevery similarto
thoseonesdescribed
in thebeforehand
models.Someclearpatternshavebeenobtained:
theunitaryfrequency
elasticity;thepositiveeffectof competitionondemand;seacrossing
donotgenerate
demand;
demandis priceinelasticwith respectto everyfares,this provides
thrthersupportfor thehypothesis
of relativelyhighbusiness
or highcomposition
of traffic;
the mostdiscountedfarespresentvaluesof priceelasticityin absolutevalueslesserthan
theeconomicclass.
Frequency
is animportantattributeof theservicequalityandproductdifferentiation.When
planningtheserviceona givenmarket,Pollack(1982)determined
thatthe airlinesfacea
trade-offbetweenfrequencyandplanesize.Pickrell (1984)andGhobrial(1993)have
reportedthat the demandis moreelasticwith respectto frequencythanto planesize.
Moreover,they coincidein that frequencyshareis associated
with morethana linear
relationwith the marketshare.For this reasonairlineswant to move for obtaininga
competitiveadvantage
throughhigh frequencyservice,this strategyis very suitablein
particularwith thehighyield segment,
composed
of passengers
with a high valueof time.
Thisvariablewouldacquiremoreimportance
in thedevelopingof thehubbingoperations.
Theneteffectof hubbingondemandwill dependontheextentto whichgreatertravelling
timesandthe inconvenience
of havingto wait in a connectedintermediate
airportare
outweighedby the increasein flight frequency.
Anyway,in thederegulation
of theU.S.
marketFleming(1991),Ivy (1993)andPhilips(1987)showthat the increasehubbing
causea dramaticincrease
of concentration
atthelargerairports.Empirically,otherauthors
asBerry(1990),Borenstein
(1991)andGhobrialandSoliman(1992)detecta significant
effectof hubdominanceon the relativemarketsharein the routestouchingthatairport.
Borenstein
(1991)showedthatthetravellerswill preferto usean airlinewhichtheyhave
usedbefore.For this reason,airlinesawareness
in the regionis a factorto take into
account,speciallyin the Europe'sair industry,wheresomenationalbarriershavebeen
identified.
Thereis a mixedeffectwhenwespeakaboutthehubdominance.
Foroneside,Morrison
andWinston(1990)haveshowedthathubairlinespresenta higherpropensityto enterin
newmarkets.Followingthis argumentonecansuggestthatstrongpresence
providesthe
airlineswith a goodbaseformwhichto enterin newmarkets.However,this canbeseen
from the incumbent'sperspective,
as Strassman
(1990)foundthatboth the numberof
endpointscitiesatbothendsof therouteandthenumberof incumbents
with a hubatone
or bothendpointslimit in a significantwaytheprospects
of newentrants.So,it seemsthat
hubbing,throughproductdifferentiation
andprobablysunkcosts,is a gooddefenceagainst
entry.
4.3 Priceequation
In this sectionwe analysehow deregulationprocessin the Europeanair markethas
affectedto marketefficiency.Withthisobjectivewehaveestimated
a pricefunctionusing
as endogenous
variablethe fare.Wehaveestimatedtwo modelsfor touristfare anda
modelwherethe endogenous
variableis the higherdiscountofferedin the route.As
exogenous
variablewe haveincludedin thefunctionalform the variabledistance,gross
-15-

2omc_ficproduc_of theorigincity, theHerfindalindexin theroute,the dummyvariable
competandthe variableFc usedin the former modelof demand.The resultsof the
esmnation
tbr eachtarearethefollowing:

logy

= 1.678 * 0.583 log dist + 0.307 log gpd -0.048 log compet +
o._l
o.oi
o.oi
0.009
O.101 log Herfae - 0.024 log pcz_perf - 0.0006 Fc
OlO[]
O.OOJ
OmO001

log desc = 2.29+ 0.461 log dist + 0.173 log gpd - 0.053 log compet
0.23

0.02

0.02

+ 0.058 log Herfae - 0.033 log paxperf
0.02

As we could

observe

+

0.01

0,008

- O.0007 Fc - O.03 2 ntarpax
0.0002

0.012

fi'om data for a same route there were important

differences

in the

fare level depending
on the origin country. The positive sign of the variable gpd can be
reflecting this effect. This can be combined with the effects of the negative sign for the
variable compet, reflecting that the level of fare also depend on the level competence
in the
origin market.
The value of the coefficient
for the variable
conclude that when competition
is introduced

compet in the second model
in the air market the response

permits to
of carriers

cutting prices is more important in the high discount fare class, than in tourist or business
class because the former correspond to more elastic market segment.
The variable

Herfae

presents

a positive

sign which

is implying

that airport

control

are

affecting to the level of the fare in the route. So the slot control in the origin airport appears
as a barrier that actually the liberalisation process has not eliminated.
Finally as we can observe by the sign of the variable Fe the existence of indirect
substitute determine the level determine the level of the fare in the direct routes too.
Both the variable distance (dist) and demand
sign respectively
as was expected initially.

(paxperJ)

presents

the positive

routes

and negative

As was observed
initially from data the level of fare could change for a same route
depending on the origin country, so we can find that for a same pair origin-destine
there is
important diferences in prices depending on origin where you bought the ticket. This can
be explained by two factors: on one hand by the level of income of the origin country in the
way that countries with high gross domestic output can present higher level of fares, But
also the level of competition in the origin market may be influencing
this effect but with
the contrary sign, so routes with a high level of competition
lower levels of fare.

in the origin

The level of concentration
and consequently
the level of deregulation
directly and significantly
to fare paid by users. So an important barrier
-16-

market

present

in one route affect
that actually remain

in the European
air marketis the slot possession
by incumbentcarriers.This permitm
manycasesto have a dominant position in the market even that represent a real barrier tbr
new entrants in the market. This can be limiting the complete
carried on by the Commission to liberalise the market.
Market deregulation

has greater

development

effect on the fare of more elastic

segments

of the measures

of demand.

So

_iie deregulation
measures has developed that carriers offers a high range of discount tare in
order to obtain a greater consumer surplus of the demand but that indirectly generate more
efficient situation in the market.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

As a consequence

of limiting

the possibility

of new entrants

in the market because

of the

privileges that flag incumbent airlines enjoy in their airports of their influence, there is only
a 6% of the continental routes that can be considered
as competitive
according to our own
definition of competition
in the estimation
of the models, and this one it is not too
stringent. In this case we have shown that the demand is below the levels it could be
achieved by the likely monopoly power that it is exerted by the pairs of national flag
carriers. In particular, it is necessary to develop a transparent policy trying to establish the
common-user
access rights to the principal airport of the E.U.
The analysis shows that we have more goals to get by introducing initiatives to obtain more
competition
in the routes and at the same time it is clear that competition is possible and
desirable to some extent. The airport at Brussels has the same landing capacity as London's
Heathrow, but only half of the traffic. Its refusal to create new landing slots, on ground that
there is not enough room, it is a serious barrier to entry that can be exploited by Sabena,
Belgium's
national airline. In addition, some new entrants airlines complain that in many
cases the handling labour of the airports favour the national
96/67/CE form 1996 intended to prevent monopolies
in airport

carrier. An E.U. directive
services, but this directive

in some experts' opinions has been watered down by the member states to the point where
it will achieve virtually nothing. Swifter justice and a stronger directive on airport services
would do much to help new entrants. To give newcomers
a chance to break into new
routes, the Commission needs to create a proper market in slots.
In spite of the previous paragraphs we cannot minimise the real advantages and benefits
that European citizens enjoy in these years after deregulation,
and that the real change is
going to be observed in the future after this year 1997, when we can say that the complete
market deregulation
now have developed
charter

services

is fulfilled. The paper that can be played by the companies that till
their strategic movements
to the competitive segment of regional and

can be higher that the expectations

that have been said by some analysts.

Cross entry and the signature of contracts with some companies can change the nowadays'
network, and some low-priced services can emerge from this new situation.
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6.

References.

Agarwall, V mad Talley, W.K. (1985). "T'. : demand for international ai: passenger service
provided by U.S. carriers". International J, urnal of Transport Economic :. 12(1). 63-70
Berry, S.T. (1990). "Airport
Review. 80(2). 394-399.
Borenstein,

S (1989).

airline industry".
Borenstein,

S. (1991). "The dominant

96/67/CE

Quarterly

.american

and mark<

Economic

power

in the U.S.

344-365.
in multiprodu.','

_f Economics.

industries:

evidence

106. 1237-! 266.

de 1996. Acceso

:. mercado

de asistencia

de ta comunicad.

"Competitic._

Fleming, D.K. and GhobriaI,
travel demand". Transportation
Fridstrom,
the entire

dominance

fi m advantage

Journa:

N (1989). "Lessens

D. K. (1991).
45(2). 181-210

differentiation"

20(3).

dei Consejo de 15 de octubre

R and Dennis,

Fleming,
Quarterly.

product

"'Hubs and high :_es:

en tierra en los aeropuertos
Doganis,

at

Rand Journal of Econor.':cs.

from the U.S. airlines".
Directiva

presence

in hubbing".
in

the

U.S.

Airline

g-:siness.

airline

:.:,_ustry",

A (199a)."An
analysis of the d:':e:minants
plannin _and technology.
18(1). 5%44.

March.

42-47.

Transportation

of regional

air

L and Thune-Larsen,
H (!989). "An econometric
':r travel demand model for
conventional
network: the case of Norway".
Trar ipor_ation Research.
23(B).

(3).231-233.
Ghobrial,

A (1993).

gateways".

" A model

International

to estimate

Journal ofTr

the

deman<

nsport Economics.

between

U.S.

and

foreign

20 3). 271-283.

Ghobrial, A. mid Soliman, S.Y. (I9 2). "An assessment
c," some factors influencing
the
competitive
strategies of airlines in .omestic markets". Imamational
Journal of Transport
Economics.
19(3). 247-258.
Guasch, J.L. and Spiller, P.T. (19%). Managing the regu.atory process:
issues and The Latin America and C 'ribbean story. The \_,orld Bamk
Han[on, P (1994). Pricing policie
in International
Ai Transport:
discriminatory
and predator?' be:aviour
for airline
=ompetition.

design,

concepts,

The implications
The University

of
of

Birn_ingham.
Ippolito,

R.A.

(1981).

Journal of Transport

"Estimati

Economics

4 airline
ac "Policy.

demand'Ath

quality

Ivy, R.L. (1993). "Variations
in i.,.tb service in the I .S. domestic
Journal of Transport Geography.
; ,.4). 211-218.

-18-

of service

variables".

air transport

industry".

15(1). 7-I ;.

Jorge-Calderon,
J.D.(i995). Prospects
for entryandcompetitionin thederegulated
E.U.
Airline Industry.Leeds. (unpublished PHD thesis)
Keeler, T. (1980).
(eds). Case Studies
Morrison,
American

"the revolution in Airline
in Regulation. Boston

Regulation".

S.A. and Winston. C. (1990). "The dynamics
Economic Review. 80(2). 389-393.

In L.W.

Weiss

of airline pricing

and M. Klass

and competition".

Philips, L.T. (1987). "'Air carrier activity at major hub airports and changing
practices in the United States' airline industry". Transportation
Research. 21A(3).
Pickrell,

D.H. (1984).

The demand

C.V. (eds) Deregulation
Massachusetts.
22-49
Pollack,
M
Transportation

and

for short-haul

:he New

Russon,

M.G. (1990).

political
Review.

boundaries
and a complex
26 (4). 323-337.

Russon,

M.G. and Hollingshead,

Strassman,
Economics

air service.

"Iterative

market".

D.L. (1990).
and Statistics.

estimation

function

C.A. (1989). "Aircraft
Journal

A (1988).

passenger-cargo
carriers in a deregulated
Economics.
15(2). 159-I 68.

some

J.R. and Oster, Jr,
Press.

Cambridge,

design

trade-offs".

for air travel

Logistics

demand".

flow sensitivity,

Economics.

in the deregulated

"The demand

variable

16(3). 297-311
airlines".

for air services

International

to

and Transportation

size as a quality of service

of Transport

environment".

-19-

MIT

of air passsengers

of distance".

"Potential competition
72(4). 696-702

Talley, W.K. and Schwarz-Miller,

planning:

V (1992). "Mode!ling
118(3). 371-380.

nonlinear

International

In Meyer,

Entrepreneurs.

(I982).
"Airline
route-frequency
Research. 16A(2). 149-159.

Rendaraju,
V.R. and Thamizh-Arasan,
Journal of Transportation
Engineering.

in a short-haul

Airline

interline
215-221

Review

provided

Journal

of

by air

of Transport

"A4"

Airports

and Aviation

(SIG)

_.?

PRIORITIES

AND STRATEGY
FOR LIBERALISATION
EUROPEAN
AIRLINES.

Sophie Briand, Diplome
University, Paris, France,

Dr Alex

Kelvin,

Scheme

d'etudes
and

Tutor

specialisees

en transport

for International

MBA

IN THE

international,

and

MAm

Sorbonne

International

Business, Department
of Managemem
and Business Information
Systems,
School, University of Hertfordshire,
Hertford SG138QF, United Kingdom.

Business

O

'_

1

INTRODUCTION.

This paper assesses
how successfully
liberalisation
increases contestablity
in the
European
air transportation.
Impacts on the customers and the airlines are examined.
Examination
is based on the theories
of contestability,
strategic
partnerships
and
networks,
and personal research.
Liberalisation
is the removal of statutory barriers
and opening up of the sector for competition.
In the course &the 1980s-1990s,
over
80 countries
were involved in deregulation.
The wider aspects of macroeconomic
reforms such as liberalisation of trade and prices and demand management are beyond
the framework of this paper.
Today

the national

public companies

still provide

an important

share of air transport

service in Europe. A number of them continue to get subsidies. For the last ten years
or so, liberalisation pressures have been increasing in air transport.
Several arguments
are commonly used in favour of regulation. The natural monopoly can be presented as
most beneficial.
For this reason, in many western countries quasi-monopolies
axe
common
in utilities.
Theoretically,
regulation
aims at accommodating
the public
interest by reducing social costs of provision and upgrading benefits from externalities.
Protective
regulation still manifests itself in pricing, restrictions on entry/e,'dt, capacity,
public investment, access to funding and taxes. But contestable pressures encourage
cost-benefit
considerations
and improve the match between the volume and the scope
of demand and supply. The administration
becomes leaner, simpler and more flexible.
Besides,
the inflationary
pressures
were attributed
to the rigid framework
of
regulation. Well, what are the best ways to liberalise air transport in Europe?
Out of 1,012 airports which are accessible to the international traffic, Europe has 380,
i.e. 37.5%.
Ten busiest routes in the world include Paris-London in the first place and
Amsterdam-London
in the fifth place. The London-New
York route ranks second in
the world. Six states are most active in the EEC: the United Kingdom,
France,
Germany, Netherlands,
Italy and Spain.
They account for about 25% of the world
total passenger traffic against approximately
31% in 1978. The United Kingdom, with
10.2%,
holds the second place closely following the United States (10.3%). Japan
accounts tbr 6%. Between 1978 and 1988, the passenger traffic increased by 4.8% per
year in Europe, while it grew by 7% in the world. In North America it grew by 8.4%,
and in the Asian-Pacific

area it grew by 10.4%.

In 1993, in terms of freight traffic,
Germany,
France, the United Kingdom,
Netherlands,
Italy, Belgium and Spain accounted for one third of the world turnover
compared
to 37.5% in 1978.
On the basis of total turnover, i.e. passengers
and
traffic, three European
airlines are among ten largest in the world,
i.e. Lufthansa,
British Airways and Air France. But only British Airways and Swissair appear
reasonably profitable.
In 1991 at the bottom of the recession, there were almost no
openings
of new routes in Europe, while about fifty, new routes were considered
common in the previous years. At the same time, many secondary routes were closed,
and orders in new planes fell by 43%.
By the year 2,000 the number of annual flights in Europe will increase from 3.6 million
to seven million. The express courier service is expanding by 15% per year. Certain

European
citiesarebecoming
hubsfor multinationals,
e.g.Brussels
for TNT and UPS. But the annual losses associated

for DHL, Cologne
with congestion were estimated at

_4 million per year for British Airways, DEM200 million for Luflhansa, and FFR2.00
million for Air France. For the mid-1990s, the annual cost of congestion
in Europe
was estimated at approximately
$5 billion. It appears that this can double by the year
2,000. The majority of flights in Europe use the space of at least three states. For
example, the Amsterdam-Nice flight uses the national spaces of Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg,
France and Switzerland.
Noise reduction lengthen the routings to avoid
flying over the towns at low altitudes.
competing carriers in North Atlantic which
for ,,he European airlines. The American
USA and service about 70% of traffic with
Concentration

and

globalisation

are

Price competition
is tough between 40
represents about one third of the turnover
airlines benefit from air deremalation in the
France.

on the

way.

The

European

carriers

have

to

compete with the American giants and the ag_essive
Asian companies.
The Asian
fleet is most modern, and staff is two or three times cheaper. Co-operation
agreements
are popular in order to limit expenses.
Atlas Group in I968 and KSSU Group in 1969
were among the first to develop strategic partnerships.
Later British Airways, Alitalia,
KLM, Sabena and Swissair collectively created the electronic booking system Galileo.
In 1987 Air France, Luflhansa, Iberia and SAS established the Amadeus system.
The
European
ordinate
partnerships

companies
make joint purchases,
exchange aircraft or jet engines, copilot training and exchange
managers.
The European
companies
need
because they cannot develop

global airline systems on their own.

The European Commission of Civil Aviation decided that a single centre of air traffic
control would be installed in Brussels. A better radar cover and harmonisation
between
42 control centres would result. The USA covers the territory twice as large as Europe
using only 20 control centres.
In 1993, several relevant programmes
were launched.
One of them was ARTAS (ATC radar tracker and server) for which Thomson-CFS
had to design a single radar system in order to replace about 30 existing systems. IBM
and [DE (Interactive
Development
Environments)
had to provide a software platform
common to all European air control systems. There was a project of the European
compulsory
incidents
Reporting System.

analysis

system,

similar

to

the

,_nerican

Aviation

Safe W

Official goals can be imposed on the public airlines from outside. However
the
unofficial objective of corporate
survival tends to remain dominant.
Many of the
airlines survive due to preferential access to capital funding, tax exemptions, restrictive
national regulations
or bilateral agreements.
For a long time, the European
public
airlines have resisted the advent of effective competition
using their influence on
political and legislative
if they are transported
service improve.

decision making. The European customers do not seem to care
by foreign companies,
provided the prices and the quality of
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METHOD.

The aim of liberalisation
services, by removing
l

is to leave the market

controls.

to use contestability

find the prices

Several objectives

to determine

costs, outputs,

2 to replicate contestability when it is insufficient;
3 to establish a set of guidelines for the European
4
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of

prices and the market
and national

structure;

regulations;

and

to assess the impact on the industry.
analytical

partnerships
1
2
3
4

and configuration

are pursued:

method

is based

and networks.

on

the

theories

The following working

of contestability

assumptions

and

strategic

are made:

Competition can be promoted or contestable conditions can be created.
Barriers to entry and exit can be minimized.
Quasi-monopolies
can be ended, resulting in better allocation of resources.
Contestability creates oppommities for innovations and dynamic efficiency.

Consumer
consumers'

surplus
wants

in the
cannot

European
effectively

air transport
is lower than it could be, and
guide the allocation
of resources
and future

supply. Consequently,
there is a scope for improving the range of services so that they
better reflect the evolving demand. Biased pricing results in poorer services and
enhanced costs. Tariffs did not appear to encourage the best use of the air transport
facilities. The rates of growth in the European airports have been lower than in the of
the world.
Moreover,
the tariffs provided
suboptimal
guidance
for corporate
investment/divestment
decisions.
The institutional
and motivational
constraints
checked the diffusion
of benefits from new investments.
In a more contestable
environment,

the demand

higher benefits.

would become

The highest mark-up

more elastic,

is attained

under

and the customers

could

quasi-monopoly.

reap

But under

growing contestability,
new entries are encouraged.
Capacity and provision of services
expand beyond the level which assures the highest unit mark-up.
This is advantageous
to the customers.
Liberalisation
increases capacity supply and diversify the range of
services.
The theory of contestability
provided basis for the endogenous
determination
of cost
functions, and market structures.
The market structure is considered sustainable if at
the existent prices costs are covered and there exists no output-price
combination
for
potential entrants that can yield economic profits.
Entry costs represent the critical
mass of minimum investment which a firm must make before it can assume operations
(Ansoff,

1987).

The Sherman

Act (1890)

enacted anti-trust

legislation.

Big firms' efficiency

had been

rationalised
constraints

by economies of scale. The role of regulation was seen as setting legal
on natural monopolies. The adverse effects of rivalry were emphasized in

the context

of predatory

competition.

applicable to the air transport
from
indivisible
transport
simultaneously.

It is essential

However

the perfectly

because the important
infrastructures
which
is to make

entry

competitive

economies
provide

model

of scope
multiple

is not

originate
services

and exit as free as possible.

In

diversifyingthe rangeof services,emphasis
fromlargescalefor oneserviceshiftsto
multi-servicepartnerships
andnetworks.Rapidadvances
in informationtechnology
andtelecommunications
helpto widenchoicesfor thecustomers.
The behaviourof existingfirmsand likely entrantsis treatedasymmetrically.
The
presentfirmstry to meetthe totaldemand
atthe existingprice.Thelatententrantscan
coveronlya fractionof demandat theprice. It is assumed
thatthe existingfirmsdo
not reactimmediatelyto the new entrantsofferinga lower price. The shorterthe
reactionof theavailable
firms,thelesstheopportunityof a profitableentryto succeed.
Success
of potentialentriesdepends
onthe priceaftertheentry.
The original dissertation(Briand 1995)coversthe assumptions
and mathematical
formulationof identicalcost functions,representative
firm, static and dynamic
framework of ultra-free entry, and the primacy of potential competition.
It has been
shown that the contestable assumptions are either too restrictive such as the absence of
entry and exit barriers, or logically incoherent e.g. the non-reaction
of existing firms to
new entrants.
Despite its imperfections,
the theory plays an important
role in the
renewal of the market structures and provides guidelines for regulation.
Contestable
pressures

are considered

effective when the market

requires

little regulation.

The framework
of strategic networks is complementary
to contestability
in finding
new market configurations.
The purpose of flexible strategic partnerships is to respond
quickly to the accelerating
change in customers'
preferences,
competition
and
technology.
The concept of strategic partnerships focuses on positioning firms in the
production

chain so that value to the customers

The most

significant

feature

of deregulated

can become
sectors

is that

optimal (Webster,
the price

1992).

differentiation

increases for short distances but decreases for long distances. It seems that stronger
price discrimination
on short distance trips is conditioned
by a finer segmentation
of
the customers.
The important test of deregulation
is whether the consumer surplus
and other indicators

3

of collective

well-being

improved.

DISCUSSION.

In October 1978 President Carter published his Airline Deregulation
Act. The US
experience was important for subsequent deregulation
in other markets. In 1986 the
European Court of Justice ruled that the Competition
Articles of the Treaty of Rome
should be applied to the EC air services. In December
1987 the European
ministers
agreed on a three-year programme
of gradual liberalisation.
Entry was made a little
easier, with a number of airlines allowed
to operate
in the dense markets.
A
considerable
freedom was granted for carriers
to serve thinner routes with small
aircraft
Capacity and pricing restrictions
have to be eased. The airlines from one
country would be able to hold up to 60°,/o of the capacity in each city-pair market. The
airlines with lower costs would be able to introduce lower fares and practice discount
fares.
Finally, there have been significant moves towards competition throu_
granting of the
Fifth Freedom Opportunities.
The classification of international
traffic was set by the

ChicagoConference
on InternationalCivil Aviationin

1944.

In five categories

traffic, the nationality of the airline counts, not the nationality of the passengers.
First
Freedom grants the right to fly over another country without landing.

of
The
The

Second Freedom allows a technical stop in another country for refuelling or repairs.
The Third Freedom gives the right to take passengers or cargo in the home country of
the airline and carry them to a destination
in a foreign country.
The Fourth Freedom
gives the right to bring passengers of a foreign origin to a destination in the home
country. The Fifth Freedom means the right to collect passengers or cargo from other
countries and take them to a destination that is not in the home country of the airline.
Most countries grant the first two freedoms. But since the following three freedoms
involve the establishment
of scheduled
bilateral basis. The Bermuda agreement

airline services, these must be granted on the
linked the Fifth Freedom to capacity. However

the Fifth freedom is commonly not granted.
and restricts displacing through competition.

This puts a limit on changing

networks,

For example, Virgin Airlines is unable to compete for Air France passengers
if the
United Kingdom is not part of the itinerary.
The airlines should be in the position to
choose hubs and experience fair competition on a route-by-route
basis.
The USA can
permit a European carrier to conduct a service to New York via Montreal, but carriage
of traffic only between Montreal and New York is not allowed.
In the Second
Bermuda Agreement the USA accepted a number of such services east of London.
The new American approach is to remove from bilateral agreements regulation of the
Fifth Freedom traffic, frequency and capacity. Airlines from one EC country
were
allowed to carry traffic between points in two other countries, providing not more than
30% of the up-lift consisted of locally originating traffic.
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland favour the open European
sky. The domestic market from the Heathrow
airport used to be the monopoly of
British Airways. Now access to others is much easier and there are virtually no price
controls.
Since 1983, the UK signed a number of bilateral agreements for air services.
These agreements
allow open entry, intense price competition
and they are almost
completely free in capacity scheduling.
But the Mediterranean
countries prefer to
carry their own and numerous foreign tourists without competition.
Yet in June 1994
France was forced by Brussels to open its Orly airport
to British Airways and its
subsidiaries such as TAT. In addition, the most profitable Paris-Toulouse
and ParisNice routes were given to competition.
This change can have serious financial
consequences
since the generated surplus was used to cross-subsidize
deficits on many
routes with public service characteristics.
Operational costs of the European airlines are higher compared
Asian rivals. The air links are considerably shorter in Europe.

to their American and
The number of highly

profitable routes is limited. Social constraints
are stronger in Europe. However
in
September 1992 the USA and Netherlands signed an open-sky agreement which allows
their airlines to fly without restrictions
in the air space of both countries.
This
agreement

allows

the USA to better

control

the transatlantic

Lutlhansa signed a similar agreement
and other agreements
agreements appear to be favourable to the American airlines.
have secured 19 fights over the coastal
like to be able to negotiate by itself.

traffic in Europe.

traffic

flows.

In 1994

can follow.
Bilateral
The American airlines

Therefore,

Brussels

would

The following areasseemmostimportantfor regulation:predatorypricing,ticket
conditions,financialtransparency,safety,and allocationof airport slots. The
predatorybehaviour impliesacceptinga short-termlossleadingto a monopolistic
position.The attractionof suchstrategyis reducedby extendingthe periodof loss.
Besides
routingsandnetworkconfigurations,
slotallocationis critical. Airlinesserving
a particularroutewill not be competingfairlyunlessthey haveaccessto equivalent
slotsat eachendof the link. The usualmethodof slot allocationat the European
airportsis basedon 'grandfatherrights',i.e.if anairlineuseda particularslot at the
sametimelastyear,it will get the slotthefollowingyear. Scheduling
committees
at
theairportsaremadeup of representatives
of themajorairlines,e.g.BritishAirwaysat
Heathrow.Thisputsnewentrantsat a disadvantage.
Sincethe slotsareallocatedto
airlinesratherthan to routes,the big carriershave the flexibility to deal with
competitiononeachspecificroutewhilethesmallerairlinesareunableto respond.
Theairports
will

retain several monopoly

characteristics.

Baggage

handling,

ticketing,

duty free sales, accommodation
and catering are airport services.
The passengers
cannot leave the airport for a drink or a snack. The interests of the airport operators
will not completely
coincide
with those of the customers
or local inhabitants.
Customers
need to be directly represented
in the decision making on running the
airports. Since the airports have significant impacts on their environment,
there is a
need to take the inhabitants' views into account.
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CONCLUSION.
purpose

of this paper

was

to outline

priorities

for

liberalising

European

air

transport.
Although the empirical evidence from the US air industry has not fully
supported all contestability
assumptions,
prices have fallen, networks have expanded,
and the customers
have benefited. More slots have been created and competition
increased.
Both price and quality
more regulated markets.

of service

appear

to be better

in America

than in

Similarly, the increased competition in the United Kingdom has improved services. Up
to the 1990s, the liberalisation of air transport in Europe did not seem very effective.
Protection of the incumbent public airlines appears to be detrimental to the customers
and the taxpayers.
But while competition
is on the rise, some governments
still
continue subsidising their national carriers, e.g. Air France. The sheltered markets exist
in quite a number of countries. They result in redistribution
of consumer surplus to the
providers of air services.
However,

successful

companies

use market segmentation

and

positioning

to match

supply and demand. Under pressures of liberalisation, there is a definite move towards
globalisation. With over 400 alliances worldwide, the industry is changing to meet the
needs of global market. Priorities for liberalisation were outlined such as removal of
restrictions
on route access
national public monopolies

and capacity related to the carriers'
nationality, ending
over air transport.
Private companies
or partnerships

appearto provideservices
at lowerfinancialcosts,transaction
costsandsocialcosts.
Thecustomers
express
preferences
for wideningthechoiceof competing
companies.
In liberalised
markets,theregulatoryauthoritiesneedto preventpredatorypricingand
price collusion, maintain high safety standards,make obligatory insurance
arrangements
to compensate
the customersin caseof airlinesgoing bankrupt.
Regulationwould safeguard
the fair allocationof slots.Mechanisms
are neededto
ensurethatthe customers'
andenvironmentalists'
viewsareadequately
represented
in
decision-making.
It is mostencouraging
thatthecustomers
arereapingrewards.
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1 INTRODUCTION

On April 1st, 1997 the formal deregulation
of :he airline industry within the European Union
(EU) was finally completed.
Since that date, any technically qualified EU (plus Iceland and
Nornvay) airline could operate in any region of the Union, even in wholly domeszic routes,
without restraints either on fares or capacity. Th:s was the final step in a large process started
at the mid-1980s, after the success, and as a :onsequence
of, non-European
deregulation
experiences.
One of the most defining

particular

features

of this European

process

has been its two-level

pattern. Previous air transport deregulation expe:-iences in the US, Canada and Australia taught
European countries that prior to, or instead of, embarking on a complete deregulation of the
whole industry., governments
should test it on a _mall range. First, at a strict nationai level, by
means of liberalising agreements
negotiated
between pairs of countries
(particularly
UK,
Ireland. Belgium and The Netherlands)
which abolished controls on market ent U and tariffs.
And second, by harmonisation
measures at the EU level, as intended
packages released in 1987, 1990 and 1992 (CAA. 1993).

by the three deregulation

Despite their common intention, the effects of th:_se two different deregulation
levels are not
always multiplicative. In already liberalised routes, the harmonisation
measures brought fewer
improvements, and decreases in fares were only c0servable in those routes where the bilateral
schemes that intended to maintain duopolistic righ:s for national carriers were removed.
The literature

on European

effects of this process
example, Puke, 1991,
efficiency parameters
extends the work by
deregulation

process

air transport

deregulation

has frequently

addressed

the study of the

by focusing on the specific impact of concrete liberalising measures (for
or McGowan and Seabright, 1989), and particularly, on airlines' cost or
(Encaoua,
1991). Our note. however, specifically focuses on prices and
Betancor and Jorge-Calderdn
(1996) in order to anaIvse the complete

on a same set of individuals

(routes)

during nine consecutive

years.

Even reckoning that it is still too early to evaluate the effects of the latest measures, this note
intends to assess empirically the results of the first phase (1986-1994)
of the European airline
deregulation
in order to draw some conclusions on what kind of results are expected during
the next five years, according to the pace and effectiveness of the process so far.
To do this, we use a panel sample of 44 city-pair 5ntra-EU scheduled routes and estimate
different standard price equations to evaluate the relevance both of the deregulation packages
of 1987, 1990 and 1992 and the liberal bilateral arrangements
that several countries had agreed
on before.
The remaining

parts of this note are divided

as tbilows.

Section

2 characterises

the leading

features of the European deregulation
process and the context in which the main measures
were adopted. In section 3 we describe the empirical model used to assess the effects of the
deregulation process on prices. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the results from model
estimation and, finally, section 5 summarises our main conclusions.

2 TIlE EUROPEANDEREGULATIONPOLICY
Whenthe Treatyof Rome

was signed in 1957 the huge differences among Member States' air
transpcrt industries made it impossible to reach an overall agreement on how this sector should
be regulated. Therefore, only the general principles on competition
were enforceable
for this
market.

These differences widened during the subsequent years, since the absence of homogenous
provisions and poticy guidelines encouraged
many governments
to pursue particular objectives.
Bilateral agreements,
either to facilitate
competition
or to consecrate
barriers
to entry
according

to national

conveniences,

were settled

all over Europe

(Caves

and Higgins,

1993).

This situation sparked several conflicts between tile European Commission (EC) and member
states until 1987, where, as a consequence
of a resolution of the European Supreme Court, the
first liberalisation package, was released.

The package only applied to inter-European
scheduled operations
and comprised
several
regulations,
all enforceable from January 1st, 1988 First, Council Directive 87/601 regulated
the pricing policy for intra-European
scheduled flights. Several fare--elves
were created,
allowing for up to sixty-five to ninety percent discount for certain restricted-conditions
tickets.
Council Decision 87/602 allowed capacity-distribution
agreements
between existing carriers
and softened the conditions tbr new entrants, although several limits were imposed on these
agreements

to avoid unfair competition

practices.

This decision also let governments
authorise second operators at the intra-European
Ievel for
certain high density corridors and created traPfic rights between regional and central airports,
even though these measures had not been contemplated
in existing bilateral agreements.
It also
allowed airlines to carry passengers between states different from that of the nationality of the
carrier with an upper limit of thirty percent of capacity (fifihfi'eedom
righls), l
Finally, Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/'87 defined competition
rules for air transport
and authorised
Commission
to guarantee
block exemptions
regarding
certain agreements
among carriers as joint planning and capacity co-ordination,
revenue share, tariff consultations,
allocation
of slots, joint ownership
of computer
reservation
systems and land assistance
services. Block exemptions should expire by January 31st, 1991.

The second deregulation
package was released in June 1990 and included three important
measures.
Council Regulation
2342/90 replaced the existing fare-zones
system by a more
flexible one, which determined that member states should approve airlines' prices according to
well-defined criteria: long-run carrier's costs, a fair margin on costs, adequate compensation
to
capital, consumer's
benefit, the market competitive
environment
and the
predatory, practices. The double approval system was replaced by a double
under which both countries had to disapprove a fare in order to reject it

need to prevent
disapproval
one,

The freedoms of the air. as agreed in the Chicago Convcntion (1944). are: First Freedom. or the right of the
airline of one country to fly over the territory, of another country.. Second Freedom. or the right of an auriine to
make a stop m another country due to technical reasons. Tturd Freedom, or the right of an airline to c,arry
traffic from its home country, to another country. Fourth Freedo_n.or the rigltt of an airline to carry, trailic from
another countr," to its home country. Fifth Freedom. or the right of an airline to carry, traffic bet_e_n t_vo
foreign countries on a route beginning or ending in its home count_,. Sixth Freedom, or the right of an airline
to car D' tr,_c between two foreign countrtcs via its home country, and. Seventh Freedom. or the right of an
airline to carry traffic bet_veentwo foreign countries without stopping in its home country.

CouncilRegulation2343/90setnewconditionsfor entryto scheduled
intra-European
routes
andfor capacitydistributionagreements.
Multiple designationwas allowedfor somehigh
densityroutes.Thirdandfourthfreedomrightswereapplicable
all overtheCommunity
whilst
limitsto fifth freedomrightswereamplifiedup to fifty percentof seats.CouncilRegulation
2344/90extended
blocksexemptions
untilDecember
3 1st,1992.
OnJuly23rd,1992theCounciladoptedfivemeasures
whichconstitutedthethird package
in
theliberalisation
of EU aviationindustryandcompleted
themarketorganisation
of thissector.
Theintentionof thispackage
wasto openup nationalmarketsbyallowingEuropean
airiinesto
compete
freelyin anintegrated
marketwithprice-setting
subjecttodoubledisapproval.
CouncilRegulation2407/92onthe licensingof air carriersdefinedthe criteriato berequired
by nationalauthoritiesfor grantingoperatorlicences.It includedsector-specific
ruleson
licensingof air carrierswhichaimedto establish
legalandeconomicstandards
whileensuring
theabsence
of discrimination
by nationality.Morespecifically,
it dealtwith effectivecontrol,
majorityshareholding,
solvencyrequirements,
periodicfinancialmonitoring,andrequirements
for acommoncertificateonsafetyfitness,
CouncilRegulation2408/92on accessfor air carriers

to intra-European
air routes abolished
most of previous restrictions. This regulation on market access granted fifth freedom rights and
authorised conseculive
cabolage between EU airports. It also eliminated capacity-sharing
for
airlines on routes between member states. As from January 1st, 1993 airlines were able to fly
from place to place within another state. However, cabotage was introduced in phases. Until
April 1997 airlines could offer a maximum of fifty percent of seats in a stopover in another
member state. From that date, the restriction
Finally,

Council

Regulation

2409/92

will be dropped.

on air fares and rates

for air services

established

that

airlines were free to set fares as from January 1st 1993, only with some safeguards intended to
protect consumer and industry interests. Other regulations
in the third package as Council
Regulation 2410/92 and 2411/92 contain amendments regarding the application of the rules on
competition to undertakings
in the sector and extend again the limit of some block exemptions.
In conclusion,
the European
Commission
has committed
itself to full liberalisation
of air
transport
by the end of the transition
period (April 1st, 1997). Therefore,
increased
competition will come about gradually as the transition period allows free market access to EU
air carriers and the freedom to fly wherever they wish within the EU territory.

3 THE

EMPIRICAL

MODEL

This section studies the empirical

effects of the above described

deregulation

process

on prices.

To do this, the city-pair route is selected as the primary unit of analysis and a panel data sample
of 44 international
intra-European
routes for the 1986-1994 period is constructed.
We just
consider passenger traffic of scheduled airlines, for which data are available and comparable
from international reliable sources.
The routes in our panel dataset exhibit different degrees of liberalisation during this period. For
example, in 1986 most of continental routes departing from UK had been already liberalised as
a result of liberal bilateral agreements, especially with Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Othercountriesreachedthe_esortof liberalbilateralagreeme':ts
m lateryearsin our sample
period,whereas
the remaining
routesstayedhighlymonopolised
or duopolisedby nationalflag
carriers.
Thus,themainpurposeof thissectionis to investigate
theexistence
of distinctandsignificant
empiricaleffectson pricesdueto this deregulation
process,bothat the particularrouteIevel
dueto bilateralliberalisation
andthe overalleffectof the 1987,1990and1992deregulation
packages.We use differentprice definitions,corresponding
to different tare structures
currentlychargedby theairlinesandstudytheirrelationship
with the regulatoryregimefaced
in eachrouteandothersupplyanddemand
factors.
The standardcompetitivemodel,togetherwith previousnon-European
air transportderegulationexperiences
supportthemainpredictionthatwe test.In principle,we expectto find
that,in case&the effects of deregulation being statistically significant, the level of competition
will increase.

In terms of price, this implies that fares in deregulated

routes,

as compared

v_s ci

vts to regulated ones, should be lower. Alternatively,
other measurements
of competition
could
be used. For example, we expect that the average number of competitors
must be larger in
deregulated
routes, the number of discount tariffs offered to travellers must be higher and the
volume of discounts,
calculated
with respect to a standard
tare must be also larger
in
deregulated routes (provided no change in the standard tare).

We have controlled by demand variables, such as the number of passengers
carried and supply
variables, such as the number of flights. We have also used the load or seat factor, (which
allows us to calculate the supplied capacity) and a density variable for each route. The
availability of a panel dataset has also allowed us to test tbr the existence of fixed-effects at the
route level. These effects could be interpreted
traNc type, safety, cultural links .... ) whose
estimates.

3. i

Sample

as non-observable
route characteristics
(such as
omission, if relevant, would yield inconsistent

selection

We have selected 44
criteria. Table I in the
densest
international
regulatory regime the?'

international
intra-European
city-pair round-trip
routes by using three
Appendix shows the selected routes, their number of order within the
scheduled
European
routes,
their distance
in kilometres
and the
have maintained during the sample period 1986-1994.

The first criterion to include a route in our sample is its representativeness
scheduled passenger traffic, z Table 1 indicates that 26 out of our 44 routes

in intra-European
are within the 75

densest routes in Europe according to ICAO Statistics. We have included six of the top ten
routes and ten of the first 25 most important ones. The inclusion of, for example, all 75 densest
routes

would have biased our sample against the two following

criteria.

The second criterion used in the sample selection was a geographical
one. Though it was not
possible to include at least one route by each EU member, we tried to select all types of
traffics, from each possible point of departure/destination
in the European Union. The average
distance

between

the selected

cities/airports

is about 600 kms, but we also have 17 routes with

" Although Austria told Sweden were non-EU members at the beginning of our sample period, the existing EUEFTA agrcements allow us to apply them the same criteria as the other EU routes.

lessthan500 kmsand another17with morethan 1000kms.To the extentthat it could
constituteanimportantdistortionwhenanalysing
prices,we haveexplicitlytakenintoaccount
theeffectof distanceonourestimates.
The third criterionusedin the constructionof the datasethasbeenthe regulatoryregime.
Apartfrom the deregulationpackages
of 1987,1990and 1992the routesincludedin our
samplefacedifferentregulatoryregimesdueto the existenceof differenttypesof bilateral
agreements.
Asshowedin TableI, in 25cases
the routesareconsidered
regulated,
in thesense
described
above.Another17routesarederegulated
overthewhole1986-1994
period.Note
thattheapparentselectionbiasin favourofUK routesisduebothto completethepanelwitha
similarnumberof regulated(568%) andderegulated
routes(38.6%),in orderto avoidlater
estimationproblems,and to take into accountthe leadingrole of LrK in air transport
deregulation.
deregulation

The remaining

two routes

was not completed

are partially

deregulated

during the period,

since its

until 1988.

In conclusion,
in terms of observations
our panel consists of 396 observations
(44 routes
during nine years) although the presence of missing values renders an effective sample of about
200-250 observations
for most of our pe,'-formed estimations.

3.2

Data sources

In order to carry out the analysis described above, data from traffic and fares corresponding
just to scheduled flights at the route level of aggregation
were needed. Data on passengers,
flights, seat factors and number of operators within each route were obtained from D'affic by
Flight Stage, a yearly survey produced by ICAO, from years 1986 to 1994. Data on fares were
collected
from the ABU
World Airline
GuMes, 3 a monthly
publication
with detailed
information

on prices.

Due to the extended practice of price discrimination existing in the air industry there is not a
unique price definition, even within a same route. Therefore, to select the price, we proceeded
at a two-stage
level. First, we got the local currency level of the four most relevant fares,
which are present in almost all routes selected. These are the standard Tourist fare (Y-class or
Economy class), the Excursion fare (E-class), the PEX fare and the SPEX fare. Second, to
make it possible to compare these prices both at country level and across-time, we deflated
4
them all at 1986 prices and then converted the resulting figure to a common currency.
The Excursion, PEX and SPEX fares constitute discount fares with respect to the standard
one. Thus, as a final stage of the analysis, we calculated the percentage of discount of these
three fares with respect to the standard Economy fare and the number of other existing

s Later renamed as 0.4 G II'brld Airline Guides (1990-1994). The figures on dus source provided the domestic
currency,rotmd-trip fare between two cities tltrough the shortest route. In certmn cases, when the rotmd-trip fare
was not available we simply doubled the single-trip one. It was not possible to obtain an average fare for each
year. Therefore. we decided to select a single month as representative for the nine-year period. To avoid
distortions due to the Summer and Chrisunas seasons (where most companies modify their tariffs) we chose
November. and when multiple fares existed, we got the lowest one searching the ltighest incidence of the
deregulation process.
Since it is one of the official currencies used by ICAO (which also provides official exctmnge rates) and given
the large number of UK routes selected, we finally chose the sterling pound. Alternatively, to check whether the
currency, choice was critical, we also repeated all our estimations using ECUs and a European-averageprice
index. Our qualitative results did not chmlge with respect to those finally reported in die Appendix.

disc_untthres.Usually,thesetaresarerestrictedto certainconditionsrelatedto cancellation,
connectionto otherflightsandnumberof daysstayingat destination,in the sensethat the
lowerthetare, the stricter the conditions. A complete and detailed description of the sample
can be tbund in the _bllowing section.

3.3

Data description

Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of passengers by years in our sample, according
to the type of route considered. Note that, although the average annual growth tbr the period
is about 20 percent, this figure is misleading, since years 1990o1991 experienced
negative
rates, mainly as a consequence
of the world situation,
particularly,
the Gulf War and the
subsequent fuel price shock, since both phenomena froze the expansion of the airline industry
during these years.
The distribution of passengers carried in regulated and deregulated
routes is almost the same
and it is maintained during the period. This contributes to consider that the impact of demand
factors in our estimations will be fairly represented.
A similar conclusion can be drawn form
Table 3, which shows, within our sample, the distribution of the number of flights by types of
routes. As expected,
is very high (0.9087),
Witi_ regard

the partial correlation coefficient between passenger and fligt_ts variables
although the observed load factors are not, as illustrated in Table 4.

to the number

of competitors

within each route,

we consider

they are defined

by

airlines with more than 5,000 passengers a year or, in weak demand conditions, by airlines with
a significant share of the market. ,_rlines within the same industrial group are not considered
as separate competitors.
Table

5 exhibits

two

additional

important

features.

First,

the comparison

of regulated

and

deregulated routes shows that for all years the average number of competitors
is always larger
for the second group and this difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level according
to standard mean tests. This relationship
favours our expected results. The
second feature, however,
is that the last column does not reflect an increasing number of
competitors year after year, so that the effect of the deregulato_
packages does net appear to
be represented

in this table.

This result is contradicted
by last column of Table 6. The average number of discount tariffs
increases from 1986 onwards, although the last three years of the sample show a moderate
decline. At the same time, deregulated routes appear to offer, on average a larger number of
discount tariffs, in accordance with Table 5.
Table 7 illustrates the evolution of tares distinguishing
between
regulated
an deregulated
routes. In order to make the comparison
possible, the figures represent
real 1986 sterling
pounds per kilometre, and have been calculated using the criteria defined above. 5
A common feature shared by the four types of fares is
always larger than the corresponding
regulated tares.
Table 8, although referred to the percentage of discount
tare. However,
since this result may be affected by

the fact that the deregulated
ones are
These results coincide with those of
calculated with respect to the standard
the fact that the average distance in

5 Note that we ignore economies of scale in this first ceteris partbus comparison mnong fares. They will be
considered in next section.

deregulated
routesis smaller(seeTablel), detailedeconometric

estimations,

controiling

by

this and other factors are required.

3.4

Model

specification

Our aim is to examine
deregulation
affecting
(i= 1..... 44; t= 1986 .....

the relationship
it, and a given
1994) described

between

each

route's

characteristics,

the level of

price variable. To do this we use the panel database
above and estimate both pooling and panel regressions,

where the dependent variable is the tare (in different forms) or some other related variable.
Several functional forms were investigated in preliminary regressions but below we only report
results corresponding
to the linear and log-linear specifications,
which yielded the best fits.
Apart from those described before, these models have made use of the following variables:

•

DEREGULATION

Dummy

variable

variable

takes

that

captures

the

value 0 in regulated

•

DISTANCE

Distance

between

cittes

•

DENSITY

Dummy

variable

that refers

effect

of liberal

routes and

aud destination

of origin

to tile average

bilateral

LOAD

Average

load factor

•

FLIGHTS

Number

of one-way

•

DISCOUNT

1Different

FARES

operators.

•

INCOME

Index

•

OPERATORS

It includes

•

YEAR

FACTOR

87- 94

types

flights

on each

of discount

of per capita

of passengers

or less in a

route.

fares

available

with more than

5000

part of the market

when the route suffers

Dunurty

that arc equal

variables

in a route. The

passengers

on

each

route,

independently

of

GDP of the countD'.

operators

deregulation

This

ones.

in kms.

number

variable
is equal to tl whe,_ there are on average 100.000
given route. In other cases, the variable takes wtlue [.
•

agreements.

1 in deregulated

packages

•

Y-FARE

Cheapest

Economy

•

E-FARE

Cheapest

Excursion

•

PEX-FARE

Cheapest

PEX aiffare

•

SPEX-FARE:

Cheapest

SuperPEX

passengers
from

a )'ear or with

a significant

weak demand.

to 1 on the specified

?'ear. They

capture

time and

effects.

airfare

(round

airfare
(round
airfare

(round

trip) in constant
trip) in constant

Irip) in constant
(round

trip)

1986 sterling

1986 sterling

in constant

pounds.

1.986 sterling

pounds.

pounds.

1986 sterling

pounds.

In the case of pooling regressions
the estimation have been performed by OLS with error
correction
methods in order to get estimates robust both to heteroscedasticity
and error
autocorrelation
problems. Since we depart from reduced forms models, an omitted-variable
test has also been carried out, allowing us to reject the hypothesis that most of our models do
not have important omitted variables.
In the case of panel data analysis, we have estimated cross-sectional
time-series regression
models, including
fixed-effects
(within routes)
and random effects (mixed) models. _ In
general, the model is specified

as: y, = ct + IBX_,+ rh + e_t, where y_t corresponds

variable, X, refers to the explanatory
regressors (including dereguIation
for the (unobservable)
individual effect, and t:, is the random error.

6 Wc ltave used
specification

the stmtdard

Breusch

test on tl_e appropriateness

azld Pagan

Lagrange

of the random-effects

multiplier
estimator.

test for razldottt

to the price

variables),

effects,

rt_ stands

aztd Hausmazl's

4

RESULTS

We have firstly estimated a model where the fare in levels is the dependent variable; its results
are reported on Table 9. Our four fare-variables,
Economy
(Y), Excursion
(E), PEX and
SPEX are regressed against a set of explanatory, variables chosen after pertbrmmg
several
previous estimations,
the most important
one among these, for our purposes,
being the
dc:'eguhlt/o_J variable. Two types of models are considered,
Model 1 and Model 2. They differ
in that the second
double-tog tbrm.

type incorporates

variables

in logs when

feasible,

thus it is a model

in

The deregulation
variable behaves as expected only for the Y-tare. It seems that deregulated
routes enjoy lower economy fares. According to parameter values from Model 2, such a fare
would be 7 percent cheaper on average for deregulated
routes. For the E-tare and PEX-t'are
results are not conclusive and very much dependent on the type of model chosen. Only tbr the
SPEX-fare there would not be any difference between types of routes.
Some year-specific
regressors are only significant for the Economv and PEX-fare. There seems
to be a trend to reduce these fares at the beginning of the period. Bearing in mind that in 1987
a first package of deregulation
measures was introduced
at a European
level, this could be
interpreted as a preliminary effect of European air transport deregulation.
Nevertheless
year
1992 brought with it new increases for the economy tare followed in the subsequent year by a
decrease in the PEX-fare.
For the rest of control variables we find ti_at distance has a direct effect on tares. As expected,
travelling on longer routes would be more expensive tbr all types of fares considered.
The
density variable is playing an important role only for the Y-tare case; Economy fares would be
higher on denser routes, while the rest of tariffs would remain similar. The greater the load
factor the smaller the level of prices, this could also be anticipated as higher load factors allow
a reduction of unit costs and, hence, of fares. Finally, as it was also expected, wherever the
national income is higher passengers must face also a higher level of fares.

The analysis of discounts in Table 10, implies that deregulated
routes offer smaller discounts
for PEX and SPEX fares, while it appears that there is no significant difference for the E-tare.
These results must be interpreted in connection to those of Table 9, Since the percentage
of
discount are worked out in relation to the Y-fare, and this one becomes smaller on liberalised
routes, we could also expect getting similar (E-fare) or lower (PEX and SPEX) percentages
of
discount. It seems that airlines operating in more liberalised routes have a narrower margin to
offer price discounts,
and therefore,
these discounts expressed
as percentages,
are actually
similar or even smaller.
Economies of scale might induce greater discounts according to the distance variable, while the
discount on denser routes would be smaller only for the SPEX tariff. With respect to the
number of flights and load factors variables it seems that they might be increased
discount pricing policy. Again, the national income variable is playing an important
same sense as in results from Table 9, except for the SPEX-fare,
tNs index variable.
Regarding
SPEX-fare

that behaves

to time effects, it is important to point out that all the estimated
exhibit a negative sign, whilst for the PEX-fare most estimates

9

through a
role in the

independently

of

parameters for the
present a positive

one.Accordingto thisresultit wouldbehappening
thatthe levelof discounttbr

tt_e former,
affected mainly by the first deregulation package, was initially decreasing. However, just after
the last two pieces of European liberalisation were passed, discounts for the PEX-fare were
increasing. This result might be interpreted as a positive market response if one bear in mind
that the PEX-fare is not so much restricted as its counterpart
SPEX. Nevertheless
the impact
tbr the SPEX-fare is not always significant, and tbr the PEX-t'are the last year considered in the
database does not capture any significant change, so we cannot be certain about ti_e continuity
of this change.
The most striking impact of deregulation
is reported on Table 11. The range of discounted
fares available tbr passengers selection is much wider, around 87 percent higher, on routes
where liberal bilateral
also to be the effect
significant from 1989
appear, it stands until
indicates,

agreements are applied. This increasing number of discount fares appears
of European
air transport
deregulation
packages. Time variables are
onwards and, although the effect takes a lag of a couple of years to
1994. Competition among airlines, as the variable number of operators

takes place through

availability

of quite a good number of different

discounted

tares.

Finally Table 12 refer to panel regression estimates when Hausman tests indicate that fixed
effects might be important. This is only the case of the percentage of discount for the E-fare in
logs form Taking into account fixed effects, it happens that the percentage
of discount is
similar between both types of routes. This finding would support previous pooling estimation
results.

5

CONCLUSIONS

In this note we have carried out an empirical assessment of the effects of deregulation
on the
pricing policies of the European air industry from 1986 to 1994 for the scheduled passengers
traffic. Our basic unit of analysis is the city-pair route, since we also consider this as the basic
unit of competition
for this sort of traffic. Two types of deregulation
effects have been
modelled. First, strict route-deregulation
effect, according to the existence or not of liberal
bilateral agreements between the countries involved in any single route. Second, a pure timederegulation
effect, according
to the progressive
influence of the European
Commission
deregulation
packages that came into place at years 1987, 1990 and 1992.
To capture
these effects we compare different price definitions over forty-four
different
international
intra-European
routes consecutively observed for nine years. In order to make the
comparison valuable, we control not only by deregulation variables, but also by several supply
and demand variables, such as passengers-kms,
number of flights, distance, load factor and per
head income. We also control by unobservable
validity of the estimated coefficients.

individual

effects that may possibly

affect the

In terms of fares in levels we can only confirm that the basic standard fare (Y-fare) is around a
7 percent lower in those routes where liberal bilaterals are in force, whilst the SPEX-fare
would be similar. With respect to other fares our econometric
special features
liberal bilaterals

of routes are bore in mind including
in Europe seems to be very weak.

results are not conclusive.

fixed effects, it happens

Once

that the effect of

When percentages
of discount with respect to the Economy fare are calculated,
we have
surprisingly found that these are always lower in routes subject to liberal bilaterals, but for the
E-fare. There is also an important difference between the PEX and SPEX-fare in terms of the
10

Europeanliberalisationprocess.Tile discountappliedto the tbrmerhasbeenincreasingat
some points in time, though the trend tbr the last is to experienced
lower percentages
the beginning of the period. Thus the impact of the European deregulation process,

mainly at
if any, has

not been the same as the one exerted by liberal bilateral agreements.
However, the most striking impact of such bilateral agreements has been the proliferation
of
tariffs, allowing passengers to choose among a greater range of tares that could be now on
average 87 percent higher. Airlines are nowadays working with a greater number of discounted
tares, this might also indicate they could be now getting lower yields if these tariffs were
actually widely available in terms of seats being offered on a discount basis. This information
is
not published in Europe, however significance
of the toad factor parameter
and relevant
literature
['or the United States case (Keeler,
199l) would support it. In relation to the
European deregulation
packages, it is also the case that effects on levels of fares have been
negligible so far. Again, its impact is tbund in the greater number of fares that are now
available to passengers.
[n conclusion,
our work shows that the effects of the air transport deregulation
process in
Europe have been much more gradual than other non-European
experiences.
This is so
because the European process has been phased in over a lengthy period and the nature and the
intensity of government
inte_'ention
varied enormously
between different countries.
This
makes that the first two years of the Single Market (1993-1994)
had not seen a uniform
flourishing of competition
across the European
Union, either between the major carriers or
from new entrants or existing smaller airlines.
However there is one caveat to our conclusions
and an important starting point for future
work. Since European airlines' yields by route are not publicly available we have restricted our
econometric
analysis only to fbur types of fares. For none of these variables, competition
in
European
application

skies has taken the form of generalised
of liberal bilateral
agreements
or the

price decreases
as a result from the
European
deregulation
process
itself

However, we have found an important impact in terms of a newer and wider catalogue
among which passengers
could better accommodate
their preferences.
Only if these
widely available tbr most flights would have airline deregulation improved matters.
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of fares
are also
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Table

City-Pair

1. Sample

No. of

Route

order
1

routes.

Distance
(Kms)
365

legulation

regime

(1986-1994)
C,:regulated

1

Paris-London

2

London-Dublin

2

450

F ,:'regulated

3

London-Amstcrdatll

3

_ i.

[ ,:regulated

4

London-Bcusscls

5

351)

zregulated

5

Madrid-London

6

1244

.egulated

6

Mih'm-London

10

979

.egulated

7

IVladnd-Fmnkfun

15

1422

'artially

deregulated

8

Paris-Frankfurt

17

471

'artially

deregulated

9

Viemla-London

19

1272

"_egulated

10

Barcelona-London

24

1145

_,egulated

I1

Atl_ens-London

27

24[2;

Regulated

12

Barcelona-Frankfurt

29

1092

Regulated

13

Milan-Frm_kfurt

33

512

Regulated

14

Stoekholm-Fraa!ffurt

37

1222

Regulated

15

Madrid-Lisbon

43

513

Regulated

16

Manchester-Amsterdam

44

484

Deregulated

17

Madrid-Brussels

50

13 l_

Regulated

18

Athens-Frank_rt

57

180

Regulated

19

Stockholm-London

6 I.

147

Regulated

20

Milan-lB

62

70

Regulated

21

Athens-Brussels

65

20;

Regulated

22

Manchester-Brussels

68

53

Deregulated

23

Barcelona-Lisbon

70

99

24

Barc:lona-Bmssels

73

10

25

Manchester-Dublin

74

2t

26

Stockholm-Brussels

75

12

27

Liverpool-Dublin

-

2"

28

Cardiff-Dublin

29

Pans-Brussets

30

Leeds-Dublin

31

Cardiff-Amsterdaln

32

russels

2

Rcgulated
,

Regulated
Deregulated

"

Regulated
Deregulated

)

Deregulated

2: '

Regulated

3(

.

Deregulated

-

3:- _

Deregulated

Cardiff-Brussels

-

4_:

Deregulated

33

Leeds-Amsterdam

.

4

Deregulated

34

Leeds-Brussels

-

4

Deregulated

35

Tees-side-Amsterdam

-

4;

Deregulated

36

Liverpool-Amstcrdmn

-

5:

37

Liverpool-Brussels

38

Vienna-Frankfurt

39

Vienna-Brussels

40

Paris-Lisbon

41

Milan-Lisbon

42

Athens-Lisbon

43
44

Deregulated

<

_

Deregulated

-

_

)

Regulated

-

'

"

Regulated

1

'0

Regulated

-

I

:3

Regulated

-

2

_0

Regulated

Stockhohn-Lisbon

_

'6

Regulated

Vicmm-Lisbon

31 _0

Regulated

SO URCES:
Aviation

-

Tratfic

Market

by Flight

(CAP

654),

Stage

(ICAO).

(CAA,

1995).
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1986- I" 94

'and The Single

European

Table
Year

2. Passengers

Re t.,ulated
thousands

Routes

in %

1986

5,326

47.7

1987

5,813

52.0

by route

type
Derek, ulated

% _rowth

thousands

Routes

in %

% _rowth

5,849

52.3

9.1

5,372

48,0

-8.1

53.0

34.7

1988

6,422

47.0

10.4

7,240

1989

5,883

39.6

-8.3

8,982

60.4

24.0

1990

6.555

44._

11.4

8,1)70

55.2

-10, 1

1991

5,957

43.5

-9.1

7,749

56.5

-13.7

1992

6,909

44?3

15,9

8,489

55.1

9.5

1993

7.226

45.5

4.5

8,654

54.5

1994

12,917

43.8

78.7

16.568

56.2

1.9
91.4

Table 3. Flights by route type
Year

Regulated

R,mtcs

Deregulated

in %
53.4

thousands

Routes
% growth

1986
1987

69,009

54.2

1988

76,316

48.1

1989

68,785

40.7

1990

77,309

49.3

1991

74,292

35.4

-3.9

85.935

64.9

5.1

1992

86.996

45.2

17. I

104,780

54.8

21.9

1993

95,548

47.2

9.3

107,449

52.8

2.5

1994

98,658

43.6

3,2

129.194

56.4

20.2

Table

4. Average

Year

Table

% growth

in %

thousands
66,206

58.184

46.6

4.2

59,101

45,8

11.0

81.238

51.9

-9_

102,115

59.3

25.6

12.3

81,753

50,7

-19.9

seat factor

Regui.ted
Roo: :s

by route

Deregulated
Routes

type (in %)
Both types

1986

57 _'-

55.2

56.3

1987

61.;

51.8

56.8

1988

60. :

58,8

59.6

1989

58.5

54.9

56.7

1990

6',. _

52.5

56.9

1991

55 -'.

53,4

54.4

1992

55 -;

53.2

54.3

1993

57 _

53.1

55.1

1994

56,

57,3

56.7

5. Average

Year

nun::_er

of competitors

Regulated
Routes

Deregulated
Routes

by

route

type

Both types

1986

2.8

3.0

2.9

1987

2.2

2.8

2.5

1988

2.2

3.2

2.7

1989

2.3

2.8

2.5

1990

2.2

3.0

2.6

1991

2.3

3.8

3.1

1992

2.6

3.3

3.0

1993

2.2

2.8

2.5

t994

2.6

2.8

2.7

14

1.5
37.4

Table

6, Average
Year

uumber

of discount

Regulated
Routes

tariffs

Derek 'ulated
Routes

by

route

Both
types

1986

2.41

3.75

3.08

1987

2.70

5.53

4.12

1988

2.78

6.56

4.67

1989

3.08

6.53

4.81

1990

4.38

3.76

6.57

1991

4.43

6.83

5.63

1992

8.04

922

8.63

1993

7.63

8.94

8.28

1994

6.63

972

8.17

Table

7, Average

filres

by

Tourist
Year

Regulated
Routes

type

route

type

(in

£/km)

fare
Deregulated
Routes

Both

1986

0.38

0.48

0.43

1987

0.36

0.44

0.40

1988

0.33

0.41

0.37

1989

0.33

0.41

0.37

19911

0.35

0.45

0.40

1991

0.35

0.49

0.42

1992

0.39

0.53

0.46

1993

0.36

0.51

0.43

1994

11.36

I1.5 l

0.44

Excursion
Year

Regulated
Routes

fare
Deregulated
Routes

Both

1986

0.23

0.32

0.27

1987

0.2 [

I).32

0.26

1988

0.20

0.28

0.24

1989

0.2 [

0.26

0.23

1990

0.22

0.29

0.25

1991

I).23

0.35

0.29

1992

0.23

0.34

0.29

1993

0.22

0.32

0.27

1994

O.21

0.38

0.29

PEX fare
Year

Regulated
Routes

Deregulated
Routes

Both

1986

0.19

0.30

0.25

1987

0.19

0.32

0.25

1988

0.18

0.28

0.23

1989

O. 16

0.27

0.22

1990

0.16

0.29

0.22

1991

0. t6

0.27

0.22

1992

I). 17

0.29

0.23

1993

0.16

0.29

0.22

1994

0.16

029

0.23

15

Table

7. Average

fares by route type (ill £/km) (cont.)
SPEX

Year

Regulated

1986

Routes
0. I0

1987
1988

fare
Deregulated

Both

Routes

types
O. tO

O. 14

0.26

0.20

O. 18

0.23

0.21

1989

0, 15

0,20

0.17

199(1

O. 14

0.22

O. 18

1991

O, 15

0,22

O. 19

1992

0.14

0.21

0.18

1993

0.14

0.21

0.18

1994

0.14

0.2l

0.18

Table 8. Average discounts by route type
(in % with respect to standard
fare)
% Discount
Year

of excursion

Regulated
Routes

fare

Deregulated
Routes

Both

28.0

types
31.1

33.9

13.5

23.7

33.3

25.8

29.5

1989

31.8

25.3

28.6

1990

33.5

29.0

31.3

1991

31.2

26.1

28.7

1992

33.1

31.0

32.0

1993

30.6

31.0

30.8

1994

31.0

24.5

27.8

1986

34.3

1987
1988

% Discount
Year

of PEX

Regulated
Routes

htre

Deregulated
Routes

Both

1986

47.1

37.7

types
42.4

1987

49.8

25.1

37.5

1988

49.2

30.2

39.7

1989

53.5

33.6

43.6

1990

54.9

38.4

46.6

1991

52.4

43.9

48.2

1992

53.9

45.4

49.7

1993

53.7

43.0

48.3

1994

52.7

42.8

47.8

% Discount
Year

of SPEX

Regulated
Routes

fare

Deregulated
Routes

Both
types
72.6

1986

72.6

1987

67.4

34.5

51.0

1988

62.0

40.9

51.5

1989

66.4

48.4

57.4

1990

64.9

53.0

59.0

1991

63.0

52.4

57.7

1992

65.3

60.7

63.0

1993

65.0

56.9

60.9

1994

62.0

58.9

60.5
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1.

INTRODUCTION.

The European liberalisation
process in the air industry has changed the conditions for
carriers to operate in this market. Before this, it was a market were limitations
to
competition existed as in the domestic markets where in many cases there was a legal
monopoly,
or in the intraeuropean
market where airlines operated
with bilateral
agreements

between

states to share the market.

The three liberalisation
established a situation
any domestic

packages have eliminated the legal barriers to competition
of complete freedom of entry and exit for European carriers

or intrastate

market,

into the philosophy

to
in

of the Treaty of Rome.

In this paper we study cost structure of air carriers with the main objective
how the liberalisation
process has affected efficiency in the production

of analysing
of European

companies. By studying the existence of economies
of scale in the industry, we can try
to predict how the companies
of this sector will response
to the measures
of the
Commission.
The main question to answer is if the size of the air carriers can affect to
efficiency gains in costs and production.
Market

structure

can be affected

by existence

of economies

of scale in the market

which

could bring possible tendencies of concentration
in the market, and that could be answer
to the bilateral agreements, joint ventures and acquisitions that can be observed actually
between air carriers along European market.
Section 2 describe the sample of 22 airlines, 13 from Europe and 9 from North America
for a period of six years since 1991 to 1995, that has been used to carry out this study.
Data has been obtained
Section
airlines.

from ICAO and IATA publications.

3 presents a parametric
analysis as an approach to analyse the efficiency
So for the period 1990-95 there still exists a gap between the performance

European amines and their American counterparts,
both in terms
unit costs. Although it can be observed that European are covering
American levels.

of
of

of productivity
and
in terms of costs to

Although
for the clmracteristics
of output in air transport it might be estimated
a
desegregated
cost function, the absence of information
to make this have lead us to
estinaate an aggregated traslogaritmical
cost function. As consequence,
its necessary to
define correctly what is understood by economies of scale and how to determine it from
an aggregated
cost function. Section 4 presents an Econometric
analysis carry out to
estimate a cost function for the industry. The use of traslogaritmical
cost function
specification

and the cost share equations

is used as a standard

methodology

to estimate

trmxsport cost. This is because is the easiest to estimate and interpret (the arguments of
the function are in logarithms). The disadvantage
comes from the number of coefficients
to estimate.
The analysis of economies
of scale with the traditional form and corrected following
Jam and CortEs (1996) and Oum and Zhang (1997) are compared in section 5. So the
presence of economies
of scale is notably reinforced if the correction of the effect of

changesin outputandnetworkoverotherexogenousfactorsproposedis perIbrmed.
Also in thissectioncostcomplementarity
andtheeffectof publicandprivateownership
is analysed.Finally residualsobtainedfrom the estimatedcostfunctionareusedto
estimate
thepotentialcostreductions
thatinefficientairlinesmayachieve.
Section6 presents
themainconclusions
of thispaper.

2.DESCRIPTIONOF SAMPLE.

Datausedin this studycorrespondto a sampleof 22 airlinesfromEurope(13) and
NorthAmerica(7 from US,and2 fromCanada),andit coversthe period1990-1995.
Thecriterionto selectthesamplewasinitially to includeall themainworldairlinesthat
reportedfinancialint'ormationto the InternationalCivil Aviation Authority (ICAO)
during that period in order to havea sufficientlylarge databaseto obtain reliable
estimates.
However,theanalysisof a largertentativesamplein whichairlinesfromotherregions
werealsoincluded(SouthAmericaandEastAsia)revealedtheexistenceof significant
differences
acrossregionsfor somerelevantparameters.
Thus,for example,crewwages
aresubstantially
lower for somedevelopingcountries(e.g.IndiaandPakistan)thanin
otherregions.Fuelcostsperkilometrearehigherfor Asianairlinescompared
to average
values,speciallyfor Japanese
companies.This latter resultobservedin our initial
samplehasalsobeenreportedin otherworks(ICAO,1992).
Thesedifferencesin cost structuresandpricesmakeefficiencycomparisons
among
companiesfrom different regionsa difficult task, sinceairlinesdo not operateon
commonenvironments.
Initial estimationsusingthewholesamplewerenot successful
in obtaininga costfunctionthatsatisfiedrestrictionsto haveeconomicmeaning.We
decidedthento reducethesampleto European
andNorth Americanairlines,whichare
relativelysimilar in theircharacteristics,
althoughstill thereexistsomedifferencesin
thepricestheypayto factors.
OriginalcostdatafromICAO publicationswereanalysedfor thoseairlinesincludedin
• e sample,in order to detectand filter potentialerrors.Someinconsistencies
and
outlierswereindeeddetectedandcorrected
werepossible.In othercases,it wasdecided
to dropdirectlyall observations
from airlineswhosereporteddatacontaineda large
numberof temporalinconsistencies
(Aviaco,CrossairandViva Air). Anotherairline
exctudedfromthesamplewasVirgin Atlantic,dueto its specialization
on transatlantic
routes,whichmakesit differentin itscoststructureto non-specialised
carriers.
Summingup, aftercorrectionsandfilters,theavailablesamplefor estimationis formed
of 105observations
corresponding
to 22airlinesfor the period1990-1995.
Thesample
cannotbeusedasa panel,sincefor mostof theaminesincluded,financialinformation
wasnot reportedto ICAO in particularyears.Only 8 companiesreporteddataevery
yearof theperiodcoveredby thesample.

The tbllowing

table offers

a full description

of airlines

used in this work.

assess their relative sizes, information from 1995 on total output (measured
ton-km produced) number of planes and employees is presented in table 1:

Table

1: Airlines

included

in tile sample

(1995

Output
Region

Name

Europe

(nlill. Avail.

In order

in available

data)

Number
Ton-km)

of

Number

Planes

[

of

Employees

British Airways

18,428

234

5 I, 178

Lu fthansa

16,844

269

33,240

Air France

13,711

156

37,323

KLM

10,871

80

25,307

Alitalia

6,368

149

17,982

Swissair

5,096

66

17,733

Iberia

4,964

109

23,617

SAS

3,581

150

17,648

F in nair

1,909

40

7,414

Olympic

1,670

60

9,140

TAP

1,600

37

8,226

Austrian

1,037

28

3,862

513

33

4,013

American

34,864

635

83,463

United

33,053

556

81,160

Delta

26,350

539

66,302

Northwest

20,663

380

North

USAir

11,329

394

America

Continental

9,637

314

29,175

7,977

188

24,160

5,861

109

19,055

80

13,677

British

Mi,dland

TWA

(*)

Air Canada
Canadian
Note: (i)

Data arc from

1994

(*)
(*)

4,722

to

_

45,517
'

41,033

(1995 not available),

An immediate observation derived from table 1 is the disparity on average in airlines'
size between Europe and North America. A closer look reveals the existence of four
very large US airlines (American, United, Delta and Northwest, producing
more than
20.000 million ton-kin a year), while in Europe only British Airways, Lufthansa,
Air
Frmlce and KLM have output levels that reach the American average. Meanwhile, there
are a number of small airlines in Europe, producing
less than 2,000 million ton-kin. In
order to take into account
this heterogeneity
in the sample,
some individual
characteristics
of each airline are used in the econometric
estimations to control for the
fact that airlines
factors.

are diverse

in size, type of routes

in which they operate,

and some other

Data sources
There are three types of information
in our database:
costs, outputs and structural
variables. First, we have data on airlines' total costs and their distribution in different
categories

of expenditure,

according

to ICAO

classifications:

labour

(only

pilots,

copilotsaitd othercockpitpersonnel),
energy,insurance,
capitaldcprc ,',ion,
payments,
maintenance,
airport and aid-to-flight
charges,
services
administration
and other costs. This information
was obtained from tl
publication
Financial
number of employees
& Personnel.
Financial

data

airlines report
transformation
dollars.

&atistics.
We also collected data on average
for different worker categories, from the ICAO

published

is already

transtbrmed

from

national

ages paid and
! ,blication Flee:

curt

'ties,

the data, into US dollars by ICA0. Exchange
rates
are carefully chosen in order to avoid misrepresentatic

However,

it must be always

.luctuations

short period may significantly
alter the validity of the transformatior
the costs of an airline may be understated
(overstated)
if the cur
has suffered

a large devaluation

In order

to eliminate

the effects

(revaluation)

of inflation,

in whic-

aployed
in tl-a
_ of data in 1_S

kept in mind that rapid currency,

operates

interest

o passengers,
ICAO annual

ira

:: the sense _ ,at
ncy in which it

against the dol .r.

all financial

data

is d :flat,_d to 1990 real

values by using national GDP deflators. The choice of the instrum at o deflate data is
also a non-neutral
matter, since some of the airlines'
costs c e rational
(labour,
administration,
materials and the like) while others have an in:er" ational nature by
definition (e.g., flight equipment, airport charges). Which is the adec ate deflator to use
then? Ideally, one should deflate each category with the correspondi:
.' index con idered
appropriate.
However. the way in which ICAO aggregates
the a: :nes' expe :diture,
tbllowing a functional classification,
makes it impossible to proce d in this dcection,
since in a single category, there may exist a mix of labour, materia
and other ypes of
costs. Theretbre,
we have opted for the use of national deflators, o _he basis ".rot most
costs are nominated in local currencies, therefore subject to natio, ..1 rates of aflation.
We believe the bias introduced by the use of a general deflator (e: US consu net price
index or US GDP deflator) would be larger than the one we m "' be causi g by the
choice of national indexes.
Other type of information
included in the sample concerns
other
individual
characteristics.
These
variables
were

airlim,
obtair

d

level of output and
form the IATA

publication
Worm .4Jr D'ansport Statistics (WATS) which reports :oth tota! production
of airlines in terms of total seats-km/ton- "km offered, and the act, _1 passe ger-kmetonkan performed. Published data is presented separately for passeng r and c: .go services,
and it is also differentiated
services.

in the part that airlines

produce

on

egular

a d on charter

In this work, we have opted for using measures of output that re" :'_'sent t .tat production
that airlines offer in the market, instead of choosing actual dema,: :d ser ices. Although
in many

studies

on the industry,

output

is defined

in terms

of _asse

effectively transported, we believe a correct definition of output
efficiency and technical characteristics
(economies
of scale, scot

gets and cargo

,hen .-ying to analyze
. den: :ty, etc.) must be

based on the real levels of production and not on demand. An zirlinc with a very low
load factor may be as efficient in terms of production as anothe airlir _ with exactly the
same characteristics
but a high occupancy rate (although the fir:t wi
revise its marketing
strategy).
However,
if we use actual hum
tra.nsported

as the measure

of output, the second

airline will show as

probable need to
er of passengers
rare efficient.

Therefore,we will be usingavailableton-kinas the mainmeasureof output,which
includesbothpassengers
andcargo.For the econometric
estimation,we usethe two
typesof outputseparately,
andtherewedefinethepassengers'
servicesoutputin terms
of availableseats-!.an
andcargoservices
in termsof availablecargoton-km.
Fromthe \VATSpublication,we haveobtaineddataon airlines'outputs,but alsoon
structuralcharacteristics,
suchas loadfactors,averagestagelengthof routes,average
speeds,numberof departures,
numberof planes,andpercentage
of charterservices,
whichareusedascontrolvariablesin ourestimations.

3. NON-PAI/,4,METI:LIC
ANALYSIS.
A first simpleapproach
to theanalysisof theefficiencyof airlinesis thecomputation
of
someratiosthatallow us to stadythe relativepositionof companies
in termsof unit
costsandfactors'productivity.Here,wereportresultsonthefollowingindexes:
b.

Unit Cost (Total real cost/Ton-kin)
Labour unit cost

C.

Energy

d.

Capital unit cost

unit cost

All unit costs used here are defined

in terms of US cents per total available

ton-km.

The

first index is the more relevant, since it reflects the total performance
of an airline in
terms of how costly is for it to produce a ton-km. However, when making comparisons
an_ong airlines based on this index, it must be remembered
indicator for efficiency, since many factors affecting airlines'

that this is only a rough
performance
are left aside.

The other three indexes are components
of the total unit cost. They
indicate where do observed differences in total unit cost come from.
The labour

cost repomed

here corresponds

to all employees.

may be useful

to

not reported

in

Although

the ICAO Financial Data publication, where only cockpit personnel cost is separated as
a single item, it is possible
to obtain information
on expenditure
on all worker
categories from the Fleet&Personnel
publication.
Energy

cost is taken

directly

Capital cost is defined
equipment,
maintenance

between

corresponds

airlines.

This input includes
and

goods

aircraft

fuel and oil.

and amortization

of flight and ground

equipment.

total unit costs (a) and the sum of the others indexes

(b+c+d)
charges);

data and it includes

as the sum of flight equipment
insurance,
rents for leased
and overhaul expenditures
(excluding
labour costs spent on

these tasks), and depreciation
The difference

from reported

to the
used

unit cost of materials
flight-related
in the

charges

production

and

other

services

(airport, en-route
of passenger

consumed

facilities

services,

used here
by

and station

ticketing

and

promotion,andgeneraladministration.Again,labourcostsaredeductedfromall this
categories,
usingthereportedaveragewagesandnumberof workers.
Therelativeimportance
of eachof thecomponents
maybeassessed
by their shareson
totalcost,whicharereportedin table2:
Table2:Averagedistributionoftotalcostbytw.
peofexpenditure
(1995)
Europe
31.2%

Labour
- Pffots/co-pilots

- Other personnel
Energy
Capital
IVlaterials & other services
- Fligtit-reiated

The indexes
e.
fi

charges

!

(6.5 %)

I

(7.2 %)

(24.7 °,41
9.1%
17.2%

i
t
i

(20.4 %)
12.1%
l 8.4 %

42.5 %

i

41.8%

(2 l. 3 %)

I

(I 7. 7 %)

computed to analyze the productivity
Kilometers-Flown
per plane.
Hours-Flown
per pilot.

o

Available

The first index

NorthAmerica
27.6%

of different

factors are the following:

ton-kin per employee.

represents

the productivity

obtained

by airlines

from their

planes,

in

terms of kilometers produced. Many other indexes may be built as alternatives
to this
one. or as complementary
indexes (e.g. number of departures, hours flown, or ton-kin
per plmae or per seat),
aircraft use.
The other two indexes

but we believe
are related

this is a fair representation

to labour

productivity.

on the intensity

of

The first of them (f) identifies

the productivity
of pilots, who constitute
one of the
enlployees.
The second offers information
on the overall

key categories
of airlines'
performance
of workers, in

terms of total production per capita. Untbrtunately,
there is no information
available on
tile actual number of working hours for all worker categories, which would allow a
more refined estimate of productivity.
Cost and productivi
It is common

O' differentials

wisdom

between

in the airline

Europe and North America

industry

that US airlines

have higher

productivities

than airlines in Europe and other regions, which makes it feasible for them to produce
with lower unit costs. This is also a fact that has been reported in some comparative
studies. As an example, Windle (1991) uses a total factor
conclude
that US airlines have a productivity
advantage
comparable

carriers.

In terms

estimated by this author
airlines in 1983).

of unit

in a 7% (data

costs,

the

productivity
approach
to
of 19% over European

advantage

used in estimations

of American

correspond

firms

is

to a sample

of

Our iadcxesindicatethat in the period 1990-95

there still exists a gap between the
pertbrmance
of European airlines and their American counterparts,
both in terms of
productivity
and unit costs• Although not very refined, since there are factors not
controlled
for, a graphical analysis of the cost and productivity
indexes easily reveals
this gap. Figures 1-4 present together the averages for European and American airlines
for each of the unit cost indexes computed,
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An examination

of the unit cost figures indicates
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European airlines is still significant in the 1990% (see figure I). On average, in 1995 the
unit cost per ton-kin produced was 37.7 cents for US firms, while European firms have a
cost of 49.4 cents, i.e. 3 I% higher. Although these figures are revealing, it must be
remarked again that they should only be regarded as indicative, since they are not
controlled

by airlines'

etc. Evolution

characteristics,

namely average

route distances,

of unit cost over recent years reveals an interesting

points served,

fact: there is a

decreasing
trendin theEuropean
tlmt European

airlines' cost from 1990 to 1995. Thcretbrc,
are converging in terms of costs to American levels.

airlines

it seems

Figures 2-4 present the evolution over the same period of the different components
the unit cost. It is observed that the main source of difference between both regions

of
are

thc labour costs. In 1995, a European firm spent 17.1 cents per ton-Mn produced on
labour, while this cost was 10.4 cents for American firms. Energy costs are very. similar
for both groups and they present a common
small gap in thvour of American airlines.
Capital

unit costs were higher

tbr European

downward

firms

covered m the sample, these costs have been
American level in 1995. Finally, the remaining
(unit cost of materials)
America.

trend,

although

there

is again a

in 1990, but in the six-year

period

reduced in Europe to almost match
component
not shown in the figures

is again higher for Europe:

19.2 cents per ton-kin,

against

15.8 in

Summing up. the gross comparison of unit costs between regions indicates that, in 1995,
there is gap of 11.7 cents per ton-kin in favour of American airlines. From this, 6.7 cents
correspond
services.

to labour,

0.5 to energy,

1.1 to capital

and

3.4 to materials

and

other

Going now to the productivity
indexes, it was possible in this case to compute the
values for a longer period than the sample used in the study. Figures 5 to 7 present these
indexes and their evolution

Figure

for the period

1984-1995:

5: Kin-Flown/Plane

Figure

6: Hours-Flown/Pilot
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Figure 5 shows the index related to the productivity
of planes, in terms of kilometers
flown per year. American airlines present a more intensive use of their aircraft, with a
value of 2.11 million
While

this index

km per plane a year, against

reveals

a different

efficiency should be made without
and the type of planes employed.

productivity
analyzing

1.95 million
of planes,

the number

for European
no sound

and length

airlines.

inference

of routes

on

served,

Figure 7: Ton-kin/Employee
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in figures 6 and 7. The analysis of the hours
trends: first, although during the 1980's the

American pilots were working more hours, during the 1990's there is no significant
difference
between
pilots'
productivities
between
Europe
and America.
This
convergence
has been achieved mainly by a reduction in the working time of American
pilots.
pilots.

Second, it is observed a slow but steady rise in the productivity
While in 1984 they were working on average 216 hours a year,

figure has risen to 258 hours, even more than the American
year.
Finally,

figure 7 shows

the more interesting

fact revealed

average

of European
in 1995 this

for that particular

by the productivity

indexes:

there is a significant
gap in terms of ton-km per employee
between Europe and
America. In 1995, while an American carrier was producing 380.5 thousand ton-kin per
employee, a European
firm obtained only 273.8 thousand, i.e. 28% lower. This lower
labour productivity
figure 2 above.

explains,

at least partly, the labour

unit cost difference

observed

in

Indexes in figure 7 also show trends that are interesting: European firms seem to have
been steadily improving their labour productivity over the covered period, and specially
in the 1990's. Production per employee in European carriers
1984-1990 at an annual average rate of 3%, while in the period
to 7.2%. Meanwhile,
American
airlines' labour productivity

increased in the period
1990-1995 this rate rose
has fluctuated over the

period. While in some years at the end of the 1980's there was a decreasing

trend, from

1990 onwards the productivity
of employees has been growing steadily and it has been
maintained above the European level. Technology
improvements
and a more efficient
use of labour may be the likely explanations
for this increase
in the airline industry as a whole during the 1990's.

in employees'

productivity

4. ECONOMETRICANALYSIS.
An estimationof a costfunctionfor theairlineindustryis carriedout in this work, in
orderto havea completepictureof the performance
of carriers,onceall possible
exogenous
thctorsarecontrolledtbr. Furthermore,
thecostfunctionprovidesrelevant
infornlationaboutthe industry(returnsto scaleanddensity,cost complementarity,
substitutionelasticitiesbetweenfactors)andit allowsus to testsomehypothesisabout
ownershipandchangeof regulationeffects.
A translogspecificationis chosenfor thecostfunctionto beestimated.This functional
/brm is the most common

in the analysis

of cost structures

across

industries,

and

in

particular,
it has been previously
applied to the air sector by many authors. Caves,
Christensen and Tretheway (1984); McShan and Windle (1989), and Baltagi et al (1995)
are examples of translog cost functions specifications
to analyze the US air industry.,
while Gillen, Oum and Tretheway (1990) have used it for the Canadian market.
A two-output
specification
is used for the cost function, considering
passenger
and
cargo services provided by amines as different products. Although passenger
services
are the main output of the air industry, cargo services should not be considered
as
merely residual in the activity of general carriers (we have not included in our sample
cargo-specialized
of cargo services

firms, as Federal Express for the US market). Moreover,
as a separate output allows the analysis of the possible

economies

of scope.

Structural

variables

control

tbr factors

are included

in the specification

which are somehow

exogenous

the inclusion
existence of

of the cost function,

to firms. These

are variables

in order

to

that may

be modified by airlines in the long run, but once a network structure is chosen, they
cannot be easily changed in the short run. Variables
included are: average stage of
length, number of points in the airline's network, load factors for passengers and cargo,
and the percentage
of total output performed
by charter
flights.
An alternative
specification
for these variables, in the form of hedonic functions for the output t was
considered,
here.

though it was finally abandoned

The functional

form we estimate

since it did not improve

the results reported

then is:
1

+V, 8sp lnP, lngp +Z_ d,e lng lnYe ,-ap InLFP+_._ InLFC+._c_,CHART
+ A.m,slIn A VSL+ 2,,et In NET+ u
The concept of hedonic functions is simply to use a re-definition of output in which production
characteristics are integrated. Thus, for example, if a level of passenger-kin (Y) is produced under
determined values of load factor, travel distance, cities served, etc. (q), q2, q3, -..) a more parsimonious
way of using all these variables is by defining a hedoni¢ output:
In ¢ = In g + _

_fl,q_

The new variable do may be used as the output to include in the cost function. Hedonic functions have
been used for example by Gilten et ai (1990).

I0

whichis theusualspecification

of a translog cost function, with two outputs plus a set
of structural variables
to control tbr individual effects. Four inputs are considered:
labour (L), energy (E), capital (K) and materials/other
services (M). The variables'
definition is the following:
Y_ : Passengers'
output (available seat-km)
Yo : Cargo output (available ton-k.m, freight and mail)
PL : Average wage (all worker categories included: pilots, other cockpit
personnel, cabin attendants, maintenance and overhaul, ticketing and
sales, other personnel).
P_ : Price of energy (total fuel&oil cost per kilometer

flown).

P_ : Price of capital (capital cost per plane. Costs included
insurance, rents for leased equipment, maintenance

are flight equipment
and overhaul,

depreciation and amortization of flight and ground equipment).
PM : Price of materials and other services (cost per departure. All remaining
costs not considered in the three other inputs are included here).
LFP: Passengers'
load factor.
LFC: Cargo load factor.
CHART : Percentage of total output (passengers and cargo) performed by nonscheduled flights. This variable is used in levels and not in logs since for
many airlines in the sample it takes a value of zero or close to zero.
AVSL : Average Stage Length (total km-flown/number
of departures).
NET : Number of network points served by the airline (this information was
obtained
network

directly from the airlines,
points for year 1996).

it corresponds

to the actual number

of

PUB : Dummy variable, value I if the airline is a public company. For mixedcapital airlines, the rule is to consider them as non-public only if private
capital

share is larger than public and there is evidence

shares or other mechanisms
decisions.
A residual

u is added

N(0,o_-'). Parmneters

exists for public owners

to the cost function

to be estimated

specification,

and

that no golden
to influence

it is assumed

board

to be lid

are _o,%oh, %, _c, a_, _3i, "t'_j(i.j =L,E,K,M),

_._,)-_, 3._h,)._,._, )_,,c,.Since it is assumed

that factor prices'

cross-products

6ip , 6ic ,

are symmetric,

(i.e. y_j=yj_), a total number of 32 parameters are to be estimated. As it was mentioned
the section describing
our sample, a total number of 105 observations
is available.

in
In

order to obtain more degrees of freedom, we follow the common practice of including
the equations representing
the share of each input over total expenditure
(S_-= P_ X/C).
For the translog

It is possible
of equations

cost function, these equations

then to obtain more efficient
and estimating them jointly

LS_=I, only tl_ree of the four share equations

have the form:

estimators by adding disturbances to this set
with the cost function. Since, by definition
may be used simultaneously.
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Thesystemof equationsis estimated
by full informationmaximum-likelihood
(FIML),
usingtheassumptionthatdisturbances
follow a multinormaldistribution.All variables
areexpressed
as differenceswith respectto theirmeans,so thatelasticitiesand other
parameters
to analyzeindustrycharacteristics
maybedirectlyobtainedfromestimated
coefficients.
Sinceall observations
aredeflatedandexpressed
in realvalues,theyareconsidered
as
comparableoutcomesof a commonindustry,cost structure.Estimationis then
performedby pooling all observations,
withoutany temporaldimension.As it was
mentioned
above,thepossibilityof treatingdataasa panelis not feasible(asit wasour
firstintention),sincetherearetoomanymissingobservations
forairlines.
Consequently,
all airlines' individualeffectsnot capturedby the set of structural
variablesandtheactuallhctorpricelevelswill bepresentin theresidualterms(u). We
consideredthe possibilityof includingdummyvariablesfor eachcompanyto capture
thoseindividualeffects,but no satisfactoryresultswereobtained.Therefore,for the
airlines'efficiencyanalysis,theresiduals
u are used as the main tool. Although for each
airline,

its individual

value of u for a particular

year may also be affected

by random

shocks, we believe they are highly intbrmative
on the efficiency
achieved by each
company. After controlling for all possible structural factors, significant positive values
tbr u are indicative
that the cost of the airline is repeatedly
above the efficient level
indicated by the cost function.
Two arguments reinforce in our case the possibiIity of interpreting the complete residual
u as the result of companies'
outcomes in terms of efficiency. First, random shocks that
might be affecting to airlines (e.g. depressing effect of the Gulf War on passengers'
traffic, sudden price rises, etc) are likely to be affecting in a similar way to all European
carriers
similar

perfonning
international
scheduled services, since all of them operate in very
markets. And second, the possibility
of observing
some residuals
for each

company allows a reduction
pattern is detected.

5. ECONOMIES

OF SCALE

of the risk of making

AND OTHER

wrong

inferences

if a systematic

RESULTS.

This section presents the results obtained in the estimation
of the air industry cost
function. A full description
of estimated coefficients,
standard errors and performed
tests may be found in the appendix.
Before studying
the efficiency
results, some
characteristics
of the industry which are derived
from the estimated
function
are
presented
Returns

and compared
to density

Definitions

to others in previous

works.

a_d returns to scale

followed

here are those common

in the literature,

although

there still exists a

debate in the profession
about the more adequate measure.
Returns to density are
defined as the effect on costs of a proportional
increase in all outputs considered,
keeping network size and other characteristics
as constant. They are measured
inverse of the sum of the elasticities of costs with respect to outputs. Meanwhile,

t2

by the
returns

to scalearcdefinedastheeffectof a proportionalincrease
in outputsand
For our sample,

the following

- Returns

to density:

D = (ev, + ew) "t= 1.057

- Returns

to scale:

S = (eyp + arc+ e,,o,) -I= 1.198

In both expressions

network

size.

values are obtained:

above, e, represents

the elasticity

(s.d. 0.0548)
(s.d. 0.0773)

of costs with respect

to variable

i.

The obtained results indicate the presence of slight economies of density and scale for
airlines, similar in size to those of previous works. Caves et al (1984) report returns to
density

between

lie between
than returns

1.21 to 1.29 for US carriers,

find values

that

I.I 5 and 1.26 for Canadian firms. In our case, returns to scale are higher
to density, since we obtain in our sample that an increase in the number of

points served results
According

while Gillen et al (1990)

in some net cost savings.

to Oum and Zhang (1997),

these traditional

measures

studying

the presence

of economies
to scale suffer from a fundamental
drawback, which may explain why
there seems to exist a contradiction
between the constants returns to scale obtained in
the literature and the observed trend to larger airlines and more concentration
in the
industry (see appendix I). The point is that other structural variables apart from network
size may have been overlooked in the computation
of returns to scale. Changes in output
or in network configuration
may have an effect on some structural variables, which are
supposed

to be constant

when analyzing

returns

to scale.

In order
auxiliary

to try in our work the correction
proposed by Oum-Zhang,
the
equations are estimated by OLS (between parenthesis, t-statistics):

following

In LFP =

4.2 - .00_I2In Y_ + .024 In NET - .062 In Pt," .0049 in Pa + .0015 In P_ + .0743 In Ps_
(58.6) (-.48)
(1.25)
(-2.9)
(-.257)
(.066)
(6.366)

In LFC =

-.47 - .0065 In Y=+ .089 In NET + .696 In PL+ •178 In Pe - .0377 In PK+ .0581 2nPs_
(-.80) (-.I37)
(.678)
(5.74)
(1.948)
(-.0527)
(8.258)

in AVSL = 6.268 + .294 In NET- .382 In PL," .133 In PE+ .0213 In P_:+ .457 In P,,,
(17.2) (6.997)
(°4.42)
(-1.736)
(.277)
(8.171)
Two separate equations are estimated for load factor of passengers
(LFP) and cargo
(LFC) and an equation for the average stage length (AVSL). Contrary to the case of
Oum and Zhang (1997), our equations for load factors indicate that the effects of output
and netv,ork size are not significant,
therefore there is no need to correct for them.
However.
points

the average

served.

determine

Taking

stage length is positively
this effect

into account,

affected

by an increase

we compute

in the number of

a corrected

coefficient

to

the degree of returns to scale:

- Full elasticity:

F = (cvp + eve + e,,, + ce,,_l c_l,,,)

-_= 1.576 (s.d. 0.13398)

Although the obtained coefficient would be indicating the existence of large returns to
scale, it must be considered that its standard error is relatively large, therefore it has not
been estimated

very

precisely

(a 95% confidence
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interval

would

include

values

from

1.31to 1.84).Moreover,the cost elasticitywith respectto averagestagelength
estimated
in our sample(ec_v_
= -0.682)seemsto belarger,in absolutevalue,thanthe
oneobtainedin otherstudies.Caveset al (1984)reporta valueof-0.148 tbr the US
case, and a non-significant
1987). Gillen et al (1990)

positive value of 0.006
report a value of-0.18l

in a different work (Caves et al,
for the Canadian case. The high

elasticity in our sample may be originated by the /'act that we are including airlines of
very different size and type of network served. Since we believe its value may be
affecting to the estimated coettlcient lbr economies to scale, it is simply presented here
as an application of the correction proposed in Oum and Zhang (1997) to our sample of
airlines.
Cost complementarity
Another

salient aspect which may be analyzed

from our two-output

specification

for the

cost function is the possible existence of cost complementarities
between products. In
order to study if the production of one of the products has effects over the marginal cost
of production of the other product, the cross derivative of the cost function with respect
to both outputs

may be analyzed.

Since we are only interested
O:C

in checking

C
=--(ape
YvY_

OY_OYc

For the case of the translog

function:

the sign of this expression,

and by definition,

+ a pct _ )

the first term on the RMS of the expression
above is always positive, it suffices
estinaate the value of the second term. From our estimated parameters we obtain:
%¢ + % % = 0.0327
The positive sign obtained
between the two products

to

(s.d. 0.072473)
would be indicating that no cost complementarity
exists
considered (passengers
and cargo). However,
again it is

important
to observe that the standard error for the estimated
coefficient
is large,
therefore it would also be possible to accept a null coefficient
or even a negative one.
No clear conclusion may then be provided from our cost function about this point.

Public

Ownership

One hypothesis
airlines

we are interested

is the existence

in testing on our sample

of a negative

effect of public

of European

ownership

and Aanerican

on firms'

efficiency.

Although this question has been previously analyzed by other authors, it is interesting to
revise if privatizations
which have taken place in some countries and the general process
of liberalization
have had an impact on improving the performance
of publicly owned
airlines. As a benchmark of reference, Windle (1991) estimated that European airlines
had 10.5% higher unit costs compared
to US firms in 1983, due to government
ownership.
In our cost function,
variable
associated

(PUB)

we capture the effect of public ownership

with value

to this variable

one for public

firms.

(%o_) will be indicating

14

of airlines

A positive
higher

costs

sign

with a dummy

for the coefficient

for public airlines,

and

moreover, we may be able to quantify
estimated cost function:
c%,u = 0.0742

the efl%ct lbr an average

to discard
values
likely

analysis,

sign as it was a priori expected,

completely

From the

the coefficient

presents

(s.d. 0:0653)

As it is the case for the cost complementarity
indeed a positive

sized career.

the possibility

although

its standard

error is not small enough

of a null effect. A 95% confidence

interval

yields

for c_l in the range (-0.056, 0.205). Although this interval is suggestive of the
presence
of a positive
effect of ownership
on costs,
we cannot
state

unambiguously

its presence

in our sample of airlines.

Keeping in mind this caveat, if the actual estimated coefficient ap, b may be assumed to
be valid, it would be indicating the presence of a cost difference of 7.7% between a
public airline and a private one, for the average firm size in the sample (i.e. an airline
with an average output level of 9,763 mill. available ton-km). Compared
to the 10.5%
value reported by Windle (199l) referred to 1983, the smaller value obtained in our
sample tbr the period 1990-1995 could be indicative of an improvement
in the outcomes
of publicly-owned
European airlines. However, the detected cost-augmenting
impact of
public ownership
on costs would lead to recommend
more privatizations
in the sector
for those countries that still keep their flag airlines as government-owned
firms, if they
want to improve their efficiency.

Efficiency

results of individual

Residuals

obtained

potential

airlines

from the estimated

cost reductions

that inefficient

cost
airlines

function

axe used here to estimate

may achieve.

Since the complete

the
value

of the term u in the cost function is interpreted as departure from the efficient frontier,
on the assumptions
mentioned above, by definition we obtain positive values for u but
negative for others. Therefore, the negative values reported in the following table must
be interpreted as the cost savings that highly efficient
respect to the average frontier in the industry.

firmg are already

obtaining

with

There are some surprising results in table 4, which seem to contradict some common
wisdom in the European air industry. These are namely the high efficiency values that
Alitalia and Olympic show, and the large potential
cost reduction
obtained
for
Lufthansa.
interpreting

Our reading of these results is that one should be extremely careful when
comparative
studies between
firms from different countries,
since the

simple fluctuation
observed outcomes.
an appreciation
world airlines"

of exchange rates may be introducing
distortions
on the firms'
For the case of Lufthansa, Oum and Yu (1997) have concluded that

of the German mark may be the main cause of the low position in the
efficiency ranking obtained by them for this company using 1993 data,

and a similar effect is found in their work for the Japanese
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company

JAL.

Table 4: Potential

airlines'

cost reductions

Europe

North America

'Air France

8.14%

Air Canada

Alitalia

-8.88%

American

6.._5 go

Austrian

7.70%

Canadian

2.85%

Briiish Ai_vays

-5.31%

Continental

-3.44%

British

-0.99%

Midland

Finnair

i
1

5.74%

iberia

i

1.o.69 Fo

9.72%

Delta

-4.84%

Northwest

-3.66%

TWA

-5.54%
t

KLM

-7.63%
'

Lufthansa

'

I

8.59%

Olympic

-10.71%

SAS

24.56%

Swissair

-3.73%

TAP

United

3.14%
1

USAir

14,35%

13, 19%

Our suspicion
is that the same currency
effect may be the cause
Alitalia and Olympic, on the opposite direction to that of Lufthansa.
period

1990-1995

both the lira and the dracma

have suffered

of our .'suits for
In fact, .raring the

considerable

de Jreciations

against the dollar. The lira was devaluated
several times and finally excludc:d from the
European Moneta_
System in 1992, and since then it has followed a decre:,sing trend.
In 1995. its value against the dollar was around 25% lower than at the begir:;ing of our
covered period. A similar pattern is observed tbr the dracma, which lost aro,zp, d 30% of
its value against the dollar during this 6-year period. Estimated efficient)
.'sults for
both these companies
are then likely to be affected by this rapid fluctuati
n of their
national exchange rates, and should not lead to conclude that Alitalia and ¢ ympic are
highly efficient

airlines.

A final exercise

performed

using

the residuals

from our estimated

cost fmction

is to

analyze the existence of some temporal variation on the efficiency patterns. This cannot
be done for all individual firms, since it has been mentioned
several times along the
work that there are many missing observations
in our sample, so that for come airlines
only 2 or 3 observations
out of 6 may be available.
Instead, we have opted for
computing for each year the average value of residuals of those companies
for which
data are available. This is done separately for European and American firm: to compare
the evolution

of airlines'

efficiency

in both regions.

in figure 8.
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The obtained

averages

",re presented

Figure

8: Evolution

of average

residuals

0,06
0,05
0,04
0.03
%%.
0.02
0,01
0
.0,01

_990

1991

"..

1992

1993

."

1994

'.

1995

-0.02
-0.03
-0,04
_- - o--. Eu_oe

The absolute

value of averages

_N_th

,N'n,sn_,

should not be interpreted

as the potential

cost reduction

of the region for that particular
year, since averages are computed
over a changing
number and mix of companies,
therefore the presence
or absence
of a extreme!y
(in)efficient firm may affect the results. The idea of these averages is simply to check if
any systematic trend is observed.
As a matter of fact, the analysis of figure 8 seems to indicate the presence of a
decreasing pattern in the evolution of the residuals' averages, both for Europe and North
American amines, although for the case of Europe the observation
corresponding
to
year 1994 seems to lie away from the general trend. The interpretation
of these trends is
that airlines in both regions have been improving their outcomes
in the direction of
becoming

more cost efficient

during the period

1990-1995.

6. CONCLUSIONS.
A descriptive anaiysis shows differences between European
and North American
airlines during the period 1990-95, both in terms of unit costs and productivity.
American firms have lower unit costs, and this is mainly due to labour unit cost
differentials,
but also to some energy cost advantage. Productivity
per employee is
also muct_ higher for American

airlines,

case for piiots, wl_ich work a very
employed by European airlines.
European

although
similar

firms seems to have improved

of unit costs and productivity.

Labour

cost has been

through

employees'

Indeed, the indicator

productivity.

of hours

their performance

1990 to 1995, probably

has substantially
grown during
compared to American levels.

from 1990 onwards,

number

workforce
the period,
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shedding
showing

although

over the period

constantly
and

this is not the

per year to piiots

some

in terms

decreasing
improvements

the production

from
in

per employee

there is still a large gap when

Theestimated
translogcostfunctionprovidesmorereliableefficiencycomparisons,
in the sensethatall exogenous
factorsaffectingairlines'productionarecontrolled
tor. Somefindingsfrom our estimatesare relevantto be mentioned:first, mild
returnstodensityandreturnsto scaleareobtainedtbr theindustry,with coefficients
of 1.06and 1.2,respectively.However,the presenceof economiesof scaleis
notablyreintbrcedif the correctionof theeffectof changesin outputandnetwork
overoti_erexogenous
factorsproposed
by OumandZhang(1997)is performed.In
thatcase.a valueof 1.58is obtained,althoughwe believethishigh valuemaybein
partaffectedby thelargeelasticityof coststo averageroutedistancethatwe obtain
m our work (-0.68). Another tectmical result is that no significant cost
complementarity
betweenpassenger
andcargoservicesis detected.
Regardingthe effector"publicownership,we estimatethat for an averageairline
producingan outputof 9,800million ton-kin a year, thereexists a 7.7% cost
differentialif thecompanyis publiclyowned.However,the estimatedparameter
to
checkthis effectis onlyweaklysignificant,thereforethe resultshouldbecarefully
taken.[n maycase,thevalueis in therangeof thatreportedin otherstudies(Windle
(1991)obtaineda valueof 10.5%for year1983).
-

The analysisof airlines"efficiencyis performedusing the residualsfrom the
estimated
costfunction.Averagevaluesovertheperiodfor eachcompanyareused,
to eliminaterandomfactorsas muchas possible.Using theseaverages,potential
costsavingsarecomputedfor airlines,with respectto theestimatedfrontier.Forthe
groupof Europeanfirms,BritishAirwaysandKLM appearas the moreefficient,
with costsbelowtheaverageefficientvalues.Strangeresultsare obtainedfor the
casesof Alitalia andOlympic,whichshowasefficient firms,but we believetheir
observed
outcomesmaybeaffectedby currencyfluctuations.Thistypeof exchange
rates'effecthasbeenpreviouslydetectedby OumandYu (1997),speciallyfor rife
caseof Luffhansa.tbr whichwe alsoreporta non-expected
inefficientprofile.The
moreinefficientfirmsin theEuropean
groupareSAS,[beriaandTAP.
For the North Araericangroup,the moreefficient US airlinesare in our sample
Continental,Delta, Northwestand TWA. Both Canadianfirms includedin our
sampleshowup asrelativelyinefficient,with a poorerperformance
for thecaseof
Air Canada.
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Appendix1: Estimationof
Defining

product

Economies

in air transport

of Scale

generate

from aggregate

problems.

What

cost functions.
must

be

considered

as

production, the number of passenger carried between Madrid and London?. It can be
considcred a different
product, passenger carried in business class and tourist class? Or
even the different fares tbr tourist class that force to passengers
to carry, out specific
condhions? Neither can be considered the same product, a direct flight between Madrid
and London, that an indirect flight through Paris or Barcelona.
In general transport
industry and in particular air transport can be defined as an industry characterised
by
mukiproduction.
A precise definition

of product

in air transport

would

require

at least an n dimension

vector to recover each origin-destination
(see Jara-Diaz, 1996). This make very difficult
to estimate cost functions because is necessary to have available the cost components
for each journey
type. The use of
aggregate
cost functions
tries to solve this
intbrmation

problem.

So a vector of aggregate products (9) , tonnes-kilometres
or passenger-kilometres,
and
a vector of qualities (q), load factor, number of points seved or average stage lenght, try
to represent

the true output of the company

So we have a real cost function

(see Jara and Cort6s,

1996).

since we would have to estimate

the economies

ofscale.

c(w.nx)
And we have an aggregated

So ma?' estimation
cost function

estimated

cost function

of (2(9, q) can be considered

to obtain them.

as an implicit

representation

C(Y).

Either 9(Y) as q(Y) depends on the true desegregated
output Y.
Marginal Cost respect to components
Yj of Y can be obtained as:

ad

a_ at
j=l

So the estimated

cost elasticity

at, or,

a_ aq_
k_l

respect to Y,:
tlt

p

j-|

k-I

where:
Ej, = aggregated output _'_elasticity respect to Y_.
EkP = quality output % elasticity respect to Y_.
Iqj= cost elasticity

respect to aggregated

2o

output = traslog

coefficient

of the true

rlL'1= costelasticityrespecttoquality= traslog
Then estimated

index of economies

coefficient.

of scale can be obtained

nt

as:

P

L.u
k=l

k "h h

where:
_j

12'q_

=

Zgi_

=

Z

_'qL_

Therefore, products and qualities elasticities are compensated
level of economies
of scale from the aggregated cost function.
The

most

important

aggregated

question

output variables

For aggregated

output

is that to obtain

and all qualities

measures,

tile level

measure,

average

Tonn-kilometres

stage length,

to obtain

the

of economies

of scale

all

must be included.
and Passenger-kilometres,

value 1 (see Jara and Cortes, 1996), so it's not necessary
obtained directly from the cost equation estimated.
For quality

by weights

the weight

to weigh

to compensate

C_,, have

the elasticities

elasticity

of this

quality have value 0, so this quality must not be included
in the calculation
of
economies
of scale (Jara and Cortes, 1996). For the quality measure, average load
factor, a sensitivity
analysis must be done between 0 and I (Jara and Cortes, 1996). In
the first case that would mean that additional increments in demand is compensated
by
an increase in the frequency to maintain load factor constant. In the second case an
increase of demand
affects directly to load factor because frequency is maintained
constant. As alternative
for this variable (Oum and Zhang, 1997) make an estimation of
the elasticity

of load factor respect to output directly.
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Appendix
Method:

2: estimation
Full Intbrmation

results
Maximum

Likelihood

Equations: Costs ShareL ShareK ShareMEndogenous
SMConvergence
Achieved after 8 Iterations
929.166
Number

of Observations

=

Variables: LCOST
Log of Likelihood

SL SK
Function

105

Standard
Parameter

_o

Eslimalc

8.09162

Error

.034530

1.13614%

.899812

t-statistic

234.334_

.074247

.065351

.071401

|2.6023=,

.046165

.015889

-.552553

.073606

.627194_

-.877938E-02

_L

.298475

.787987E-02

37.8782

_E

.041686

.065702

.634469

_K

.163176

.187522E-02

87.0168

_

.423682

.697966E-02

60.7024

YLL

.164447

.023266

7.06825

Y_E

.478189

.426951

1.12001

"{_K

.100389

.724344E-02

13.8593

y_,

.147563

.019613

7.52390

7LE

.035056

.029829

1.I7523

"(L_

-.047149

.740266E-02

-6.36915

YLx,

-.057877

.019046

-3.03886

YeK

-.031717

.665419E-02

-4.76641

y_,

-.070314

.028228

-2.49090

YKx,

-.054244

.507834E-02

-10.6814

6Lp

-.093457

.033024

-2.82999

5Ep

-.312558

.175433

-1.78164

6K0

.015013

.738983E-02

2.03161

8_p

.073998

.027250

2.71550

6_,

.073590

.026576

2.76905

hE,

.266696

.160444

1.66223

8_,

-.920714E-02

.660879E-02

-1.39317

6_,_

-.073718

.021773

-3.38577

k_

-.587879

.355514

-1.65361

k,

-.066608

.072180

-.922806

k,,

-.i18364

.363659

-.325479

A,,,,

-.681593

.144055

-4.73148

k_,,

-.110937

.074551

-1.48807

Equation
Dependent

Costs
variable:

Mean of dependent

LCOST
variable

= 8.15123

Std. dev. of dependent vat. = .957915
Sum of squared residuals = .785391
Variance of residuals = .747992E-02

Std. error of regression
R-squared = .991772
Durbin-Watson
statistic

22

= .086487
= 1.97060

=

Equation
ShareL
Dependent variable:

SL

Mean of dependent variable = .299019
Std. dev. of dependent var. = .075261
Sum of squared residuals =. 188575
Variance of residuals =. 179595E-02

Equation
Dependent

variable:

= 2.61761

SK
variable

=. 163162

Std. dev. of dependent var. -- .036166
Sum of squared residuals = .014470
Variance of residuals =.137805E-03

Dependent

R-squared = .679969
Durbin-Watson
statistic

= .042379

ShareK

Mean of dependent

Equation

Std. error of regression

Std. error of regression

= .011739

R-squared = .893631
Durbin-Watson
statistic = 2.25017

ShareM
variable:

Mean of dependent

SM
variable

= .423124

Std. dev. of dependent var. = .069013
Sum of squared residuals =.140361
Variance of residuals =. 133677E-02

Std. error of regression = .036562
R-squared = .717274
Durbin-Watson
statistic = 2.58134
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Overview

of Regulatory

Changes

Strate_es

in International

Towards

the

US Open

Air
Sides

Transport

andAsian
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Initiatives

"7"

by
Tae

Tiffs paper

identifies

U.S. open

sldea initiatives

with those

issues

brief history

Sldes agreement

History

The paHr

regulation

aviation

air services

Section

III.

Section

as foLlows.

the recent

Section

US initiatives

17 identifies

IV identifies

major

deal.
[ is a

for olin

some key problems

Key lessons from the US-Canada

and governments.

governments

how they might

challenges

Section V describes

to deal with the US open sides initiatives.

Open

that the US
the suggested
The paHr

and conc',usions.

of International

of Bilateral

Air Services

Systena

Regulation

Prior to World

governments

for the fights to serve foreign

assisted U.S.

airlines,

,

War 17, U.S. airlines negotiated

territories.

begin to assume

( Taneja, I976, p.2fiS), t At the 1944 Chicago Convention

of the Pea_

Conferenca

commercial

in 1919 in Paris.

directly with foreign

Although _e State Department

only in 1943 did the U.S. government

t The basic rule ofinU:mazion_l law regarding
Commission

including

market.

when they dealwith the

and suggests

is orgar.ired

treaty negotiations.

in Section

for Asian carriers _d

service, negotiations

Asian countries,

bring to Asian carriers

ends with a summary

History

single

axe described

open sides initiatives

towards

air services

of European

Oum

Asian aixli.nes and governments

and practically.

of international

with traditional

strategies

dizected

strategically

sides and creation
associated

major issues facing

I-loon

aviation was established

sometimes

responsibility
on International.

for air
Civii

at the Aeronautical

The Paris Convention es',ablished the International

Commission for Air Navigation to revolve any technical problems arising be,'w_a c_untries. Although the US did
not ratify this convention, the Pan American Convention signed in I-Iavana in 1928 agreed to most of the principles

•

.-.
4

-

...........

.....,.

.-

..

Aviation,

the United

services)

States

The Convention

rights for international
transport

matters

pressed

for an open, multilateral,

failed to produce

air transport

have been governed

for other bilaterals

an inter-governmental

agreement

air treaties

air transport

of international

the countries

air

involved.

The

F', wkich has provided

Civil Aviation

and operational

I.ATA was established

involved in tec,knical and commercial

aspects

air

1988, p.5).

a forum for discussion

of technical

international

on commercial

between

also set up the L'uernational

coordination

to ICAO,

agreement

in I946, known as "Bermuda

agency which provides

basis for world-wide
counterweight

by bilateral

to follow (Kasper,

The C,kicago Convention

for postwar

services. Since then, all commercial

US and UK signed the first bilateral
a framework

a multilateral

regime

aspects of aviation.

of key aviation

standards

in I945 to represent
IATA served

Organization

issues and the

and pra_ices.

the interest

(ICAO),

Acting

of airlines,

as an effective

as a
and is

industry

cartel

for a long tisne.
Bermuda
freedoms,

f was a fairly liberal agreement

multiple carrier designations,

and substantial

in 1976, the UK gave notice of termination
the US carriers
agreement

had a disproportionate

in 1977

desi_ations,

which

tra._c be_'een

Britain

supplied,

5a freedom

of Bermuda

British

no capacity, iL-nit on 3rd./4th

fights. However,

I, claiming

share of traffic.

accommodates

Emit capacity

in that it included

that under the terms of the treaty,

The US was forced

demands

to virtually

and give up some of US carriers'

and other countries.

It was a devastating

thirv¢ years later

to sign

e!imina_e

muItiple

"beyond

policy setback

Bermuda

rights"

rI

carrier
to carry

for the US (Toil,

1997).
Bilateral
of se,'-dces,

agreements

pricing,

and other

based on the principle
different

typically regulate
commercial

of reciprocity,

carrier and route designations,

as aspects

business.

an equal and fair exchange

in size and with airlines of varied strength.

generally specify services

o_'doing

and routes to be operated

Bilateral

between

capacity and frequency
Bilateral

of rig,hts between
agreements

the two countries,

agreements

are

countries

very

vary in forrr_
designate

but they

airlines and

of_e Paris Convantiom
: This U.S_intent was consistent with its national inte,,'_'t_ ARer WW- Ig the U.S. _'merged as just about
the only nation in the world who could su_y
launch commercial scale internanonal airi.i.ucservice_. The
U.S. had aircr_ technology, trained personnel and fixm.uc_alability whiie the wax had de',_oa-ta_ the European
countries and Japan

capacityto be providedby eachairline,stipulatefaresettingmechanisms,
andspecifyconditions
underwhichpassengers
maybetakenorpickedupineachcountryandflownto thirdcountries(fifth
freedomrights). Thereis, at present,an extensivenetwork,of bilateralagreements.Each
international
airlinefacesa complexwebofbilateralairservices
agreements
signedbyitshomestate.
The e.-dstence
of thesebilateralagreements
hasgreatlyconstrainedthe freedomof indb,'iduaI
scheduled
airlines,andlimitedcompetition
in theinternational
airtransportindustry(OumandYu,
1997,ch.3).

Towards

Competitive

markets

System

- US Initiatives.

in 1978 has demonstrated

se.wices,

Carter

Statement

Administration

on International

of the policy (which

the advantages
launched

Air Transport

became

achieved

of competition

through

the

liberal

Netherland
1983).

bilateral

The

operating,

effect

Negotiations

airline system.

in August

Air Transport

agreements

were thus conducted

signed between

place".

the United

air

the Presidentia[

1978. The underlying

philosophy

Competition

benefits can best be achieved through

air services

air transport

On international

policy by signing

airlines in a fair market

ofbiIateral

negotiations

agreements

s, Germany,

of competitive

the pro-competitive

consumer

between

renegotiation

A series of crucial bilateral

of the U.S. domestic

the main trust of the International

19793, L_.TCA) was that "maximum
and extension

The deregulation

Act of

the preservation

This broad aim was to be

(Dresner and Tretheway,

over the period

1977-82,

States and 23 countries

t987).

resulting
including

in
the

B etgium, Israet, S ingapo re, Thailand 4, Ko re.z, and the P ki.Iippines (Haan ap pel,

of these liberal

the total scheduled

points with direct services

bilaterals

capacity

to European

_'le new US aviation
I978, the US Civii Aeronautics

was

offered

dramatic

expansion

in th"ose markets,

of

the number

and the number

of airlines

of US gateway

or Asian destinations.

policy also directly

affected

IATA's

price-se_ing

Board (C._B) issued an order requiring

to show cause why CAB should not withdraw

its approval

activities.

In June

IATA and associated

ot_,and consequently

anti-tru_

parties

exemption

3 United. States, PubLicLaw 96-192, 1980, 94 STAT; 34.
Tl_und renou_ace.A,
its air servioe agr_ment (ASA) with. the U.S. in 1990, claiming the agreement
favored US airline.s: A new agreement was sig_ext in May 1996 to open their aviation markets to each other's
_'rie."s.

for, IATA's Trai_cConferences
andotherrelatedagreements
_.Withoutexemptionfromanti-trust
[egislation,alriinesparticipatingin pricingagreements
wouldriskbeingtakento U.S. courtwhen
flyingto the UnitedStates.The immediateshort-termeffectof the ShowCauseOrder wasthe
withdrawalof all.US airlinesfi-omLATA
international

trafthc was to and from the United

considerable.

worldwide,

Ln March
with all European

it undoubtedly

countries.

with a three year phase-in
States

States,

so the potential

signed be_'een
agreemen_

In February

provision.

Denmark,

countries

Belgium,

with the Czech Republic

for approval

LATA's

member

threat

abandoned

including

signed

open skies agreements
Switzerland,

to IATA

amidst protests

"open

from

sides" agreement:
1992 bem'ee:

were signed between
Norway,

(Kayal,

1997).

The U.S. also signed

a phased

alliance z. In all, about 40% of Europe-US

,
ws

open sk_ :s

1995, the first such Fact with a former Eastern
are underway

tb

Luxembour

and Austria _. One year later, an open skies agreement

L_December

BA-AA

was

an open skies agreemer

Sweden,

the US and U-K over an "open s'Ides" accord

of the proposed

airlines'

:m_fluence in the industry.

transborder

1995, US and Canada

In May 1995,

the U.S. and Germany

country r. Talks between

undermined
to negotiate

of LATA

The first US "open skies" deal was simned in September

and 9 European

Finland,

seriously

i992, the United States offered

the U.S. and the Netherlands.

Iceland,

Over 40 percent

Althougah the Show Cause Order was subsequently

governments

United

membership.

b? c

as a prerequi
traffic

flies un

:e
_.r

open skies (Hill, 1997).
Following
aviation

the successes

in Europe,

the U.S. started

to shiP[ the focus

policy to Asia. T'ne U.S. Open Skies initiative in Asia was announced

by April, 1997, Singapore
the 1997,

Bmnei, Malaysia,

the United

became
Taiwan

of its knternatic

in summer

1996,

the first country in'Asia to sign an open skies agreement.
and New Zealand

5 United State_, Civil Aeromaudes Board, Order 78_-78,'ltme/.2,

1978.

s According to Air Transport Ass_ation of America (1995), the Unite_ States signed, new h-oer_
agreements or amendments _th 16 coua_triesin 1995.
It offered a s_mi_aragreement to Poland too, but sN1 needs to work Jt out.
s The Uuiw.d.States has made open skies a condition for agorot'mr c.odes_.re a//iance.s.
5

:',d

Dt "k=g

have also agreed on open sides accords

S t.ates (U'S DOT News 91-97).

ai

dth

Towards

Compe,_dve

System

- European

deregulating

its hternai

market

(Tretheway,

1991, and Matin't, 1995).

similar to the US domestic

Initiatives.

through

market.

:he adoption

market

potential

th_:s became

passenger.'.

National

of

Union

the three

Any EU-registered

the world's
ownership

for Iiberalizz_ion
market

carrier has the right to run domestic

se_'ices

single aviation

and Icetand.
market

The single European

with more than 370 million

rules have been replaced by EU ownership

have been given freedom to set fares, with sffeguards

ha

a single aviation

as ,,veil as in Norway

largest

has been active

packages

From April, 1997, the EU created

within any of the EU'_ 15 member countries,
aviation

The European

against predatory

criteria•

pricing through

Air_es

competition

rules.
So far, these changes
access to EU mem_.r
of its Member.Staten
including

'Open

Commission

authorize

S:.ies'

independent

with

states

the US ('Button,

carriers'

of the community.

agreements

1997).

Many

with non-EU

However,

the

states,

European

The EU

a multilateral

is promoting

transport

aviation

ministers

agreement

a deal with the United

recently

decided

with the United

States

to

States

as a model for EU-

with tYlrd countries.

and 5iultHateral

Flaws in Current

Approaches

Bilateral

Process

for Liberal_,ation

and Proposed

to influence bihteraJ

airline.

Carrier

interests

tend to take a back seat. In this environment,

interests

negotiation

Solutions.

allowed

are bound

not agree to inc',ease competition
reasons

members

on foreign

by individual states, and is making efforts to negotiate

as a bloc.

the Corm'Tfission to negotiate

wide accords

Negotiation

liberal bilateral air services

negotiation

The Commission

a_eements.

remains with individual

agreements

on beha:-" of member

OBarnard, 1996).

Bilateral

presently

have been pursuing

oppose_

ah treaties

states

do not apply to extra-EU

why the countries

oppose liber_llr_tion.

In many countries,

process. Tais is especially

to dominate

the bilateral

flag carriers

true when a country

negotiation

process

with competitive

Tais bilateral process

carriers

has only one

while

consumer

although con_miners gala, governments

unless their flag carriers can also win. This definitely
are pro-h'beralization

is, therefore, unworkable

while

would

is one of the

other

unless liberalization

are

c.,ztmtries
offers win-

win situationto thecarriersof bothcountriesinvolved.It is inherentlyflawed
compet;,dorl

usually makes

some players

In order to make the bilateral
for the broader
bern'con

goods and services

countries.

detem'_ning

This would

winning industries

to form a single European
economic
market

integration
despite

associated

employment

There
countries
these

new entrants

influence

interests

carriers.

There

to increase

economic

between

markets,

negotiation

countries

in

were able

to agree on a singie aviation
of the

ak negotiation

will emerge.
markets.

process

process.

Sooner

First,

as

or later, some

of

This wi,il tend

as the governments

to reduce

the

need to deal with

carriers, and it needs to be seen to play fak to the multiple
that countries
of carriers.

for increazing

tends to enhance
for consumer

In addition,

competition

consumer

with mukiple carriers

benefits

deregulation

in international

power and encourage
of increasing

make efforts

m_kets.

consumer

competition

of domestic
Secondly,

movement.

relative

This

to the weight

interests.

Approach.

There

have been included
fora _ve

from

better

ak transport

deals among panidpating
package

is no obvious
other

international

in the General
chances

matters

reason

why international

trade

Ageement

for Liberalization

should move towards

countries.
on ak transport

matters.
on Trade

multilateral

without

aviation

EspeciaLly,
in Services

on a regional

It is nearly impossible

or _obal

matters

should be

telecommunications
(GATS)

fi-amework.

scale.

Eventually,

fora which can strike package

for counu-ies

the opportunities

7

. :...

its course

lose their a_A.nes and much

the bilateral

new entrants

designation

effects

services

.:-

It was possible

to enter international

via multipte

any diK'erently

.:.,..,. ....

takes

that the European

will eventually

ways to improve

the competing

has positive

liberaiizatioa

countries

in the bilateral

handled

international,

states.

is alto a strong emph-ical evidence

to the carf.er

Muiti.iateral

It is arguable

advantage

market because the aviation was included as a part of the whole

will be allowed

advancement

Multilateral

the .theory of comparative

some

will likely add to the weight
#yen

allow

their domestic

competition

airline markets

This would off'or a better chance for striking a compromise

base.

of flag carriers

con_ctkng

should be kncludeA in _he negotiations

trade.

the EU member

are two additional

deregulate

to work, aviation

of each counm/.

the fact, that

increased

to win and some to lose.

process

ak- services

among

because

to agree on a mukilateral

to tradecff" with other sectors

of"

economy.

Therefore,

ICAO would not be an effectdve forum

because

liberalization

of air transport

will always

ASEAN

stand a better chance ofh'beralizing

to discuss liberalization

create winners

and losers.

of air transpor_

WTO,

APEC and/or
.

air services

along with other goods and services

most countries

wii1 be able to find some winning industries.

Lessons

the Success

from

of theUS-Canada

Until W"fO and/or APEC becomes
the aviation
countries

industry

Prior
services
agreed

to February,

agreements
that,

reasons.
populati.oa

and strong

at some congested

problems

between

Iike-mLaded

In this case, US-Canada

open sNes

example

with some useful lessons.

hubs.

Canadian
Canada's

continental

Second,

carriers

in the world.
would

fear was based

services

network

since the majority

of

bilateral

air

Expe,'-ts

be strucmrai1y
on the following

supported
transborder

by large
travelers

to eight major cities in Canada, the US carriers would be able to reach over
market

cost effectively

Third, Canadian

by e:('tending their spokes

to these Canadian

carriers may not be able to access landing slots, gates and

U.S. a2uports, so they may not.be able to initiate new services or provide

services.

Although
these

have well developed

transborder

cities from their US hubs.

high frequency

Liberalization

liberalization,

had one of the most restrictive

skies agreement,

to the major US carriers.

and defensible

from or destined

counters

run.

1995, serves as a successful

of an open

US carriers

80% of Canadian

in the short

air services

although they share the largest bilateral air services market

as compared

First,

fora to negotiate

air treaty process.

1995, the US and Canada

in the event

disadvantaged

originate

the only option

signed in February,

Skies Agreement

an effective multilateral

is stuck with bilateral

are probably

agreement

Open

because

there were disagreements
existed.

countries

agreed

Croton:o,

Montreal

In order to remedy

on the following
and Vancouver)

measures.

on the extent of these problems,
the situation

both sides agreed

and create a level playing

field, the two

First, US c_-'riers entry into major Canadian

are to be relaxed gradually

over a three-year

that

phase-in

markets
pe,,,iod 9

9 In fact, a two-year phase-in period was _opted to Moatrml and Vnncou'ver while We NIl ttu'_e-year
period was usext far T_mam.

.

"

whileallowingCanadian
carriersintotheUSmarket_omday1withoutanylimitation.Second,the
U.S. guaranteed
that Canadiancarriersget someadditionalairportslots andgate spacesat the
congested
US airportssuchasChicagoandLaGuardia
In addition

to these efforts

factors

which

helped

carriers

(Air Canada

major US carriers.
with American
Canadian

carriers.

open

Air Canada

1.997). u These

rights of four major airports
These

air seduces

relationships

between

because President

had alliance

had the alliance with United

airport

authorities

vigorously
was

(Vancouver,

taking

Clinton and Prime ,Minister Ci'u-etien appointed

At this high level of negotiation,

other economic

and political

alliance

some fear of
transferred

Edmontorr,

to the locai

the

These other relationships

with at least one

reduced

Caigao')

the local business

into account

Canadian

with the U.S., Canada

Montreal,

representing

important

had an equity

relationships

for the open skies agreement.

conducted

the two countries.

relationship

while Canadian

alliance

several

both of the _v¢o major

shortly before the open skies a_eement

role in lobbying

skies

field, there were

First,

A.irlines International)

(Oum and Park,

Second,

authorities.

important

to create the Ievei playing

the open skies agreement.

and Canadian

Airiines

the operating
.airport

conclude

in New York) °

Third,
overall

interests

played

the negotiation
economic

factors

on the

and political

were taken into account
their respective

an

indirectly

special negotiators.

couid play an important

role at

least indirectly.
Tb.e most
possibie

to create

competitive.

important

level playing field even if the flag carriers

For example,

with, say, Korea.

Koreans

alliance with the Chinese
these measures

lesson learnt from the US-Canada

if airlines in China fee! insecure

may be construed

the opening up of Chinese

aviation

of the two countries

about

may be able to offer significant
flag carriers

open skies agreement

liberalization

concessions

via which they can pool tra._c

as an anti-competitive
market itself increases

behavior

are not equally

of bilateral

agreement

such as doing codesharing
and/or

in western

competition

is that it is

revenue.

Even though

industrial/red,

and thus benefit

countries,
air travelers.

l0 i"_c tl_-yea.r anniversary report publisheti by the US DOT (1998) indimtes that Air Canada has done
outstandingly well and Canadian _ done very wetl dunng the last three years. Tile total US-Canada transborder
passenger tra_c l:msin--by
37.2% (12.1 miiliota to I6.6 million).
u Air Canada

also had alliance

owns _33.3% equity shares

of Canadian.

with Continental

which

it had 28.5%

ownersNp.

American

Challenges
Posedby the U.S.OpenSkiesInitiatives on

Asian Carriers

and Governments
o,°,

The US Open Skies Initiatives.
summer

1996.

In January

agreement

with the United

air service

agreements

(June,

I997),

between

The U.S. goverrwnent announced

1997, Singapore
States u.

(ASAs)

and New

countries'

with Bmnei

Seventh

provision

also provide

In addition,
Freedom

is intended

Thailand.

In particular,

important

element

transpac_c
US-Korea

routes

between

from the struggling

12The U.S. also reached

carriers,

agreements

or

to both

The latter

in Asia.
(South)

Korea

and

of aircra_ff size) as a very

The main reason is that the U.S.

of

smaU aircraft: on their
larger

aircraft

size in

about "past imbalance" in the

gauge. :4 Korea witl also need to worry

be abIe to take away a significant
Japanese

fly

and Bmnei

territory).

including

of economies

by Japan if Korea allows US carriers

would

fights

the U.S. and Singapore

rights in foreign

with Korea.

to allow the changeof

Malaysia

on capacity

(Sth freedom)

On the other hand, the Korean side is concerned

retaliation

U.S. carriers

traffic

5th freedom rights in Korea wish to operate

ASA and is very reluctant

about potential

beyond

Seou! while taking advantage

1997),

with no restrictions

the U.S. is seeking change of gauge rights (change

to/from

open skies

allow airlines from both countries

to work on other countries

for doing Open Skies agreement

markets.

(February,

Express and UPS to set up mini-hubs

has started

carriers who already have extensive
intra-Asia

unlimited

has accomplished

1997), Taiwan

rights on cargo (hubbing

to help Federal

The U.S. government

travellers

(Janua_',

at least the agreements

traffic

in Asia to sign an open skies

Since then the U.S. government

Zealand 's. Most of these agreements

The agreements
carriers.

includes

because

became the first country

any point in the U.S. and any point in that country

frequency.

its Open Skies initiative in Asia in

the change-of-gauge
poction

rights.

of the lapan's

This is

international

and route them via Seout.

on open skies with Taiwan

and Brunei

in early 1997

(US DOT News 48-97).
Sknilar agreements
were signed with six Central American
month (US DOT News 82-97).
,4 A U.S. official is reported
twelve European

nations

Countries

as saying that the U.S. has "change

with which it si_ed

open skies agreements
l0

during the same

of gauge"

(Ballantyne,

fights with. the
1997).

Despitethe denialby asenior
U.S. approach
Germany

in Europe,

into signing

that Washingtoa's
holds

focussing

a deal. The U.S. is now working

strategy

includes

air transportation

directly

Asian countries

number

include ex_ensive

freedom

traffic rights.

principte

for determining

complete

freedom

negative
transport
services

Since

ministers
policy

bilateral agreements
For example,

liberal

Korea

attitude

on

Asia has shifted

away fi-om

because

with other

successes

with a

many of these open skies agreements

may

rights (hubbing or change of gauge rqghts),

services

more freely than most Asian carriers

ber,,veen Asian

most of intra-Asian

and fi-equency

to set their flight frequency

consequences

in this approach

will have open skies or hearty open skies treaties

and some seventh freedom

capacity

led

In Asia, it appears

and somewhat
toward

evenmaJly

Japan to sign a truly open skies bilateral.

may be in a position to set up intra-Asian
because

to Japan

with the rest of Asian countries

within a few years.

fi_%hfreedom

on the U.K. and France.

The new US policy

the U.S. government

This can happen

3rd/4th

matters.

will later pressure

of A.sian countries

U.S. carriers

given its proximity

in Asia paraLiels the

with "soft targets"

forcing Japan to liberalize) s Of'course,

on Japan to working

Undoubtedly,

official, _5 the progress

a series of open skies treaties

a key to the U.S. policy

international

can.

where

U.S. government

of services

countries

have quite restrictive

ASAs apply the "equal

whiie the U.S. carriers

coutd

have

Because

the potential

of such an anomaly has caused enough worry to some countries,

the ASEAN

have established

as a prelude

and prices in the same markets.

benefits"

a group to study this problem

to an eventuat

and to develop

a competitive

air

open skies regime in ASEAN.

_ M.r. Mark Gerchick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation,
has said in
his inte_ziew published in Orient Aviation (June/July, 1997 issue) that the U.S. government
approach to Asia does not include a strategy of"divide and conquer", designed to pressure the
toughest target of all, Japan, into U.S. liberalization
demands.
_6 Although

Japan signed a fairly liberalized

agreement

with the U.S. in January1998,

it has

not changed Japan's basic stands of regarding the bi]ateral with the LT.S. as being "unfair'and
'"unbaianced".
In the new four-year deal, Japan recognizes the unlimited beyond fights to the three
U'.S. carriers (United, Northwest and Federal Express). It also aliows All Nippon Airways
incre..ased access to a number of U.S. cities in exchange for increasing opportunities
for the U.S.
MOU (Memorandum
of Lrnderstanding)
carriers on 3rd/4th _eedorn markets between the two
countries.
ll

Dismantling
Although

.Restrictive

Bilateral

zhe US has open skies agreements

deal with the situation
from

Intra-Asian

Apt:,1, 1997.

European

markets

carriers

without
In other

words,

The Asian carriers
because

their Asian neighbors.
bilaterais..

wholesale.

Strategies

for Asian

However,

would

the situation

get serious

in Asia if US

would not be able to compete

effectively

their governments

the restrictive

and

with the US carriers

bilateral agreements

to dismantle

between

Asian countries

with

those restrictive

sign open skies agreement

bilaterals

in

with the US,
will need to be

Governments

of the open skies continental

and consumers.

Sucha

pro-competitive

allow the Asian caniers

to compete

wii1 allow major Asian carriers

carriers

couid

Open SMes Firs_

Creation

continent

market

in Asia, and set up eflbcient intra-

number of Asiart counties

Carriers

can

more fi-eedom in the intra-

what they can do is limited by the restrictive

if enough

the EU countries

a single unified aviation

enjoy

Ideally, open s',des should occur first among the Asian countries,
Asia.

countries,

of the open skies agreements

this would lead to a situation where
dismantled

carriers

They will need to persuade

Therefore,

Intra-Asian

European

than any US carriers.

their own continent

with many European

much difficulty because they formed

szarz to take full advantage

Asian nenvork.

Agreements.

effec, ively.
in forming

air transport

market

effecive!y

with the US carriers

This will help put Asian carriers
service networks

outside

in several ways. t7 First, it will "
in their back yard.

hub network

covering

Second,

1997). t'

it

the entire Asian

in equal status as the US and European

(Oum,

of

is in the interest of Asian carriers

policy will help Asian carriers

to set up an efficient mukiple

global alliance

and then, with countries

Third, Asian carriers

mega

based in

/°

•7 La fact,open
carrier

ze_'works.

carrier

s_king

t, Sia_

to

pray ane

Aixlines
would

none
partners

Asian

(50J

carrier

announced

competitior,

of the Asian

ma Z lead

aixlin_

in Asia aligns
against

put 5Q at odds with Thai

has eff._"/ve

with more

another

its allian_

to failure

in ord_

carriers

coverage

to ¢x=act

better

and most

who is already

and changes

of entire

than one competing

with Lug.hmasa,

rntet'aatioaal

of some

Asian

alliance

l_ly

a member

Asian

in the industry

markets,

carriers.

a,ud

a U.S. or European

Therefore,

they will be able

in January.

1998,

conditioo.s,

seek a membership
of STAR

st.ructu.re

in STAR

atlian_.

Singapore
This

a/lian_.

12

e; """_":"

:":"'; ..... -" .... :'"" ":2 .'_". "."'-,:.

;"

..... _-...--.-.._ ..:....-z;

.,.-,--

. .. ..... _..,_..,,_,

the _untries whereinputcostsarerisingfastwouldbe ableto shift theirsignificantcostbases
includingemployment
to thecountrieswhichenjoyslow inputcosts.Thiswill lengthentheperiod
in whichtheAsiancarrierscanenjoyunitcostadvantage
vis-a-visUSandEuropeancarriers.
Pr_ricad

Measures.

Since it is impossible

to achieve consensus

among

countries

like-minded

liberalized

air transport

countries.

From

iiberaiization

shouId

among all Asian carriers

be negotiated

regime as weU as illuminate

the earlier

discussions,

first.

the following

previously,

this increases

industries.

This may require

a significant

Currendy,

in most countries

the ,Ministry of Transport

process

with the negotiation
opportune/for

(2) Compez_satingfor

a method

or structurally

India because

than other

competitiveness

major Asian

or Korea Air to compensate

liberalized

markets

time.

demonstrate

benefits

of

fi-om the protective

may be fi-uitfuUy applied

for

This is important

For example,

when the US-Canada

aiIcwed

in the three major Canadian

carriers

were allowed

especially

who control
between

air

country

are

to devise

Chinese

or Korean

carriers

are less

Air. It is possible

for

in such a way that the benefits from the
carriers.

measures

cities only on a gradual

in a certain

when dealing with China and

For example,

carriers

Another
to protect
was si_,ed,

way of compensating
those

carriers

for some

the U.S. carriers

basis (3-year phase-m)

from Day 1.

13

if trade-offs

involved.

carriers, it may be desirable

Open Skies ageement

in the US market unlimited

are the main people

If carriers

such as Singapore

is to adopt some safeguard

of governments

accordinNy

of carriers:

the Chinese

As discussed

are to be made.

be shared nearly equally with Chinese
carriers

structure

than other countries'

carriers

trade issues:

eack country may find some winning

personnel

are not competitive.

Singapore

the disadvantaged

becat/se

trade matters

those carriers.

their flag carriers

and services

change in institutional

disadvantaged

of compensating

competitive

measures

This should be changed

and services

differential

on goods

compromise

for air bilaterais.

and other goods

less e._dent

would

liberalization

within Asia.

air bilateral

transport

This

the threat of traifi.c diversion

(1) Linking

negotiation

and governments,

were

while Canadian

(3) Sert,ing

a time table for achieving

iiberatJzatien

and evenmaily

acNeving

open skies:

It is helpful to set a specific

time schedule

for

open skies even though the dates may be far into the future.
.,'."

This helps prepare

beth the carriers

and governments

for the eventual

open skies.
.2"

(4) L!beralize

easier itemsfirs_:

It is easier to liberalize

- Relaxing

foreign

ownership

- Relaxing

charter

and fi-eight services.

- Relaxing

scheduled

- Relaxing

third and fourth freedom

- Move

towards

V'£ Summary

and

economies

whose

schedule

multipie designation

targeted

direct, behests
aviation

towards

markets are expected

counting

to grow very rapidly in the future.

Japan,

and thus,

agreement

goods

the US-led

on the fag that Korean

strategy

threat to repeal its 'unbalance'

and services

with Asian

Second,

despite

for forcing

Japan

1952 Air Services

trade. Given the fact that Japanese

relative to the U.S. or other Asian carriers, the rational
open skies initiatives

carriers enjoy enormous

it may be possible

with. the U.S.

of having open skies agreements

for Japan to take that course of action because of its fear

are net cost competitive

policy for Japan is to postpone

appear to have two clear objectives.

appears to include a 'divide and conquer'

in the areas of general

carriers

rights

Asian countries

for the U.S. carriers

with the U.S., it is not possible

international

services

of carriers

to the open skies re zime. Despite Japan's repeated

of U.S. retaliation

and local airports

Conclusions

the U.S. denial, the U.S. strateg)'

A_eement

items first.

level flag carriers

services to and from secondary

The U.S. open skies initiatives
First, it recognizes

Iimit oa the second

the following

"

for Japan

market

to discourage

Japan also knows that Korea-is

as long as possible.

Japan may be-

shares in the markets
Korea

retu_ant

from

singing

to and from

art open

to give away change

skies

of gauge
..

ri_s

to the U.S. carriers.

Korea plays a pivotal role concerning

the U.S.-Japan

air bilateral matters
'7.;

because

Seou! can be used to siphon away traffic to and from Japan.

Likeiy to succeed

in the North_st

for ekher the C,hinese gove,,7_ent

A.sian market
or Chinese

The U.S. initiatives

because of these fa_ors.

carriers

to even consider

Tn addkion,

are not yet

it is premature

open skies with the U.S. "fSis

14
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leaves some

breathing

region it_Eorea

room for Japan to fend offthe

and distribution

network

of Asia.

have an incentive
competitors
STAR

the entire Asian continent

network

Therefore,

in Asian market,

better conditions

The

operations)

U.S.

wishes

Pacer

routes.

Korea, Taiwan

markets

Since most Asian countries

U.S. than among

themsdves,

carriers

directed

a _obal

join a global

alliance

alliance

to Asian countries

for unlimited

_'eedom

in their own intra-Asian
restrictions

can provide

situated

agrees to give unlimited

Therefore,
liberalized
in Asia.

it is better

air transport

frequency

region) before allowing

the entire continent.

addition,

this would allow the Asian carriers
significant

the period

of larger

carriers

using

aircra_ff in the trans-

locations

with. the

in Asia (such as

seventh freedom rights or change of gauge

Asian carriers

bilateral

agreements

would be far more constrained

Most bilaterals

between

Asian countries
freedom

have
tra._c.

multiple hub airline network

their status in _obal

based in the countries

where

allianc_

networks.

In

input costs are rising fa..,-'I:

w_,ich, enjoy low input

,,rill have uak cost

15

more

to do hub (or sr.ar burxt) operations

to set up an efficient

This wi.ll also e_ance

Asian

services

to create open sides bloc (or substantially

cost bases to the countries

in which

Asian carriers

high frequency

in strategic

the U.S. carriers

This will induce the major Asian carriers

to shi_r2their

senior

up hubs (star-burst

and pridmg even on the third/fourth

for Asian countries

covering

prolong

because

markets than the U.S. carriersl
and/or

other

already have far more iibera[ bilateral agreements

This would happen

on seat capacity

such as

pose a major threat to Asian

rights to the U.S. then this will lead to dismantLing of the system of restrictive
among Asian countries.

are mutual

network

network,

for setting

while enjoying economies

if one or two countries

and Hong Kong)

for Asian alliance partners

Since these Asian carriers

in joining

so that the U.S. carriers

smaUer aircrat_ in the intra-Asian

each Asian

for alliance.

to negotiate

in Asian countries

Essentially,

may be in a position to play one against another

The recent U.S. open skies initiatives
carriers.

ca_n-iers looking

they are at disadvantage

When two or more Asian

extraa

effectively.

tra._c col1_cfion

to and from its own capital city, but does not have any hubs in

major US or European

in the global alliance network

and thereby

none of the ,_ian carriers has efficient

to align with more than one Asian carrier.

Alliance.

partners

carriers,

covering

has a fairly extensive

other parts

in the

does not sign an open skies with the U.S.

Unlike the U.S. or European

airline

threat of the U.S. open skies initiatives

advantage

costs.
vis-a-vis

This wili help
the U.S. or

Europeancarriers.
Sinceit is impossibleto ac,hieve
consensus
amongall Asiancarriersandgovernments,
liberalization

among like-minded

be fruiffuity applied

for liberalization

•

Linking

•

Attempt

future

prepare

for the eventual

airports,

in an open

for protecting

Setting

Liberalize

foreign

may.

skies

in developing
environment

countries
and/or

who are

to build in

those carriers.

time table for achieving

easier

The following measures

on goods and services trade issues.

the losses to the carriers'

to be disadvantaged
safeguards

first.

within Asia.

to compensate

temporary

•

should be negotiated

air bilateral with the negotiation

expected

•

countries

open skies to get carriers and governments

open skies.

items first such as freight,
ownership

of secondary

charter,

carriers,

services

to/from

secondary

etc.
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INTRODUCTION

Over

the past decade,

booming

economies

within South

East Asia and in adjacent

regions,

especially North East Asia, have provided a foundation
for strong growth in airline travel.
Despite
the potential
for expansion,
Thai International,
Philippines Airlines and Garuda
International
have faced financial constraints and their competitive
positions have weakened.
They have lacked sufficient finance to grow and to upgrade their fleets, they have accumulated
sub-optimal mixes of equipment, and they have been expected to provide uneconomic services
that governments
deem necessary. To a large extent, these same problems have beset Malaysian
Airlines while Singapore's

has, by necessity, remained

Faced with these challenges,

government

focused

on its international

markets.

policies in South East Asia that protected

flag carriers

have given way to privatisation and a more liberal approach to competition. Increasing reliance
has been placed on private sector airlines to supplement capacity as competition in domestic
airline industries has been liberalised. A step that has followed soon after has been multiple
designation
in international
markets (Hooper,
1997). In the process, aggressive new entrants
have been accommodated
in dynamic markets. However, aviation policy in Asia continues to be
characterised
by a close relationship between the flag carrier, dominant business groups and the
government (Bowen, 1997). The underlying approach to policy change can best be described as
"pragmatic"
(Bowen and Leinbach, 1995) and it is not evidence that governments
in the region
have committed themselves unequivocally to an ideology of flee and open airline markets.
Nevertheless,
policies continue to be challenged. The expansion of airlines from source or
destination markets outside the region is one of the key ones, particularly since these carriers
attempt to align themselves with airlines based in the region. Singapore Airlines, for example,
has been linked to Delta Air Lines and Swissair in the Global Excellence
alliance. United
Airlines

and Lufthansa

have been associated

with Thai International,

but as Singapore

Airlines

shifts its allegiance to the Star Alliance involving these two airlines along with Air New Zealand
and Ansett Airlines, the role of Singapore as a regional hub has been strengthened
at the
expense of Bangkok. Governments
in South East Asia have to deal with ever more complex
alliance arrangements
and a concentration
in market power. When the alliances involve airlines
from the USA, an additional consideration
is the pressure that is exerted to enter into an "open
skies" bilateral agreement.
These open skies agreements,
with generous provisions for fifth freedom traffic, give the
airlines from the USA a competitive
advantage through their more advantageous
access to
intra-regional
traffic (Findlay et al., 1997). Bilateral agreements between ASEAN economies _
have tended to remain restrictive on the issue of fifth freedom rights. AS a result, it has been
difficult for the airlines to use their equipment to maximum advantage within the region let
alone to consolidate
hub-and-spoke
networks.
Alliances among airlines are being used to
circumvent the regulations, but the focus has been on agreements with carriers based in Europe
and North America. The hubs based in ASEAN play their parts within global networks but their
capacity to distribute traffic efficiently within the region is liiIfited. At the same time, there have
J ASEAN's
Myanmar,

current

members

the Philippines,

are Brunci
Singapore,

Darussalam,
Thailand

Indonesia,

and Vietnam.
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Lao People's

Democratic

Republic,

Malaysia,

beenimpediments
to thedevelopment
of newroutesprovidingdirectlinksbetweencontiguous
growthareas.
Progress
onreformof airlineregulationona multilaterallevelhasprovento bea slowprocess,
but broaderinitiativesto liberalise trade accelerated the process in Europe and in North
America (Button,
1997). Various regional trade agreements
in South East Asia have been
developed, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the Northern Growth Triangle (IMT-GT),
the East ASEAN Polygon (BIMP-EAGA),
the Southern
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT),
the
Greater Mekong and Golden Quadrangle
Growth Areas. The geography of South East Asia,
however,
places considerable
reliance on efficient air and maritime
transport
to promote
regional integration.
The need for more flexible aviation arrangements
has become clear and
this prompted the ASEAN transport ministers to commit themselves to an "open skies" policy.
The policy requests member countries to remove many of the current restrictions
on market
entry to international
aviation with their markets and to support free competition
between the
airlines. Within APEC there is even broader commitment
to free trade and an agreement
to
review ways to achieve a more competitive environment for air services.
The current

economic

situation

in Asia will force the airlines to consolidate

their positions

for

at least the short-term.
All of the region's carriers are facing gloomy economic prospects and it
is possible governments
will adopt a more protectionist
stance. However,
the IMF bail-out
packages require governments
to commit themselves to free trade. The economies of the region
have prospered
by broadening
markets and it is likely that the drive to expand intra-regional
trade will remain a strong force. In addition, the major airlh_es in South East Asia are
participating
in "global" alliances that demand better systems of feeder services. Also, the USA
already has concluded several open skies agreements and it will continue to exert pressure on
other countries to follow suit.
There

is sufficient

momentum

behind

the formation

of aUiances and the creation

of regional

markets that airline competition
in South East Asia will become more and more competitive
over time. This paper describes these forces and makes observations
about the impact they will
have on the development
of intra-regional
airline service. In particular, we raise the question
what South East Asia can learn from experiences
with single aviation markets elsewhere,
particularly
Europe. Inter-related
questions concern the benefits that can be expected to flow
from a single market, whether the regional airline market is a step towards
a more liberal,
multilateral framework, whether a particular group of economies is optimal for the airlines and
whether new members will be permitted
to join. Finally, we examine the global forces of
alliance formation and open skies agreements
with the USA and ask whether regionalism will
combine

2

with these forces to create a more competitive

AVIATION

Airline services
from European
following

World

POLICIES

international

airline sector.

IN ASEAN

in South East Asia developed initially as a set of links in a network radiating
countries to their satellites. This network was strengthened
in the two decades
War

II, but it was the introduction

of long-haul,

wide-bodied

jets and the

emergence
of aggressive
airlinesin SouthEastAsiathattransformed
themarket.Singapore
and
Bangkok,in particular,werelocatedstrategically
asstopoversandinterchange
pointson the
rapidlygrowinglong-haulservices
betweenEuropeandAustralasia
(Rimmer,1996).
The emergingcarriersin SouthEastAsiapossessed
competitiveadvantage
in termsof the
locationof theirhomebaseandtheirlowerinputcostsandtheywereableto establish
a strong
presence
in thelonghaulmarkets(Findlay,1985).Furthermore,
therapideconomicgrowthin
Asia over the past fdteenyearshas presentedamplescopefor theseairlinesto pursue
expansionist
strategies.
As a result, airline services between ASEAN and North-East
Asia have
undergone considerable
development
(Rimmer, 1996). Economic growth and broadening intraregional markets did have an impact and the network of airline services within South East Asia
was beginning
to improve. For example, the network in 1979 included Hanoi, Vientiane,
Yangon,
Bangkok,
Kuala Lumpur, Singapore,
Jakarta, Manila and Bandar Seri Begawan
(Brunei) and 11 other cities. By 1996, Phnom Penh and an another 17 non-capital city airports
had been added to the network (Bowen, 1997). Most of the new airports were in Malaysia and
Indonesia, but all of the South East Asian nations were opening
border traffic.

up secondary

ports

for cross-

The key airports in South East Asia now have the potential to be used by the airlines as hubs to
consolidate
regional traffic from feeder routes. An additional feature at Singapore is the use of
these hubs by carriers based in the United States and Australia to transfer on-line passengers
between various points in their home continents and countries other than Singapore. These
arrangements
allowed the carriers to make more efficient use of their wide-bodied
aircraft and
have permitted increases in frequencies into the hub. Singapore took a lead when it agreed to
the UK's request for break of gauge rights within their air services agreement, increasing the
potential for traffic consolidation
and feeder services. The strategic placement and use of these
hubs have mitigated some of the weakness in the region's route network development.
The aviation policies adopted
by the ASEAN economies
have adapted to their changing
circumstances.
All promoted a single, government-owned
flag carrier that was expected to take
on unprofitable
services to assist in nation-building.
This was particularly
important
for
Malaysia to link the Peninsula with East Malaysia and for the Philippines and Indonesia, both
archipelagos.
Each of the ASEAN carriers faced the challenge of establishing their presence in
a market very much under the control of the metropolitan powers generating the bulk of the
traffic. During the 1970's, though, a more liberal environment
began to emerge. Competition
among the carriers made it progressively
more difficult for governments
to control fares.
Promotional
fares proliferated
as scheduled airlines learned to cope with floating currency
exchange rates and competition from charter airlines (Lyle, 1995). Progressively,
there was less
attention to pricing regulation
inthe bilateral agreements and the major objectives
for the
ASEAN carriers were to gain access to markets and to get approval to increase their capacity.
However,

the pace of change varied from country

to country.

Thailand maintains tight regulatory
control over all aspects of international
aviation. In its
bilateral regulations it has sought "order in the air" through the balancing of economic benefits
in the exchange of traffic rights, a careful monitoring of controls over capacity, the multilateral

4

establishment
of tariffsthroughIATA anda generalacceptance
of airlinecooperative
practices
suchaspooling.Thailandalsois reluctantto deregulate
its domesticmarketbecause
its minor
domesticairlinesare not strongenoughto withstandopencompetition.However,Thailand
recentlyendedits policyof designating
onlyoneinternational
carrierandThai International
is
beingprivatisedto enhance
itscapacityto manage
morecommercially
andefficiently.
In contrast,Singaporehaspursuedexpansion
of itsinternational
air transportfinkswith a very
openapproachto settingcapacity.Singapore
hassignednumerous
bilateralair agreements
that
do not requirereciprocalcapacityentitlementsfor SingaporeAirlines.Whereverpossible,
Singaporeexchanges
rightsbasedonopportunities
ratherthanonabsolutereciprocityin traffÉc
or operationalterms.Nevertheless,
Singaporehashadto bereadyto reacha compromise
and
in manyof its agreements
it hasacceptedsomerestrictionson routeaccess,traffic rights,
capacityandtariffs.WhentheUSAturneditsinterestin concludingopenskiesagreements
to
Asia,Singapore
wasthefirstto move.FromApril 1997, US carriers have been permitted to fly
beyond Singapore while Singapore Airlines enjoys similar benefits in the USA. The privatised
Singapore
Airlines has been free of community
service obligations
and it is noted for its
commercial success.
The Philippines

has ended Philippine

Airlines'

monopoly

in the domestic

market

and five new

carriers have been free to compete on domestic routes. One of these new entrants (two more
had applied) was given the second official flag carrier status for regional routes. Indonesia has
opened 23 gateways for international tourism and air traffic rights have both Indonesia
Philippines have liberal air services agreements with Singapore.
agreements

Partners

in bilateral

capacity
ASEAN

increases have been negotiable in many situations.
However, cross-border
links in
are under-developed
as a result of the bilateral system. Bowen (1997) has argued that

there is over-servicing
of
on routes from Malaysia
distorted by the inherent
examine how alliances can

3

ALLIANCES

International

have been under similar pressures

and the

and multiple designation

the routes between Malaysia and East Malaysia and under-servicing
to adjacent Sumatra and that the "...pace
of change is slow and
biases in the bilateral system" (Bowen, 1997, page 136). We now
alleviate this problem.

AND

AIRLINE

SERVICES

airlines have used alliances to circumvent

IN SOUTH
restrictive

EAST

regulations

Europe. This gives credence
airlines is an attempt globalise

ASIA

that prevent

from pursuing network strategies within which a hierarchy between feeder and
would emerge. These
alliances are organised
around
code-sharing,
joint
programmes
and marketing,
shared computer reservations
systems, joint use
combined purchasing
and co-ordinated
schedules. Thus far, the airlines based
Asia have been more interested in forming alliances with major carriers from the

1991; Doganis,

and

them

trunk services
frequent
flyer
of resources,
in South East
USA and from

to the argument that alliance formation
among international
within the regulatory constraints (Gialloreto,
1988; Tretheway,

1994).
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Accordingto oneline of argument,the majorairlineswill determinethe locationof key hub
airportsandthelesserairlineswill berelegatedto feederroles(Shenton,1995).WhenUnited
Airlines and Lufthansa formed their alliance in September
1993, United had to choose whether
to use London/Heathrow
as its mini-hub in Europe, but chose to use its code-share flights with
Lufthansa
for intra-European
services. Similar effects are emerging as Singapore
Airlines is
admitted to this alliance. Lufthansa's link to Thai International is weakening and a consequence
is that Lufthansa will concentrate
its services to South East Asia through Singapore. As this
Star Alliance adds new partners such as Air New Zealand
role as a regional hub is enhanced.
However,

there are concerns

that the smaller carriers

and Ansett International,

within these alliances

Singapore's

will be relegated

to

the role of feeder airlines. The proposal for British Airways and Qantas Airways to extend their
code-share
agreement on routes between Australia, Singapore and Europe raised the concerns
of Australia's
International Air Services Commission (IASC) for this reason (Findlay et al.,
1997). The IASC refused to approve the proposal when it was first raised
grounds that the Australian carrier would play too small a role within the
Australia's point of view, the emerging alliance between American Airlines and
ensures Qantas is part of a powerful airline group. However, if this comes
Qantas being relegated over time to being a feeder airline there are important
Australia

(Bureau

Policy makers

of Transport

and Communications

Economics,

in 1997 on the
alliance. From
British Airways
at the price of
implications for

1994).

in South East Asia will have to balance their concerns

about

increasing

market

power of the major alliances (Burton and Hanion, 1994), the possibility that the region's
airlines will be relegated to the status of feeder airlines and the benefits of concentrating
traffic
through hub airports. The USA has the clearest policy regarding these types of alliances - they
are acceptable provided they operate within an 'open skies' regime and if dominant positions
on less competitive
routes are weakened.
Interest among the world's airlines to enter into
alliances with their counterparts
in the USA has given the latter country
the leverage to
negotiate very liberal air services agreements. Ten European nations have acquiesced (Jennings,
1996; Odell, 1997) and the USA is pursuing a similar approach in Asia (Bal.lantyne,
1997;
Jennings,
1996). The protectionist
approach taken by some of the key nations in Asia has
discouraged
alliances with airlines from within the region, but even Japan has not been able to
sustain its opposition
to alliances under the pressures of competition
from the European and
North American airlines.
In April 1997_ Singapore
entered into an open skies agreement
with USA and similar
agreements
have been concluded between the USA and Brunei, New Zealand and Taipei with
discussions
in place with Malaysia and South Korea. The Singapore - USA agreement allows
for access to all gateways in the USA and beyond, greater flexibility in code-_sharing and the
freedom to create a wide variety of commercial relationships with US and third party carriers.
Key points of the agreement
•

Termination
and routes

•

Liberal

are (Chin, 1997):

of restrictions

charters

on pricing,

capacity,

type of airlines,

and number

of flights

•

Right to fly between
to third nations

any point in the US and any point in the other nation and beyond

•

Open code-sharing

•
•

Prompt conversion and remission of hard currency
Self-handling provisions for carriers to perform or control
their operations

•

Non-discriminatory

•

Fair competition

•

Membership

operation

and access to computer

in commercial

of international

activities

conventions

airport

activities

reservations

systems

such as airport

that support

charges

on safety and security

The USA is attempting to draw a critical mass of Asian countries into these liberal agreements.
It is realistic to assume that countries in South East Asia will be unable to stand in the way of
alliances involving the mega carriers and it will be very difficult to resist the pressure to enter
into open skies agreements.
This poses difficult questions about how to promote effective
competition
while positioning regional airlines in such a way that they can exercise influence
within the alliance (Oum and Taylor, 1995). At the same time, the open skies agreements
that
have been negotiated with the USA put the regional carriers at a disadvantage - their access to
intra-regional
traffic is less favourable than is becoming the case for the US airlines (Findlay et
al., 1997). In addition, if the hub airports are to live up to their potential, the South East Asian
airlines will have to develop strong regional, feeder services. It is not so much a question of
whether a more liberal regime will emerge in Asia as it is a question of timing and form. It is
possible that more liberal access to markets and more competitive conditions will be granted on
a bilateral basis, but another path is within regional airline markets.
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TOWARDS

WITHIN

SOUTH

A COMPETITIVE,
EAST

REGIONAL

AIRLINE

MARKET

ASIA

Although the matter will be raised again by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), air traffic
(landing) rights or services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights remain outside the
framework
of GATS. The principles of bilateralism
and reciprocity
dominate
negotiations
concerning international
trade in airline services. As a general proposition,
though, multilateral
initiatives to promote free trade tend to become bogged down in complex sectoral issues. More
substantive
progress
has been achieved in recent years through regional trade agreements.
Associations
of states agree to reduce barriers to trade within their region in order to allow
industry access to larger markets and to reap economies
of scale and to improve efficiency.
Alternatively,
a regional trade agreement can be formed to give the member states greater
negotiating power in external markets. The regional trade agreement also can be an agent of
change designed to promote regional political co-operation
and possible integration.
It is more likely that regional trade agreements will be formed by economies that are located in
the samegeographic
area, but it is helpful if the participating states share a common history and
that they have reached similar levels of economic development
and have compatible
trade
policies. Regional integration generally is the result of a combination
of market and policy
factors,

but it can proceed

in a variety

of ways. For example,

the European

Union (EU) is an

attemptto achievebroad regionalintegrationbasedarounda singlemarket.The North
American
approach

Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) has progressed
along the lines of a traditional
to free trade among member countries based on tariff reductions. The EU has been

able to set up supranational
by national authorities.
In January

institutions

1992, the Association

whereas

of Southeast

the NAFTA

Asian Nations

approach

(ASEAN)

relies upon enforcement

announced

its intention

to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. In September
1994, ASEAN Member
Countries agreed to accelerate progress with AFTA by reducing the initial time frame from 15
to 10 years. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN's position as a competitive
production-based
economic region geared towards servicing the global market. This is to be
achieved by expanding trade relations, making it possible to increase specialisation and exploit
economies of scale. ASEAN
members also participate in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and share in the commitment to remove trade barriers by 2020.
These regional trading agreements have provided a foundation upon which more liberal airline
regulations can be introduced for a group of countries. Since April 1997, for example, there has
been a single aviation market in the European Union and airlines from member economies
are
able to operate anywhere within the region. Canada has signed an open skies air services
agreement
with the USA, but this is separate from NAFTA (Tretheway,
1997). Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay recently signed a regional agreement (Mercosur group) and
this has been mooted as a step towards a pan-American
"civil aviation network governed by a
single multilateral regional air transport agreement" (Pereira, 1996). The single aviation market
between Australia and New Zealand is another example of a regional approach within the
context of a broader trade agreement. ICAO has identified 50 such groupings of states that are,
or could become, involved in the regulation of aviation. Clearly the potential exists to form a
similar arrangement
in Asia particularly to cater for the new airlines.
In 1994, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding
under
which regional flights would be encouraged within the 'Northern Growth Triangle'. Each of the
signatories was free to designate two airlines that would be permitted to operate whatever
capacity they wish between secondary
airports on a scheduled or charter basis, carrying
passengers and/or cargo. In situations where this arrangement was at variance with air services
agreements, the latter were to take precedence.
Since then, the Philippines and Brunei have joined and the group is known as BIMP-EAGA
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines - East Asia Growth Area) and it covers a market with
a potential of 250 million air travellers (Ballantyne,
1996). Discussions
between Thailand,
Myanmar,
Vietnam, . Cambodia,. Laos and Yunnan Province of China have mooted another
aviation bloc. The EAGA group has been working together to improve transport links that have
been neglected. Indonesia has declared Kalimantan and Sulawesi unrestricted to foreign carriers
from other Southeast
Asian countries. EAGA governments
have agreed to set up a new
regional airline, Saeaga,
a joint venture between
a Malaysian
company
and the State
governments
of Sabah and Sarawak. Saega has been designated as Malaysia's second airline for
points in EAGA.

AlthoughJapanhasa moreprotectionistapproach
to aviationpolicy,it attemptedin

1995 to
create an Asian aviation forum to achieve regional cooperation
on aviation policies (Ballantyne,
1995). APEC, through its Transport Working Group, also is examining ways to promote a
more competitive air services regime. More tangible progress, though, was made in ASEAN in
February 1997 when the transport ministers reiterated the importance of the development
of a
Competitive
Air Services Policy as a gradual step towards open skies in ASEAN.
The first step
is to introduce air services liberalisation within or between sub-regional groups such as BIMPEAGA, IMT-GT, IMS-GT. The second step is to develop the ASEAN Open Sky Policy. The
final step is to implement the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Commercial
Rights on NonScheduled

Services

among ASEAN

countries.

The intention in AFFA is to accelerate the growth in business and foreign investments,
tourism
and trade. Deregulation
within individual economies is an additional force. ASEAN transport
ministers have stated that "The competitive
environment
in international
air transport within
ASEAN shall be developed
and promoted,
with no restrictions
in frequency,
capacity and
aircraft type for point to po'mt access". However, the proviso was added that tiffs competitive
regime must be based on the progressive,
order!y and safeguarded
change in international
air
transport
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regulations

A REGIONAL

on the basis of fair and equal opportunity

AVIATION

MARKET

for all member

IN SOUTH

EAST

countries."

ASIA:

SOME

ISSUES
Attempts
motivated
improved

to create a competitive,
regional airline market in South East Asia have been
by the desire to strengthen
ties between economies
in the region through an
network
of airline services. Given the experience
with aviation in the European

Union, it is worth examining what is similar in South East Asia and what can be learned from
Europe. For that matter, what can be learned from other attempts to create single aviation
markets within Mercosur and Closer Economic Relations (CER) between Australia and New
Zealand? Several inter-related
questions arise. One is what benefits can be expected to flow
from a single market, particularly in terms of new routes and strengthening
of feeder services
and hubs? Is the regional airline market a step towards a more liberal, multilateral framework?
These questions cannot be answered without also considering whether any particular group of
economies is optimal for the airlines and whether the defined group remains the optimal set in a
dynamic industry. On what terms are new members permitted to join? Finally, to what extent
are the global forces of alliance formation
and open skies agreements
with the USA
complementary
to the formation of regional markets? Will the two sets of forces combine to
create a more competitive international airline sector or will one be set against the other?
Button (1997) has commented
on the lessons that Asia can draw from the European
experience. He pointed out that the formation of the single aviation market lagged behind trade
liberalisation and built upon experiences of deregulated domestic markets. The European Union
had developed
prior experience
in the transport sector through the road transport
sector.
Europe

presents

the airlines

mostly

with short-haul

markets

that were

relatively

mature.

In

somerespectsSouthEastAsiashares
someof thesecharacteristics.
Key

among these is that
liberalisation of aviation competition
is dealt with as a part of a much broader programme
of
trade and cultural integration.
However, it is notable that progress on aviation reform was slow
in Europe.
Despite Europe's
ability to agree on supra-national
organisations
to manage
competition
policies, it has been difficult to establish a level playing field in the competitive
airline industry. Arguments
about state subsidies to airlines, unfair competition,
consumer
protection,
safety and environmental
issues continue to arise. The comprehensive
framework
within the European
Union, though, has allowed it to deal with issues such as a code of
conduct for computer
reservation
systems and to examine the pricing of packaged travel
products.
The pace of economic
growth has been a major factor motivating
liberalisation
of airline
markets in South East Asia. The recent economic difficulties might ease the pressure on
regulatory reform, though it is possible it will give even more reason why airlines should be set
free to adjust to prevailing conditions. There are good reasons to believe that the time frame for
liberalising
airline markets
will be shorter
in South East Asia. One of the interesting
developments
to come out of the currency crises of 1997-98 has been that the Asian
Development
Bank will take on a central role in setting standards for financial management and
reporting. This is a long way from the European model that created supra-national
regulatory
mechanisms, but it is an important step nevertheless.
The

formation

of a single

aviation

market

in Europe

has resulted

in the formation

of new

airlines, the expansion of services on secondary routes, altered relationships among the carriers
and increasing competition
among hub airports. The charter airline sector has been highly
influential in Europe, carrying at least as many passengers as the scheduled airlines. Charter
airlines provide strong price competition in leisure markets, but they also have played a key role
in the development
of new routes. In South East Asia, the charter market is not such a strong
force and this could prove to be a constraint on the expansion of cross-border
routes between
growing sub-regions.
To some extent,

South East Asia has more to learn from Latin America's

attempts

to improve

intra-regional
services. Through the 1990's, the airlines in Latin America realised that their
costs were higher than those incurred by their large US rivals. Government
policies prevented
the region's airlines from working together within cross-border
alliances (Cameron, 1996) At
the same time there were few impediments to the Latin American airlines entering into alliances
with the USA's carriers. This has allowed some of the region's
carriers to improve their
financial position, but they have had to play a secondary role. When the Mercosur trade group
was formed, though, there was immediate interest in the development
of new north-south
routes to connect growing
sub-regions.
Within the group of member countries,
a liberal
approach appeared conducive to the estabLishment of new services, but an added attraction is
that these would operate free of direct competition from the powerful carriers from the USA.
Thorough
studies of the Latin American experiment with a regional airline market would be
likely to provide

valuable

insights for policy makers in South East Asia.

i0

Thereis a distinctpossibilitythat the formationof regionalaviationmarketscouldresultin
greatercompetitionwithin,but the barrierscould rise for airlinesfrom outsidethe region
(Ballantyne,1996).ICAO hasaddressed
this matter,but thereis insufficientexperience
with
tradeblocsto makeanyfkm predictions.
Protectionist
blocswith largeinternalmarketscould
usetheirpowerto thedisadvantage
of smallerparties.Spurredonby competitionfromwithin
the bloc,efficientairlinesdrawingupona largemarketcould becomedominantcarrierson
inter-blocroutes(Nuutinen,1992).Indeed,the DirectorGeneralof the InternationalAir
Transport
Association
liberalising competition

was reported to have urged African nations to pursue a strategy of
within a bloc to promote efficiency and development,
but to use the

bloc as a countervailing

force to deal with powerful

So far, regional

integration

agreements

external

have proved

interests

(Vandyk,

to be compatible

1995).

with multilateral

free

trade. Possibly there has been a "honeymoon
effect" within which liberal attitudes are
reinforced and as awareness and commitment to international
rules governing trade relations
grows (Chichilnisky,
1995). However, this could give way to more protectionist
approaches as
vested interests realise the potential to divert trade and to extract rents. Since free trade
agreements emphasise rules of origin, it is likely they will face resistance to open membership
rules that would allow them to become a genuine step towards multilateral free trade (Krueger,
1995). Regional trade agreements
are more likely to foster global free trade when they are
formed in order to reap external economies of scale and to eliminate inefficiency (eg. optimising
cross-border
airline services). Bowen (1997) argues that the strong links between governments
in South East Asia and the airlines and the politicisation of the industry has resulted in powerful
vested interests in maintaining the status quo and he has raised the possibility
undermined by exclusions. Furthermore,
he regards the consensus approach
an obstacle
APEC

that AFTA will be
within ASEAN as

to progress.

is committed

consider such as
upon which new
whether there is
market based on

to non-discriminatory

liberalisation

but

there

are

practical

issues

to

the problems airlines have in gaining access to congested airports. The terms
members can join the free market are important,
but this begs the question
an optimal set of members. It is not difficult to appreciate
that an airline
ASEAN member countries focuses attention on Singapore
and Bangkok as

hub airports, but some of the busiest routes in the region are concentrated
(Rimmer, 1996; Bowen, 1997). Airlines plan their services based upon groups

on Hong Kong
of countries that

make up natural markets and the networks they have been able to develop. The conflicts that
emerged between Australia and Hong Kong during 1996, for example, highlight the problems
that can occur. Disputes arose because Qantas Airways was carrying passengers originating in
Hong Kong to Bangkok and Singapore. A region defined as ASEAN or some sub-regional
grouping might make sense from the point of view of economic and cultural integration, but it
might not make good sense from the point of view of the economics of amine operations. The
bilateral approach to negotiation of air services agreements constrains the way regulators and
airlines consider
markets (Findlay and Round,
1994; Alamdari
and Morrell,
1997), but
regionalisation
Generally,
argument

is likely to encounter

similar problems.

airlines do not derive a cost advantage by extending their networks, but there is an
these are more important in international
market (Findlay et al., 1995). We have

11

pointedout that allianceformationis focusedon relationships
with carriersfromoutsidethe
regionratherthanfrom within SouthEastAsia.However,the greatestpotentialto increase
trafficexistsby encouraging
alliancepartnersto co-ordinatebeyond-gateways
is to (Parkand
Cho, 1997).Someof the newentrantsin SouthEastAsia have provided feed traffic to their
country's flag carrier with equipment suited to lower density routes. In Europe, though, the
major carriers have consolidated
their positions by acquiring regional airlines or at least
entering into appropriate,
vertical alliances. KLM, for example, has a small home market and it
has been dependent upon concentrating
European traffic through Amsterdam.
Its investments
in regional carriers have been designed to protect this position. At the same time, British
Airways
regional
Singapore
generally

and Lufthansa
carriers.

have expanded

their influence across Europe

via their relationships

Airlines had expressed interest in taking equity in Indonesia's
there has been little evidence thus far that the South East

with

Sempati Airlines, but
Asian carriers will be

permitted
to invest in each other. The experience in Australia has been that liberal policies,
coupled with financial constraints on airlines makes it necessary to have an open attitude to
foreign investment. Air New Zealand has become a 50% owner of Ansett Airlines. Singapore
Airlines is forging an alliance with both of these carriers and is evaluating an investment in
Ansett. Possibly Singapore is responding in the same manner as KLM, but it emphasises again
that the optimal market might not be bounded by ASEAN.

6

CONCLUDING

COMMENTS

Regionalism is not a force that acts alone. It has been pointed out that the Latin American
airlines see the Mercosur regional airline market as an opportunity to develop markets as they
cope with the pressure of competition
from the major US carriers under liberal bilateral
agreements. In Asia, the USA has concluded several open skies agreements and its carriers now
enjoy opportunities
to carry intra-regional
traffic on more advantageous
terms than the airlines
based in the region (Findlay et al., 1997). One way to counter this is to enter into liberal
bilateral agreements with each other. New Zealand and Singapore already have done this. The
formation of regional aviation markets takes this a step further. However, the USA becomes a
de facto member of the groups where it has signed its open skies bilaterals with the significant
partners.
This is a factor that could lead to a more open approach to membership
of the
regional groups. Bowen (1997) argues that the US open skies agreements
are a progressive
step in an opening salvo to liberalise the transpacific market in the same way the Atlantic was
liberalised in the mid-1990's.
Much will depend, though, on the way the governments
in South
East Asia respond to the open skies agreements
and in the way the cope with their current
economic problems and the pressure that these are placing on their airlines.

12
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There

are two

types

One is single-tracked
and the other
operate
price
single

of international
route

is double-tracked

simultaneously.
competition
and

performance.
passengers

where

tracked

routes

in and

one Korean
where

both

we analyze

the two Korean

On the basis
are benefited

route

In this paper,

between

double

only

routes

carriers

show

of the analysis,

out
carrier

operates,

of Korean
whether

carriers
there

is a

and thus whether

difference
we calculate

due to price competition.

of Korea.

in

price

how much

1. Introduction

Effective
bilateral

competition

among

ageements.

The routes
pursued

These restrain

connected

Korea

Conventional

restrictive

restrictive

pattern

the

types

practice

a traveller

frequence,

the

restrictive

bilaterals

competition

and so on.
The US has

bilaterals

with

such as restriction

markets.

The guideline
critical

number

cannot

protecting

which

each

airline.

This

on ticket-buying

buy the ticket

services,

behavior.

without

originates

of competition

in Japan.

of passengers

and

measures

are

other than price

: the number

route

and

network

in some important

free entry

beyond

KAL

from Korea.

of Korea _ which

the criterion

Because

cooperative

The latter dimension

not allow

stipulates

by

carrier at its home base is to be respected.

this market

does

in

for each international

means

the internal guideline
airline

preserved

through

to Japan

industry

on routes in and out of Korea.

exercised

and route network.

by which

airline

rights

of in-cabin

be served

of that with the US.

into international

of competition

do not allow for competition

because

one exception

base, the two carriers

dimensions

quality

frequencies

is some

liberal

of traffic

at least for national traffic
are several

with

from Korea

changes

have the same home

There

has signed

restrictive

aircrafts

are an main exception.

is to have a market

of each national

The entry of ASIANA

to compete

under

flight frequency,

ASIANA

pattern

is also reinforced

For instance,

ASIANA

carrier,

of competition

restricting

Thus pricing

flight

bilaterals

the conventional

pattern

places.

routes,

Most of the countries

the entry of the second

by

tariffs,

is not expected

1980.

I989 has changed

airline

regime.

also maintains

However,

airlines

to and from the US territory

an open-sky

the US since

international

etc..

However,

dimensions

is only subject
prescribes

for double-tracking,

such as

to long run

which route is to

into any international

which, the second

of flight

meaning
carrier

city-pair
that there

can enter

the

market.
One cannot

find the presence

after the density
flight

frequencies

agreements
frequencies
that duopoly

and

of passengers
given
the

of the two national

is such that the second

to the new

internal

entrant

guideline.

and the latter, the number
competition

carriers

is conducted

is doubly
The

in every route.

carrier

can enter, the number

restricted

former

defines

given to the second
only on the dimension

Also even

cartier.

through
the

total

of

the bilateral
number

What this means

of
is

of pricing.

*)Since the entry of ASIANA, Korean government has set the rules stipulation which route is to be cerved
by which airline by how much. The rules are contained in the internal guideline. See Kim(1996) for
details

The TranspacificroutesconnectingKoreaandthe US havebeenliberalized
1980.

When

the

two countries

(double

disapproval

system),

full effect of the liberal
US international
and

Taipei '_.

between

Seoul

turned

launched

and LA.

On the routes

towards

shakeout

cooperative

agreements

among

competition

to capture

lessened
KAL

international
significant

including

with

Delta,

between

the two

determination

depending

Korean

on competition

single tracked
double tracked

Korean
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we

carriers

2. The

ASIANA

airlines.

The

has
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routes
analyze
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regulation
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carrier

there

single

and double

On the basis of the analysis,

that

fierce

and the US carriers

is

For instance

Other

US

flight

still does

carriers
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not

is virtually
allow

free

on price.
of international

routes,

operates

carriers

is a price

sales

on the routs

two types

airlines:

of a

blockseat
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and reduced

the two Korean

whether

route

lean

partners.
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where both of the Korean

on the
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and

Northwest.

aromaments, we can classify

routes

the

This

cooperative

its operation

Korea

there.

made

and the two should compete

between

in 1990

Codesharing

with

especially

and the US, the addition

between

internal

The

operate.

competition

tracked

routes

we calculate

between
show

the two

difference

how much

in

passengers

due to price competition

Model

Competition
of a national
reasonable

share

restructured

and thus whether

performance.

are benefited

became

market

of flight frequency,

In this paper,

carriers

After this incidence,

On the basis of above

however,
carriers.

pricing

and routes.

markets,

flight

Korea

foreign

and

Asian

since it was already

1990s,

for liberal

after 1988, when the new set of the

that both sides become

UA and Continental

to and from Korea.

between
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frequency

1st transpacific

competition,
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in early

flight

of flight
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ASIANA

economic
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was being realized
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a bilateral
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carriers
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carrier
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profit
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2)To operate over Korea and Taiwan has a purpose of surrounding Japanese market.
Narita contributed to the diversion.

maximization
may be a

The unamity

rule

Also, congestion at

is usedand

each participating

Let i, k denote
single-tracked
maximize

airline can secure reasonable

the national

route

carrier and the foreign

r, the airlines

joint profits

set the prices

rc_,+ z_rk, where

k.

Profit is composed

dr',

the

numbers

respectively,
Also let

then

C_,

P) • d',

C,* denote

each function

has arguments

carried

P_. d_ represent

of number

P_', P)

Then on

of revenue

r by carriers

of carrier

r_•

and cost.

Let

i and

k

i and k respectively.

i and k on route r, respectively,

of passengers

k

of carrier i on route r and

on route

revenues

of carriers

respectively.

in such a way that they will

of _vo components

of passengers

cost functions

counterpart

rr,' is the profits

is that of carrier
d, _ denote

level of profits.

d, and flight distance

O_.

and

That is

c::c:(o,, a;) & c; ---c; (e , a;)
Then the prices are set to solve the following

(I)

problem:

max(zt _,+ rc_)

P;,?:
From the first order

condition,

(2)

c3_ _ cMi p_ + di_
8Px
OP

From

(2), we can have

O)

p_

Bertrand

compete

competition

(4)

hypothesis

_ MC_ ) 3d_
OPi

0

c_P_
Oat;

on double-tracked

routes,

each airline's

we assume
individual

that the Korean

profit.

That is, the

Korean

carriers

and k denote

a foreign

carrier

which

operates

on

zc_ of carrier i on rout r is

zd = P el (P', P/, 1:*, m, m _)
P,

P_ are prices

of passengers

and foreign
before.

ea

is adopted.

Then the profit

Where/_,
number

aa

.-.-=
_di +
. pi, + MC e ._=
OP'
8P'
OF"

on prices for maximizing

Let i and j denote
router.

MC

MC _-_ d _. OP..__
i
Od' _(pk

For modelling
carriers

we obtain

country

carried
concerned

of carriers
by airline i.
on route r.

i, j, k on mute
m and ra_ denote
The cost function

r respectively
purchasing

and d is the
power of Korea

C i has a same meaning

as

Thengivenpi,/_,,
(5)

max

airline i set its price

rc i

From the fn-st order condition

(6)

P' to solve

4 aC,

/_i=d,

o_

assuming

the existence

of interior solution,

we will get

&l, =0

ed, 0P,

Rearranging

(6), we have

(7) _---_
ag = o::>P,= MC,- 4" ad,
Regression

The airlines
The solution

Equations

aiming

profit

maximization

solve

equation

(3) simultaneously.

prices must satisfy.

(8)
(9)

at joint

aF-iP'-Mc')°d''"
•_d---7
0d i
pk=MC

__d

k OP_
ad _

(p,_MC,)

0P'
_d _

_d'_ c3P'Od,

From (9) and at solution,

(10)

P_ = MC k-d

_pk
k'_-_d _

Opk
(P_ - MC_) Od_

Thus to put (10) into (8), we obtain

(11)

P(-MC

_=

-d i gpi
Opt,
"__d' + --_k
1

If we denote

the denominator

A, and the coefficient

Od*

aP*

¢.MI, Opi
OPk " ad"--7
OF

of the R.H.S by K. the coefficient

old k by B, we have

of d_in numerator

by

(12)

÷-Ba'

K

Because

K

the marginal

passengers

cost function

and flight distance,

it can be estimated

(13)

MC _ =c_ +130 +?td'

Where

ct, !3, 7 are unknown

estimated

through

(14)

parameters

the coefficients

of

with

to be estimated.

Thus price

equation

P' is

ofd _and dk of equation
equation

(14) by 13:and t33 , 13t for 13 and

is

P_=ct+13tO+J3,d'+J33d_+a,

In equation
in flight
change

(15), 13_measures

distance
on numbers

of passengers

airlines.

On the double

tracked

airline's

profit

equation

is

change

will generate.

costs of involved

routs, the regression

maximization

problem,

Where

cq 131,132have the same meaning

difference

equations

(15)

effects

equation

&the

equation

(6).

effects

change

is obtained

between

equation

as in equation

of price

in the latter

on

from each national

Therefore,

the

regression

(15).

and (16) into one equation
the single-tracked

routes

in order

to clearly

and the double-tracked

see the
routes.

will do the job:

(17)

P,_ =0: +131O r +(132 +5,133)d¢

Where

P,_ denotes

r, _

the

not only direct

change

+1310 +[32d,

of prices

The following

cost that an incremental

133 include

but also indirect

pt __

We combine

in the marginal

13_ and

(16)

route

of the number

+Bd_K

add an error term, our final estimation

(15)

i is a function

the linear equation.

P_=c_ +130+_-K)d'

If we replace

MC _ of airline

price

is the number

+5,134

set by a national
of passengers

.d_

carrier

carried

i on route r, Or is the distance

by airline

i, and finally

d_ denote

of
the

numberof passengers
carriedby all theforeigncarriersoperatingonrouter. 8, is a
dummyvariablewhosevalueis 1onsingle-tracked
routeand0 otherwise.
Results
For estimation

purpose,

the year 1995.
national)

The

reported

price

of passengers

data of each airline

data

on

by national

Estimation
KAL

The numbers

data on routes

where

carried

national

carriers

by each carrier

operate

(foreign

for

as well as

over the year were used.

We obtain
used.

we gather

alone

confronted

is conducted

shows

value.

between

S ta_ndm-d error

has

the

it is shown

This means

route than on double

value

in pricing

Normal

real flight

fares are

distance

data

tracked

that,

between

carrier

flying

meaning.

when

it is

on a particular

And

consolidated

change in pricing behavior.

ceteris

mutes.

alone, and consolidated.

that the estimate
paribus,

133has

price

It also indicates

a statistically

is higher on single

that overall

there

exists

KAL and ASIANA.

13:

93

(Z

31

189

0.07

-010001

0'.0028

0.0006

0.0001

0.0001

0.3004

0.0013

0.0419

R.,

34

0.89

An airline

alone

estimation

single tracked routes.

produces

However

in pricing

behavior

irrespective

However,

ASIANA

result

samples

applied

number

of single tracking

be helpful

the

behavior

same

there exists aggregate

estimation,

positive

Estimated

difference

estimation

whether

In the consolidated

price competition

from

and when it is the sole national

alone

examines

significant

is compiled

for three cases: KAL alone, ASIANA

estimation

ASIANA

estimation

distances

the year.

carriers.

with ASIANA

route.

tracked

flight

at one point during

of the

existence

of ASIANA-alone

routes

result.

KAL

it turns out that ASIANA

may not be a useful

for estimation

in discriminating

a similar

is only 3.

higher

price

on

alone shows little difference

of KAL

on routes

conclusion

the

flies.
of

case is as many as 19 out of which

the

the two cases of single-tracked

because

ASIANA
number

This means

7

levies

that the latter number
and double-tracked

may not
mutes.

ASIANA

197

0.073

-0.0001

(0.0.022)
244

(0.0001)
0.069

(0.3955)
-0.0008

O. 0008

0.0027
(0.0012)
-0.0006

(0.1194)
-0.000724

0.92

(O.O001)
(0.0750)
(o.ooo3)
(0.0630)
.(0.8555)
Numbers m parenthesis refer to standard errors of the corresponding estimates.

In consolidated
The estimate
reduction
The same

estimation,

for

_32, however,

due to passenger
result

takes

many insingnificant

3. The

the estimates

In this section,

we estimate

price due to double

tracking.

Changes
to double

in consumer
tracking.

the passengers

Where
passengers

i denoted

the

pay.

airlines,

If the route r were double tracked,

So the price differential

increase.
case shows

routes.

generated

calculation

through

&the

as a difference

double-tracked

to what is estimated

by foreign

of cost

effect &passenger

of passengers

are calculated

value

that the effect

ASIANA-alone

section.

• and df

of parameter

be expressed

zXP, is

=P?- P?=r ,d,+ ,dr
^

k

what

by KAL

That is,

is the number

d_ is that of KAL.
P_ would

between

due

by KAL alone, KAL will set

in the previous

the price

lowered

net benefit

routes were operated

If a route r is operated

estimated

values.

Tracking

are the basis forthe
surpluses

132have poskive

of data on single tracking

to Double

pay if the presently

Pf according

estimation.

the net benefit

Consumer

would

carried

due

surpluses

alone and what they actually
the price

for KAL-alone

Effect

This means

is offset by the positive

result due to deficiency

Economic

13's except for

is not significant.

increase

place

for

as,

of

The following

table shows the changes

in consumer

surplus

due to mukiple

tracking

for

the year 1995.

Route

single tracked fare

Double tracked fare

Net consumer surplus

Seoul-Guam

766.38

429.40

81530594

S eoul-Nagoya

840.16

243.60

228048600

1753.06

1051.00

306538831

2213.15

178.90

2180145061

Seoul-Manilla

633.69

384.20

55669259

Seoul-Bankok

1213.46

434.30

383861036

Seoul-San

1176.76

1017.10

45941104

1039.16

838.10

25084652

Seoul-Singapore

710.74

487.70

48928144

Seoul-Okinawa

278.54

290.90

S eoul-Honolulu

1397.90

736.10

247269982

Seoul-Hong

1070.46

341.80

392734966

S eoul-Hukuoka

713.68

217.00

168851413

Seoul-Hiroshima

234.92

259.60

-765817

2046.92

1036.60

664648018

Seoul-New

York

Seoul-Tokyo

Franscico

Seoul-Sydney

Kong

Seoul-LA

12509

Total Benefit

4828498357

,_, Units are USD for the 2nd, 3nd column and 1,000won for the last column.
In 1995, 1 USD was about 800won.

The

table

shows

price differential

some

results.

carried

on the route relative

Seoul-Hiroshima

route tells that double tracked

This takes

due to the excessive

relative

to other routes.

of these will produce
tracking

differences

In these particular
better estimate

and single tracking

4. Concluding

route

This result seems to be produced

of passengers

place

The

of 10 times as high as (the double tracking

that of s'mgle tracking.
number

unreasonable

Remarks

of Seoul-Tokyo

price is ten times as low as)
due t6 excessive

to the sample

price

is higher

in

The case

of

mean.

than single-tracked

difference

one.

variables

that time series data on each

in setting down the hypothesis

show significant

difference

in the size of explanatory

cases, it seems

exhibits

in pricing

whether
behavior.

the double

Entry

of a new carrier, ASIANA

welfare.

Frice

significant.
never

Korean

felt

bilateralism
foreign

differential

when

compete

bilateral
restrictive

adopted

measure

bilateral

competition

if market

routes

are

from ASIANA,

which

was

between

flight

to include

means

using

that

restrictive

a national carrier

and a

carrier and make them

it.

Bertrand

hypothesis

that one

on the pricing behavior

more general

this restriction

of our model

even

will facilitate

rigime in terms

I0

may be relieved

competition

of

conjectural variation.

in nature in the sense that flight freguency

frequency

and open-sky

can sustain

passenger

tracked

It also

with fixed conjecture

However,

The extension
regime

double

pressure

is analyzed

here is short-run

and

and

in promoting

that to have more than a national

competition

air given.

of network
framework.

tracked

monopolist.

This may be extended

of airlines

effect

the

on the price dimension

the other airline.

run

single

in enhancing

improving

duopoly

competes

Also the model

was

If also implies

is a welfare

network

former

is not successful

In this paper,
airline

between

Air seems to feel competitive

the

carrier.

turns out to be successful

under

to capture

and
long

the

restrictive

comparison

between

of the network

comfiguration.
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I.INTRODUCTION

The importance
of corporate
involvement
in the decision making process for business
related air travel is being increasingly recognised the literature.
Business travellers consume
air services (i.e. they take airline flights), however, they may not be the principal decision
maker in the purchase.
Also it is the organisation
that employs the traveller that incurs
cost for air travel.
Consequently
this research addresses
the relationship
between
traveller and his/her employing organisation
in the purchase of air travel.

the
the

In this paper traveller opinions on his/her corporate
travel policy are evaluated
using a
Likert summated rating scale. The benefits sought, by the traveller, from the air service are
also investigated
and these benefits are used to segment the short haul business air travel
market in the EU.
Changes in the market for short haul business travel since the full
liberalisation
of the aviation market in the EU are evaluated by comparing
the data to an
earlier study of similar travellers in 1992.
The common notion of business travellers is that they tend to travel more frequently then
leisure travellers and they tend to pay higher prices for these services. The business travel
sector of the market is prepared
to pay higher fares as it is the company and not the
individual traveller that bears the cost of the travel. This cost is then subsumed within the
costs of the business. Airlines, not surprisingly,
value this segment of the market very
highly.
Airlines can practice price discrimination
in fare structures as business travellers
have been prepared to pay higher fares to ensure travelling flexibility (i.e. to be able to
change their flight bookings
freely should, say, a business meeting run-over).
In the
domestic
US market about 50% of passengers
are travelling
for business
purposes,
however, this market represents two-thirds of passenger revenues (Stephenson,
and Bender,
1996).
In the EU the passenger
number figure may be as high as two-thirds
(Doganis,
1991), indicating the revenue figure would be even higher. The business travel market is,
therefore, very important to the EU airlines.
The airline industry in the EU until recently has been one in which operators face very little
competition.
Bilateral
agreements
between
national governments
within the EU had
ensured that most routes were only served by two airlines.
Duopolistic
arrangements
ensured that consumers
were given little choice of airlines, schedules,
and prices. The
market for short haul air services in the European Union has experienced
a period of major
change
since 1990 when the first effective
initiatives to liberalise the market were
introduced.
The final elements of a single market for airline services, completed
in April
1997, has created an regulatory regime where any airline can offer any route within the EU
at any price. Evidence suggests that increasing competition can have a significant effect on
the market.
Studies indicate that when more than two airlines operate on a particular route,
tariffs and yields fall significantly,
although there tends to be an increase in passenger
numbers stimulated by the falling prices (Barrett, 1991, Doganis,
1994).
The number of
routes where more than two airlines operate has been small (only 2% of European routes in
1992) but changes in the industry can be observed.
A number of marketing
alliances
have been created between
short haul operators
and larger
operators
in a bid to gain from potential
benefits (e.g. increased interline business

agreements and
transcontinental

economies
of scale and scope, and marketing
through code-sharing
agreements,
and shared

frequentflier programmes)
(Williams,1993,Doganis,1994).Opportunities
to usethetariff
asa competitivetool hasbeentakenby a numberof start-upairlines.Fourteennewcarriers
of this naturebegunoperations
betweenMarch1995andSeptember
1996 (Jones,1996).
Theseno-frills,lowcostoperators
whoofferlowerpricesasthey:•

sell directly to passengers,

•

tend not offer flights through
these costs.

•
•

tend not offer in-flight food, seat assignments,
outsource as many services as possible

•

operate

from uncongested

thereby

avoiding travel agency commissions.

a computer

airports

reservation

system

(CRS)

thereby

avoiding

and interlining.

with low charges

(Whittiker,

1998).

The concept has proved to be sufficiently popular in the US that major
introduced
their own low-cost subsidiaries to halt declining market-share.
seen as a similar move, British Airways has also announced
its plan
subsidiary operating in Europe.

operators
have
In what can be
for a low-cost

As the supply side of the airline industry with the EU changes, airlines need to assess
whether the factors of demand for their services will also change. If the principal concerns
of business travellers are having fully flexible tickets, free in-flight food and beverages,
and
the opportunity
to earn points on frequent flier programmes,
then increased choice, and
reduced tariffs in the traditional market and the introduction of low-cost operations
will not
greatly affect the business travel sector of the short haul market.
If, however, the lack of
airline and schedule choice and the non-availability
of heavily discounted
fares has meant
that the market has been required to pay higher fares then a re-assessment
of the attitudes
and likely future behaviour
of the market is appropriate.
This paper, therefore,
is
concerned with investigating the business travel market.

2. THE BUSINESS
The behaviour

TRAVEL

and attitudes

MARKET

of the business

travel market

has been the focus of a number

of

recent studies.
The most substantive and comprehensive
of these studies is the Stephenson
and Bender's
analysis of the US business travel market (1996). From a noted reduction in
the proportion
of business related travel in the market from 55% in 1979 to 48% in 1993,
the authors dismiss this reduced proportion
as the result of an increase in non-business
related travel and investigate the reasons for the reduction in business travel, attempt to
determine the effect of air travel substitution by other modes of travel and increased use of
telecommunications
such as videoconferencing
and the internet. The paper is based on two
studies; one of 421 corporate travel managers and one of 701 business travellers as part of
the 3,061 people surveyed as part of a national travel study. They found that the demand
for business related air travel was reducing.
This finding was supported
by both travel
managers
and the travellers.
They conclude
that the primary reason for reduction
in
business travel is both companies
and travellers frustration
with high airline prices, and
internal corporate
pressure to reduce travel expenditure.
Evidence was also given for
significant substitution by other modes and also alternative communications
methods.

The costof travelin demandfor business
travelhasbeentraditionallyviewedasbeingnot
importantastheemployingcompanybearthecost. In Stephenson
andBender'sstudyit is
not surprisingthat cost is identifiedas beingimportantas they surveycorporatetravel
managers.Corporateinvolvement
inthebusiness
travelmarkethasbeensomewhatlimited
in theacademic
literaturebut moreacknowledged
in commercial
studiesof theindustry.
QuotingfiguresfromtheAmericanExpressTravel& Expenditure
ExpenseSurvey,Bourne
(1991) notes the growth of large companiesemployingtravel managers. For UK
companies,
this figurehadgrownfrom 11%in 1986to 42%In 1991. Skapinker(1992)
notespressures
by companies
onboththeirtravellingemployees
andon theirtravelagents
to reducethe cost of travel by down-grading(forcingbusinesstravellersto travel on
economytickets)andalsoto evaluatein a moresystematic
way the purposeandvalueof
travel.
Althoughliberalisationis leadingto morecompetition,someevidenceindicatesthat its
overall effecton cost is not downward. In 1996,spendingon travel via the Guild of
BusinessTravelAgentswhohandleabout75%of UK corporatetravelincreased
by 17%,
whilethe numberof flight increased
by 8.5%(Cohen,1997).The authorthenarguesthat
stronginvolvementin the management
of travelexpenditure
is vital by corporationsthat
havelargetravelcosts.
AnotherUK basedstudy of corporatetravel (Cook, et

al, 1994), undertaken
by the
University of Westminster,
indicates the some of the ways that corporations
are involved in
the business travel market.
A s rvey of 128 companies revealed that 77% had a written
travel policy, but that 70% of these policies granted
executives.
However 20% were looking to reduce
1997 Corporate
Air Travel Survey showed
try "no-frills" airlines (IATA, 1997).
Corporate

involvement

in the purchase

activities.

Firstly, travel policies

travel choice discretions
to travelling
this choice in future.
Indeed IATAs

that 70% if business

of business

either written

travellers

were

willing to

air travel can be in seen in a number

or unwritten

may be used to influence

of

choice

of airline, and fare type thus reducing cost. Travel managers or travel departments
may be
involved in the selection, and purchase process of airline tickets.
Travel management
may
include bulk purchasing
deals from preferred
airlines thereby influencing
future travel
choices.
Travel managers may use their travel agent to find the airline ticket which gives
them the greater perceived value for money.
Individual
Corporate

travellers may be adverse to corporate
choices may be contrary to the preferred

a member of a frequent flier programme
reduce the travelling, comfort, flexibility,

influence in their travelling behaviour.
choice of the traveller if the traveller is

(FFP), or if the choice of airline
status, or convenience.
A number

tried to assess the effectiveness of FFPs to
the US market concluded that FFPs have a
This view is partially supported by a study
(1995) found that membership
of a FFP
purchase decision but not one as important

is perceived to
of studies have

influence airline choice. One empirical study of
significant effect on airline choice (Nako, 1992).
of Australian business travellers.
Browne, et al,
was a factor considered
by travellers
in the
as on-time performance,
schedule convenience

or low fares. Gilbert (1996) concludes that the proliferation of FFPs
unredeemed
rewards have affected the effectiveness of these schemes.

and the build up of

Mason & Gray (1995) argue that corporate involvement
in the business travel purchase
decision is sufficiently important that the market should be treated for marketing purposes
as a hybrid market, displaying characteristics
of both consumer and industrial markets. A
stakeholder
model of the purchase decision process is used to analyse the market.
They
identify three stakeholders
in the purchase of air travel; the traveller, the travel organiser
and the employing organisation,
and argue that each stakeholder will have a set of purchase
benefits. The actual purchase benefits sought will be based on the competition between the
stakeholders.
A sample of 824 business travellers is segmented
into three distinct market
groupings based on the key purchase benefits and demonstrate
affected by corporate involvement in the purchase decision.
This brief consideration

of the demand side of the business

that these

travel market

groupings

are

has shown that the

validity of the high consumption,
high yield airline passenger
is questionable,
and that
traveller choice may well be influenced by corporate
involvement
in the purchase.
This
combined with the changing supply side of the industry, further investigation of the business
travel market
is required
so that marketing
strategies
may be based on a sound
understanding
of the factors that affect the market.

3. METHODOLOGY

To investigate corporate
survey was undertaken.

influence in the EU short haul business travel market a quantitative
The survey was administered
in Stansted in the UK over two

separate periods.
Agreement
to survey passengers was gained from Air UK Ltd. which
operates the largest number of flights from this airport.
The survey was carried out over
three days in April 1997 and five days in November
1997. A scale of traveller attitudes
towards corporate
travel policies was included.
Behavioural
data regarding the traveller,
the travel organiser
and the employing organisation
were collected.
An attitude scale of
business traveller purchase benefits previously developed by the author (Mason, 1995) and
was included to evaluate the importance
to travellers of various product elements.
An
earlier survey of business travellers was undertaken
at the same airport on the same target
sample in 1992.
Thus the new survey provided data to enable an examination
of the
reliability of this scale, and will allow the investigation of changes in the market over a five
year period. 1,000 self-completion
survey forms were distributed to short haul international
and domestic travellers of which 450 useable survey forms were collected.
This represents
a 45% response rate for distributed survey forms, which is a similar to the response
rate
achieved by Stephenson
and Bender (1996) in their Corporate
Travel Manager
study.
Analysis of the passenger
figures during the survey period indicates that the sample
represents
about 5% of all Air UK travellers (both leisure and business) from this airport
during the survey periods. The sample size allows an estimate of average number of trips to
be calculated with 95% confidence within a 1.5 trip interval. Although this does not meet a
preferred
I trip confidence
interval as achieved in the earlier survey (Mason and Gray,
1995) this sample
Demographic

data

is deemed
about

to be acceptable.

the respondent

and higher

company

were

collected.

Also data

about the respondent's
travelling behaviour including the number of trips taken in the
twelve months,
how the flight was selected,
and booked,
whether
the respondent's
employing company had a corporate travel policy (CTP) or a travel manager or department.

Fifteenattitudestatementsabout corporate

travel policies were developed
through the
views about travel policies comments reported
in various trade journals and also from
asking a number of business travellers their views about such policies.
The most extreme
and some fairly neutral comments were kept for inclusion in the survey. These comments
were both positive and negative, and are included in Appendix I. Attitude
statements
regarding 25 product attributes were also included in the survey. This list (see Appendix II)
is similar to the list included in the earlier survey and reported in Mason and Gray (1995).
The authors indicated that repeated survey administration
and comparison
would provide
data to evaluate the validity of the results of the first study and this study will allow this.

4. RESULTS

A demographic
profile of the respondents
did not reveal any surprises. The sample was
predominately
male (90.3%),
with the vast majority working
in senior roles in their
respective
organisations.
19.3% of the respondents
indicated that they were company
directors,
a further 34.0% worked as senior managers, while another 26.4% worked in
"other management"
positions. Together this means that 86.9% of the respondents
fell into
the A or B social stratifications.
An age profile of the respondents shows business travellers
tend to be in middle age. 36.3% were aged between 35 and 44, with a further 40.8% aged
between 45 and 64.
The respondents

worked

in many different

industries

and from very small to very

large

companies.
The majority (64.1%) of respondents worked in services industries of various
types.
27.9% of the sample were employed in the manufacturing
sector while extractive
industries accounted
for 19.7% of business travellers in the sample.
The author believes
that the large extractive industries sector is partially influenced by the routes offered by Air
UK at Stansted.
The east Scottish coast and Stavanger in Norway,
both which have
significant oil sectors, are both important destinations for Air UK at Stansted. However the
large services sector is surprising.
19.8% of respondents
worked for small companies
with
less than 100 employees.
23.2% of the sample worked in medium size companies
(up to
1000) employees with the remaining 57.0% of the sample working for companies with more
than 1000 employees.
The respondents
on average made 19.75 business trips per annum. This may be compared
to the figure found in the earlier survey which was 16.61 (Mason, 1995).
Assuming the
sample to be normally distributed (although it is slightly skewed), the amount of trips made
by business travellers in 1997 is significantly higher than in 1992.
This results provides
some evidence to the on-going importance
of the business travel market in the EU and
distinguishes
this market from the US market were Stephenson and Bender (1996) provide
evidence that the market seems to be travelling less. EU short haul business travellers make
fairly short business trips. 30. I% of the sample were making a day return, with a further
28.1% staying just one night. 91.3% of all respondents
made trips of no more than 2 nights
away. Respondents,
on average were members of 1.99 frequent flier schemes.
Free flights
were the main benefit claimed from membership
of such schemes with on average, each
respondent
redeeming
1.03 free flights during the preceding twelve months.
This benefit
seems about three times more popular than free upgrades, of which 0.34 were claimed by
respondents
during the year on average.

Businesstravellerscollect informationaboutavailable
40.1%

of respondents

made

travel

agency

enquiries,

flights from three key sources.
while 19.0% used in-house travel

managers or departments
to find out about available flights.
their flights using airline printed schedules.
The large amount

27.7% of travellers planned
of flights taken by the sample

would infer that travellers become familiar with the available airlines operating
from a
particular airport and may collect printed schedules directly from the airline. The majority
of flights (71.0%) are booked through specialist business travel agents, with a further 10.9%
of flights booked directly with the airline.
The majority

of short

haul business

travellers

still select

their own

flight.

64.0%

of the

sample indicated they selected their own flights. This figure, however, is significantly lower
than the figure in the 1992 survey where 69.8% or travellers selected their own flights.
Business travellers it would seem are becoming less involved in the purchase decision for air
services.
This reduced involvement
may be explained by greater corporate involvement
in
the market.
42.7% of respondents
worked for companies that either employed a travel manager or who
had a travel department
(this figure has risen from 36.3% in 1992), and 70.7% worked for
companies that had a corporate travel policy (60.3% in 1992).
The survey does provide some evidence that fewer companies
provide their travelling
executives with full-fare fully flexible travel. 14.4% of the sample were travelling on fullfare tickets while this figure was 25% in 1992.
This figure cannot be fully off-set by a rise
in the proportion of travellers that do not know the fare type they are travelling on (29.3°,/0,
as opposed to 25% in 1992), but the fact that such a large proportion
of travellers
know what type of ticket they hold indicates low involvement in the purchase.
This brief analysis shows that
selection and booking of airline
an increasingly important roles
having some identifiable effect
toward

cost reduction

4.1. An attitude
A Likert
corporate

do not

business travellers seems to becoming less involved in the
services, while travel managers and travel department
have
to play in this area. The effect of corporate involvement
is
on the selected airline service, and that this effect is tending

rather than increased

scale for corporate

traveller

flexibility.

travel policies

summated
rating scale was used to assess business
travel policies (CTPs). Fit_een attitude statements,

negative in nature, were developed
for use on the scale.
indicate their level of agreement with each of the statements

traveller attitude towards
some positive and some

Respondents
were asked to
on a five point scale, from

"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree".
Statements that were positive about CTPs were
scaled from five for "strongly
agree" to one for "strongly disagree",
and vice versa for
negative statements.
A total attitude score for each respondent
was calculated by totalling
the individual item scores.
Therefore
between 15 to 75. The mean score
lowest

score,

i.e. most opposed

normally distributed,
three equal groups;

the range of potential scores on the total scale
was 50.06 with a standard deviation of 6.21.

to CTPs, was 27 and the highest

72.

and to assist in the analysis of the scale respondents
respondents
against CTPs, respondents
with neutral

The scores

was
The
were

were divided into
attitudes towards

CTPs,

and

those

scores

with

the

most

with

positive

scores

discriminated

given

between

are a good

"CTPs

are a constraint

which

serve

"CTPs

are a hindrance

when

planning

"CTPs

tend

of employment

to infringe

A chi-square

CTPs.
item

attitudes.

A correlation

shows

These

the

of the

statements

in the

summated
scale

that

were:-

(r 2 = 0.6036)

test of independence
influenced
of variables

towards

individual

respondents

"CTPs

variables
tabulation

idea"

attitudes

for each

no great

was

respondent's
that were

purpose"

a business
travel
used

(r 2 = 0.6395)

trip"

(r: = 0.6399)

benefits"

(r 2 = 0.6588)

to identify

which

demographic

and behavioural

attitudes
towards
CTPs.
Table
1 below
provides
a
shown,
at the 95% level, to influence
respondent
attitude

to CTPs.

Table

1: Business

traveller

attitudes

Company size
1-99 employees
100-999 employees
> 1000 employees
Company has a CTP
Yes
No

towards
corporate
travel policies.
Anti-CTPs
Neutral to CTPs
(%)
(*/,)
33% of sample
33% of sample

Pro-CTPs
(%)
33% of sample

35.0
17.9
47.0

13.4
28.6
58.0

11.8
17.6
70.6

55.2
44.8

84.7
15.3

93.2
6.8

Company has travel manger or dept.
Yes
No

33. I
66.9

49.6
50.4

57.1
42.9

CTP type
Written rules to be adhered to

20.0

25.7

35.7

Written guidelines
Written rules open to interpretation
Unwritten rules

46.3
13.8
20.1

50.5
5.7
18.1

46.4
7.1
10.8

Respondent selected own flight
Source of flight information
ABC, OAG etc.
Airline produced schedule
Travel agent enquiry
Travel Manager/Dept.
enquiry
Flight booked by:
Traveller
Traveller's department
Travel Manager/Dept.
No of trips in last year
1-5 trips
6-10
more than 10

70.9

65.2

63.1

9.6
28.9
51.8
9.6

9.2
36.8
25.0
28.9

12.5
16.1
44.6
26.8

30.0
29.1
25.5

16.2
39.6
34.2

14.4
32.4
36.9

48.1
26.9
25.0

53.2
25.2
21.6

30.9
32.7
36.4

The

table

company

shows
that

that business
he/she

works

traveller
for.

70,6%

attitudes

towards

of respondents

CTPs
who

CTPs worked
for companies
with more than 1000 employees.
to the proportion
of the respondents
with negative
attitudes

are influenced
had positive

by the size

attitudes

of

towards

This figure can be compared
towards
CTPs,
where
47%

worked for companies with more than 1000 employees.
A larger proportion
of the group
with negative attitudes towards CTPs worked for small companies
with less than 100
employees compared to the positive group (35.0% compared to 11.8%).
It would seem
therefore that business travellers who work for larger companies are more likely to have
positive

attitudes

towards

CTPs.

Business traveller attitudes towards CTPs may be partially explained by knowledge of CTPs
based on their experience of working with them. 93.2% of the group with positive feeling
towards CTPs worked for companies with CTPs, whereas only 55.2% of the group with
negative attitudes did. Those that were anti-CTPs were more likely to select their own
flight (70.9%), while those with a positive attitude towards CTPs were more likely to allow
others for select their flight (36.9% did not select their flight).
This behaviour
may be
explained by the frequency with which each group travel.
negative group had made fewer trips in the last year compared

The results show that
to the positive group.

the

The presence of a travel manager or department
within a company seems to have some
effect on business travellers opinions regarding CTPs. 57.1% of the positive group worked
for companies
that employed travel managers, while this figure was only 33.1% of the
negative group.
It is surprising that, when questioned
about the nature of the
company, a larger proportion
of the group positive about CTPs
was quite rigid with written rules to be adhered to. About half of
indicated that the CTP under which they make business trip are

CTP employed
in their
indicated that their CTPs
all respondents,
however,
written guidelines.
This

may be compared
to the results in table 2 below which shows a cross-tabulation
of
respondent
attitudes towards CTPs and the class of travel accorded
to those at different
corporate levels within the employing company.
It would seem that, while the proportion
of traveller allowed to fly on business class increases with corporate status in all groups, the
hierarchical bias is most obvious in the group of travellers that hold negative feeling towards
CTPs. Business traveller attitudes towards CTPs may be most affected by companies that
create travel policies that favour those at the top of the corporate
Table

2: Hierarchical

corporate

hierarchy.

travel policies and business travel attitudes.
Anti-CTPs
Neutral to CTPs
Pro-CTPs

(%)
Flight allowance for various
hierarchical levels in respondents
company
Company directors
-Business Class
-Economy Class
Senior Management
-Business Class
-Economy Class
Other Management
-Business Class
-Economy Class

Table

1 above also shows differences

find out flight information,

52.9
47.1

67.9
32.1

64.3
35.7

36.7
63.3

46.4
53.6

44.8
55.2

15.5
84.5

18.7
81.3

30.1
69.9

between

the groups in terms

and also book their flights.

The negative

of the way in which they
group

were most likely

to sourceflight information
more

likely

to make

produced
schedules.
themselves,
relying
departments.

from travel agents, while the neutral and positive groups were
enquiries on in house travel managers
or departments
or airline

The
more

positive
heavily

group were also much less likely to book the flight
on others in their departments
or in-house
travel

The analysis of the scale of traveller attitudes towards CTPs shows that company size
obviously will affect the likelihood of a company employing a travel manager or having a
CTPs and thus it would seem that marketing approaches for different size of company may
be appropriate.
The evidence provided here shows that corporate
involvement
in the air
service purchase is greater in larger companies, and it would seem that these travellers on
the whole are positive or at least neutral about this involvement.

4.2. Business

travel market

purchase

benefits

Each respondents
rated the importance of each of 25 product elements on a 5-point ranked
continuum scale. Principal component analysis of the 25 purchase benefit elements was
performed to identify any underlying purchase benefits. The data performed well under test
of sampling adequacy (KMO = .82848) and sphericity (Bartlett = 3046.8, significance =
.0000) indicating the suitability of the data for principal component
analysis (PCA).
Six
principal factors identified by PCA accounted for 59.6% of the variation in the data set.
Tests of the internal consistency of the data (Cronbach's
alpha) provided evidence of the
reliability of the attitude scale. In the earlier study six factors were also identified with a
very similar amount of variation (60.6%).
Table 3 below shows the variables that are
closely associated with each factor.

Factors

1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 each have a bundle of product

attributes

associated

with them

which are very similar to those discovered
in the earlier study.
This provides further
evidence of the reliability of the attitude scale, and indicates that there are the following
purchase factors in the EU short haul business travel market; Business class value, in-flight
comfort and experience, price, schedule, and local airport.
Factor 3 in this survey includes
duty free shopping and free newspapers,
and beverages.
In the earlier study this factor
included ease of reservation,
seat allocation, quality of ground service, and was called "air
service user-friendliness".
Further testing of the attitude scale is needed to investigate the
reliability of this area of purchase benefits.
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Table 3: Factor
Variable

analysis

Cronbach Alpha
Business Class value
No ticket restrictions
Seat allocation
Return Boarding Card
Business lounge
Business Class Check-in
In-flight comfort &
experience
In-flight service
Seat comfort
Airline punctuality
Past experience of airline
Airline safety record

of business
travel purchase
Factor I
Factor 2
Factor
.7678

.08924
.07395
.30155
.23953
.14483

in-flight user benefits
Duty Free available
Free newspapers
Free beverages
Price
Ticket price
Ticket discount
Schedule
Timing of outward flight
Timing of return flight
Airport
Local airport

Following

the

principal

procedure
the

was

sample

final

application
cluster
with

of the

of the sample,
deemed

.13195

The

iiiii_iiii_i_i_7_211_i_i_i_i_i_i_i
-.05149
i!iiiiiiiiiiii_i_i_l.iiiiiiiii
-.06530

factor

analysis

scores

to identify

.10873
.13262

i_ii_::i:_!_!_!_i_iii_:_i_:_!_i_:
.09406
!jii!i!!iiiii_iiiiiiiiiiiii .05213
.05995

for

each

segments

respondent
within

were

the business

analysis

was used,
evaluate

of the

analysis

membership

were

analysis

in the

stored.

The

for the bottom.

cluster

solution

segments,

used

bottom

half

as

the

initial

cluster

process

The result

reached

data
was

top half of
stored.

centres

Again

membership
coefficient

to the

cluster

of the sample.

the correlation

was

a cross-validation

was re-applied

in the validation

then

validation

data,

three

validity

The cluster

cluster

process

and a robust
the

the
were

0.8799

of the cross-validation

The
in the

validation
correlated
for the top

procedure

was

satisfactory.

chi-squared

significantly
management
the

ii!iiiiiii!i
i_i_ii
!iiiiili
::::::::::::
::::8:::::::::::::::
iiji iiiii_ii!_i
if!!

analysis,

in a cluster

membership

and 0.7701

-.14626
.09102
.06001

-.04223

To

were

-.00777
.10578
-.05495

.12538

of this

cluster

.30118
.03470
.05237

.00479

respondent's

memberships
the original

.02188
.07153
.14435
.14435
-.03888

-.09181
.03476

component

cluster

.00112
.00881
.18568
.16232
.04056

-.02686
.02307

to the solution.

centres

.00936
.03497
.00530
.11572
.13651

:_;_:"_:"__:_:_
_i_i_i_i_!_!_..$.:ii_i_i;_
?
.49488
:::;"::_:.
: ::':_:_:
..............
_7_9..:L::::,,.
....... 20197
ii!iiiiiiii!_i_iiiiiii_iiiii!
.02857
iiiiiiiiiii_iiiiiiiii!iii
_!:::
.03287
iiz_i_iiii!_iii_i_!_i_;i_!i!iii_!
.06982

algorithm

and each

cluster

-.19996
.02103
.35450
.21021
.09457

.08326
.12469

iterations.
applied

.08844
-.04366
.12523
-.05598
.00784

-.06644
.08124

segmentation

clustering

.15668
.19398
.19720
-.04926
-.14428

.08475
.17720

travel

four

.02897
.03391
.09119
.32410
.19039

.09447
.10934

4.3.

only

na

.03640
.02671

to be used

after

.6957

-.01874
.19153
.20303

saved

An iterative

Factor 6

.7619

.12644
.16246
.03503

calculated
and
travel market.

Business

Factor 5

.7202

.7883

_:i!:ii:iiiii_!_i!iiiiiiiii:i
.23780
ii!ii::i:!i!_!i!i!_ii6_iii_i!_i!ii_!ii!ii
.31436
!i!i!!iiii_!iiiiil;_
.07233
iiii!ili!iiiii!
i__iiiiiiiiii!iiiiii.16340
ii::!_i:ii_ii:i_:ii_:_i!_iiiiiiii_
.17992

benefits.
Factor 4

3

number

test

between

of

level/social
of trips

independence

the clusters.
taken

classification,
during

was

used

The variables

that

to

size of employing

the past

twelve
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identify

influenced

months,

the

company,
whether

variables

segment

which

membership

age (at the
the company

differ
were;

90%

level),

had

a CTP,

and

the

Likert

score

on the

CTP

attitude

scale.

Details

of the

differences

are

shown

in table

4 below.

Table

4: Business

travel

segmentation

profile
Segment

1

Segment

(%)
20.5%
Management
Company

2

Segment

(%)

of sample

34.8%

of sample

44.7%

of sample

level
18.2

17.4

32.9

66.2

67.4

57.8

15.6

15.2

9.2

25-43

27.3

30.5

17.6

35-44

37.7

34.4

38.2

45-64

35.1

35.1

44.1

1-5 trips

48.1

56.5

36.9

6-10

19.5

24.4

33.3

32.5

19.1

29.8
26.2

Senior

director
management

Other

3

(%)

management

Age
(significance

Number

more

0.09982)

of trips

than

Company

in last 12 months
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Size

1-99 employees

15.6

15.3

100-999

23.4

26.7

19.2

61.0

58.0

54.7

yes

75.0

77.9

65.1

no
Views

25.0

22.1

34.9

Anti-CTPs

11.7

39.6

34.5

neutral

35.0

30.2

35.2

53.3

30.2

30.3

more

than

Company

1000
has CTP

of CTP
to CTPs

Pro-CTPs

Analysis
on

of variance

product

elements

1 to

scores

can

mean

attitude

show

the

highest

was

elements
22.

range

most

These
from

score

used

1 to

to examine

25.

This

differences
1 (highly

for

a number

important

factors

the

are

importance

placed

revealed

significant

differences

significant

important)

to 5 (low

of purchase
first.

difference

process

The

element
segment

is highlighted.
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at the

95%

importance).
for
that

each
rates

level.
Table
segment
each

In

by

the

each

product

product

attitude

5 below
and

segment

for

shows

is organised
element

scale,
the
to
the

Table 5: Purchase

benefits

sought

Most important purchase factors
Timing of outwardflight
Timing of return flight
Local airport
Punctuality
Seat comfort
Fast-track check-in
In-flight service
Lack of ticket restrictions
Frequent flier programme
Ease of reservation
Business lounge available
Price
Duty free available

These

4.3.1.

by business travel set[ments
Segment 1
Segment 2
mean attitude score
mean attitude score

Segment 3
mean attitude score

1.0519
1.9015
i::::_
ii!_:ii!:i
i i]_0058 iii!il ili::!
1.3247
2.1818
iii:: ::_iii!iiii_0_i::_i:_ii:ii::!i
i
i :::i:i i::
::il
iiii:_tli_ii_:::i::ili_:i::i_:i_i
ilii_:
iiii
1.7803
1.5202
1.8939
1.6127
_ii::i
_:iil
!ii:iii!ii:iiii_ii_ili!i_,iiiiiiii_i_:iii_i!iiii
1.8106
1.7341
iiiiiiililiiiiiiii!i!!iiiiiliiii_i_iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiii
1.9615
1.6716
i.iii
iiiiiiil
:..i.:i!.i!i.l.i._
!i._i!iiiiii!!.i.i!i!ii!.ill
!!ill
2.1818
2.1445
2.7532
2.2803
2.6134
2.4987
i!!ii:_!ii
!!!iii_!iiiii_iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!!ii
;i
3.1169
2.3712
iiii:_i!i
ii::iiiiiiiii_!_ii_;iiiii!iiiiiii::ill
2.7662
2.5758
ilili_:_i:_:i:-ii_iiiiiii::ii_:ii_:i::_iiiiiiii_ii!iiiii!iiiiiiil
ii
3.4675
2.5227
iiiiiii!iiiil
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4.0260
_:i!_i!_:!i!iii_:ii:::i!i_.ii!iii_._:ii_!_i_
::!:i_i
ii:_i:_iii:_ii!_:iil
....
3.,_162

tables are used as a basis to develop a profile of each segment.

Profile

of segment

1

The first segment is made up of 20.5% of the respondents of the survey. A large proportion
of members are employed in senior management positions.
The age profile of this group is
fairly even across the spectrum, however, the largest proportion of the segment (37.7%)
aged between 35-44. This is consistent with the management positions they hold.
With regard to business travel consumption, the largest proportion
have made five trips or less in the last twelve months.
However,

of the segment
when compared

are

(48.1%)
with the

other segments, this segment has the largest proportion
of the members who have made
more than ten trips in the last year (32.5%).
Members of this segment are most likely to
work for large companies, with 61% of the group working for companies with more than
1000 employees.
75.0% of members of this segment work for companies that have a CTP,
with 53.3%

of the group holding positive attitudes

towards

these policies.

By identifying the product attributes that most closely associate with the purchase factors
identified in the factor analysis above, we can see that segment one seems to rate factors 2
(in-flight comfort and experience) and 6 (local airport) most highly.
Local airport is the
most important purchase item to members of this segment.
Members of this segment are
keen to ensure that their time is not wasted, and thus airline punctuality
and fast-track
check-in are important purchase considerations.
It is interesting to note that it is this group
that rates airport business lounges least highly of the three segments, but this may reflect the
groups propensity not to waste time. Once on board it is members of this segment that rate
seat comfort and in-flight service more highly than members of the other
the group that places least importance on the price of the airline service.

segments,

but is

This segments, therefore, works for large companies, is not interested in the price
product but wants a smooth and pleasant product delivery during the consumption

of the
of the
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service.As longas
by corporate

4.3.2. Profile

these items are met, members of this segment
involvement in their travel arrangements.

of Segment

would be least bothered

2

Representing
34.8% of the sample, a similar proportion of this segment are employed
in
senior management
positions (67.4). The age distribution of this segment is similar to that
found in segment 1, however this group tends to travel the least of all the groups.
56.5% of
this segment have made five or less trips in the last twelve months.
Although a smaller
proportion
of this group work for very large companies (58.0%), 77.9% of this group work
for companies that have CTPs. The effect of corporate size on attitudes towards CTPs may
explain the high proportion

of the group with negative

attitudes

towards

CTPs.

As can be seen by the table 5, members of this segment on average do not rate any product
attributes
more highly than members of other segments with the exception of duty free
shopping.
Consequently
to investigate this segment we will look at the product attributes
they rated most highly and also look at those product attributes where this group recorded a
similar score to segment that scored the product highest. The most important factor to this
group is local airport, which is rated higher than the timing of the outward flight, as is
punctuality
and seat comfort. The availability of a business lounge is relatively important as
is the ease in which tickets may be reserved.
The profile indicates that members of this segment tend to travel less than the other
segments.
As they travel less the evidence suggest they get more involved in the purchase
of their flights, and have negative feelings towards CTPs.
To market to this segment,
airlines should concentrate
on the traveller not the corporation, given the travellers negative
feelings towards
CTPs, promote ease of access to the local airport,
the connections
available from the airport and quality of the duty free shopping and the business lounge
facilities.

4.3.3. Profile

of Segment

3

Representing
44.7% of the sample, this segment is the largest group of business travellers.
32.9% of the segment indicated that they work as company directors, with a further 57.8%
working in senior management.
This segment has the largest proportion of members who
work for small companies (26.2%), although over half (54.7%) work for companies
with
more than 1000 employees.
Members of this group are fairly evenly distributed
in the
frequency of business trips made. 29.8% of the group have made ore than 10 trips in the
last year but 36.9% have made five or less. The age distribution
is more distinctive,
however,

with 44.1% of the group being aged 44 or over.

With regard to CTPs members of this group were the least likely to work for a company
that had a CTP. However this figure was still 65.1% demonstrating
the reach CTP have in
the business travel market. Attitudes towards CTPs were fairly evenly distributed between
members of this segment, the largest proportion holding neutral opinions (35.2*/0).
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The identifiable characteristics
of this segment however are the purchase factors that they
rate highly.
Table 5 shows the large amount of product elements that members of this
segment rated more highly than members of other segments.
The scheduling factors were
most important but members of this segment also rated purchase factors 1 (Business class
value), and 4 (price), more highly than other segments.
This segment represents
good schedules at low
bookings

without

These factors
possibly
decision

a large section of the short haul business travel market that want
prices but also want to have the ability to change their flight

restriction,

and want to use well equipped

combined with the slight tendency

business

of this segment

class lounges.

towards

smaller companies

indicates that travellers in this segment have a greater involvement in the purchase
than, particularly
segment 1 where there seems to be more evidence of corporate

involvement.
Airlines or travel agents may wish to develop products aimed at this market
segment that reduces the need for traveller involvement
and makes the purchase easier.
Travel agency management
of smaller companies
travel expenditure
accounts
may be
mutually beneficial for the companies and agents.
This research has identified and profiled three market segment within the EU short haul
market that are not obviously comparable with the market segments identified in the earlier
study.
The most striking difference between the earlier study and this research is that
company size can be used to distinguish between segments in this
not possible in the earlier study.
Company size is obviously a useful
when combined
with the findings regarding
corporate
travel
involvement
in the purchase decision and procedures,
the findings
useful.

study, whereas this was
segmentation
basis and
policies and corporate
in this survey are very

5. CONCLUSION

This paper has provided additional information regarding the business traveller and his/her
employing organisation
in the purchase of air travel.
The scale for traveller attitudes
towards
CTPs cart be evaluated
by its application
in other markets.
Other attitude
statements could be developed that might gain greater insight into business traveller attitude
constructs.
The scale for purchase attributes which was previously
developed has been
assessed and surprisingly similar results were found in terms of the key purchase attributes
in the short haul business travel market which provides strong evidence of the key purchase
benefits sought by the business travel market. A new market segmentation
based on these
product elements reaped further in-sight into the market and how it has changed in the last
five years.
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APPENDIX
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

CTPs
CTPs
CTPs
CTPs
CTPs

I

are a good idea
make the whole process of travel more easy
are a constraint which serve no great purpose
benefit those at the top of the hierarchy

take transport decisions away from the individual traveller
6. CTPs allow the company to save money on travel
7. CTPs are a sensible business decision
8. CTPs are a hindrance

when planning a business trip

9. CTPs
miles)
10. CTPs
1I.CTPs
12.CTPs

onto other transport

force travellers

modes for short distance

travel (up to 300

tend to infringe of employment travel benefits
require advance planning of business trips
downgrade the class of travel allowed

13.CTPs have resulted in companies having preferred airlines
14.Frequent flier points should be awarded to the company rather than the traveUer
15. CTPs increase the use of video conferencing and e-mail while reducing air travel

APPENDIX

H

1. Timing of the outward flight
2. Timing of the return flight
3. Flight frequency
4. Ticket
5. Ticket

price
discount

6. Ease of reservation
7. Lack of ticket restrictions
8. Direct route
9. Seat allocation at reservation
10. Fast-track check-in
11. Quality of ground
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

service

Flight from local airport
Return boarding card on departure
Business lounge available at airport
Automated
check-in
Exclusive Business Class check-in

17. In-flight service
18. Seat comfort
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Duty Free available
Free daily newspapers
Free beverages
Frequent flier programme
Airline punctuality record
Past experience of an airline
Airline safety record

17

TopicArea• A4

I

ECONOMETRIC

ANALYSIS

OF AIRLIFT

PASSENGER

Dr. Suk-Hong
Professor,

DEMAND

Yoon

Department

of

the Aviation Management
Korea Aviation
Hwa-jon
Gyong-gi

Univ.

Dong, Go-yang

City

Do, Korea(411-791)

FAX : 82-02-307-5769

1

GENERAL

REVIEW

This research
accordance

OF THE AIRLINE

is purposed

to review

current

with the analysis methods

Kanafani(1983)
microanalysis

categorized

macroeconomics

MODELS

airlift demand forecast models and to refine in

models

into

to the dichotomous

and microeconomics

respectively.

of the time series models and variable elasticity

< Figure

FORECAST

of econometrics.

current

models in reference

DEMAND

two

of

analysis methods
Macroanalysis

macroanalysis
of the economics

methods

models as shown <Figure

1 > Macro analysis

I Macro

ways

includes

I and 2>.

models

Analysis Model

I

I

t

Time Series
Elasticity
Variable
1974 Kanafani
1978 Frankena
1992 Oum
1992 Goodwin

I
Time Series
Simple

I
]

1972
1980
1988
1990

Lave
Behbehani
Teodorovic
Bennett

1992
1992
1992
1992

Bishop
Oum
Goodwia
Dresner

1992 Fujii
1993 Jansson
1995 Maillebiau

Adjustment
Partial
1972 Young
1983 Kanafani

I
Income

1972 Young
1980 Aureille

Gerneral
Time Series

1980 Kanafani
1995 Dargay

and
as
both

Simpletimeseriesmodeldeveloped
byMaillebiau(1995)
isasfollows.
log(PAX)= ct - 0.868log(YLD)+ 0.618Iog(USENP)
+ 0.170Iog(ACC)
- 0.044log(TRD)+ 0.062log(DOL)-0.217D86.......................

(1)

ACC:accessibility
of service
( PAX:annualpassenger
TRD:annualtrades
YLD: averagefarepermile
USENP:annualdomestic
enplanements D86:dummy)

Invariableelasticitymodel,Oum(1992)
estimated
airfareelasticities
of air passenger
travel
demandas<Table1>.
<Table

1> Demand

Elasticities

Cross-section

Time Series
Leisure

travel

0.40-1.98,

of Air Passenger

1.92

Travel

Other

1.52

1.40-3.30,2.20-4.60

Business travel

0.65

1.15

0.90

Mixed or unknown

0.82,0.91,0.36-1.81

0.76-0.84,1.39,1.63

0.53-1.00,1.80-1.90

1.12-1.28,1.48

1.85,2.83-4.51

In consideration
essential

of time, the statistical

that the economic

Current demands
U.S. domestic

In Dt

=

datas are available

usually takes as one year, because

years as Dargay(1995)

model for the

passenger.

a + bin Pt + cln Yt + din Dr-1 .................................................

air fare in period t,

it is

on an annual basis.

would be the results of the foregone

( Dt : travel demand in period t,
Pt

observation

Yt : Personal

(2)

income in period t

Dt-i • travel demand

of the previous

year )

< Figure
I

I

2 > Micro analysis

models

Micro Analysis Model

I

I

I

I

Air Travel
Choice Model

Pair Model

1977 Kanafani
1990 Sergio

I

Model

1972 Verleger
1986 Oum

Airport
Demand Specific
Model

1972 Young
1993 Williams

1975 Haney
1991 Kaemmerle

1992 Hong
1992 Chou

2

ECONOMETRIC

Airlift passenger
nonbusiness

are divided into business

are subdivided

into tourism

often

not

taken

into

of official,

business,

and nonbusiness

have

tourism,

by trip purposes.

and visitor (of relatives
of trip purpose

consideration

immigrations/emmigrations

purposes
national

BUILDING

said that, from the unavailability

are

concerned

demands

demands

Kanafani(1983)
analyses

MODEL

1993 Oum

been

gathering

and visitors

and friends.)

information,

in air travel.

And

But

trip purpose

Korea

informations

(relatives/friends)

authorities

about

strictly

the trip

in view of

securities.

The objective

period

was inaugurated
categories

into the transpacific

is between
routes.

1976 and 1990, before

Econometric

ASIANA

airline

models will be built for these 3

with time series analysis.

Independent
Transaction

of this research

variables
between

are
Korea

final

consumption

and U.S.A.(Table

capita (Table A-4) of appendix.

expenditures
A-6),

And the standard

per

capita

air fare (Table

(Table

A-3),

A-5), and GDP

year to change the current

per

value to real

values is 1985.

From the decreasing
were increased

14.2% in average

In due to the absence
transpacific,

effect air fare and increasing

Since the specification

American

travelers

to Korea

annually.

of intermodal

these analyses

of income,

competition

between

airlift and others

on the route of

do not include any cross elasticity of demand.

test becoming

an intergral

part of econometric

demand

model,

all

modelsarepassedthrough

one of the statistical

inference

tests,

Kolmogorov-Smirnov

managed

rate of foreign currency,

evaluation.
In Korea,

Since government

the exchange

this research

omits any effects from this.

2.1

American

Tourists

In Tt= 1.321156

In dr- 1.028466

(2.403056)
(

to Korea

) t statistical

In fi-l+ 0.536099

(-1.243644)

In Tt-i

(3.159584)

value of 95% significance

level.

R 2 = 0.97,

R 2 = 0.96,

(Tt : American

tourists, dt : final expenditure

D.W. = 1.94
per capita, fi-_ : fare of the previous

<Table 2> Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Range

Number

(3)

...........

of

Observation
(Oi)

year)

Evaluation

Accumulated

Expected

Accumulated

Difference

Frequency
(C Oi)

Frequency
(Ei)

Frequency
(C Ei)

(d=CiCi-CiEi)

-oo ~-1.0

0

0

2.6976

0.1587

-0.1587

-1.0 ~ -0.5

0

0

2.5463

0.3085

-0.3085

-0.5 ~

0

7

0.41

3.2558

0.5

-0.09

0 ~ 0.5

10

1.0

3.2558

0.6915

0.3085

0.5 ~ 1.0

0

1.0

2.5463

0.8413

0.1587

1.0 ~ oo

0

1.0

2.6979

1.0

0

total

17

max

[d I = 0.3085

There

are

American

17

< 0.318,

three

findings

tourists

demand

rather than the current
of Americans

therefore,

from

null hypothsis

this

is elastic

study

being

different

from

to air fare of the previous

year. And this is different

participates

is adopted.

in tours organized

from <Table

by travel agencies

conventional

studies.

year of their departures

1>. The reason

is that almost

who begin to promote

their

sales several years prior to.
American
experienced.

tourists

swarm

into the trip corridors

They prefer of those routes

And they are sensitive

that the

security ascertained

American

tourists

to the undeveloped

to their income of the year of their departure.

have
routes.

been

2.2

American

Visitors

In Bt = 0.420802

to Korea

In gt + 0.764301

(3.004489)

R 2 = 0.9330,

(Bt: business

purpose visitors,
between

D.W. = 1.97,

(4)

Number

two countries

of

9 = 0.597 (Cochran-

Orcutt)

gt : real GDP per capita in America

<Table

Range

.................................................

(5.491212)

R 2 = 0.9442,

mt " transactions

In mt

in the period

of "t")

3> Koimogorov-Smirnov

Evaluation

Accumulated

Expected

Accumulated

Difference

Frequency
(COi)

Frequency
(Ei)

Frequency
(C El)

(d=CiCi-CiEi)

Observation
(Oi)
- :_ ~ -1.0

0

0

2.2218

O. 1587

-0.1587

-1.0 ~ -0.5

2

O.1428

2.0958

0.3085

-0.1657

-0.5 ~

0

2

0.2857

2.681

0.5

-0.0228

0 ~ 0.5

6

0.7142

2.681

0.6915

0.0227

0.5 ~ 1.0

2

0.8571

2.0958

0.8413

0.0158

1.0 ~ m

2

1.0

2.2218

1.0

0

total

14

max

13.9972

[d [ = 0.1657

< 0.349,

Doganis(1991)

identified

services

all markets,

across

economic

factors

per capita

2.3 Korean

=

as generally

affectiong

is adopted.

passenger

diposable

demand

income

for

airline

and the level of

activity.

organization

lnVt

null hypothesis

i.e., the level of personal

But the results is that American
to GDP

therefore,

rather

than personal

pays trip expenses

Ethnics

0.560291
(0.802)

visitors for the purpose
disposable

of business and official are sensitive
income.

The reason

is that visitors'

for the visitors.

(of America)

+ 0.516563
(7.584)

Visitors

lndt - 4.168766
(-3.180)

lnfi-i - 3.461288
(-2.917)

lrtfi-2 .................

(5)

m

R 2=

0.8787,

R 2=0.8374,

The reason why statistical
travel their motherland

D.W. = 1.26,

9= 1.17.

values are not so good is that, when Korean

to visit relatives,

ethnics (of America)

they are used to buy any diluted tickets

from the

normal tare.

3

POLICY

Americans'

IMPLICATIONS

behavior

of travel is rational

three models. In tourism
are near unitary

purpose

(1.32 and -1.03

in view of economy

referring

travel model,

demand

elasticities

respectively)

mean that they consume

statistical

values

of

both of income and fare
travel as an usual

goods rather than luxury.
They respond
fashions

to the fares of the previous

year not the current

of the previous year. It means that Americans

their departures

American

and pay tour fees to the organizers

visitors

for the purpose

than final consumption

of business

expenditures

year and also to the tour

begin to plan several years prior to

two years prior to at least.

respond

per capita,

to the real GDP

per capita rather

and also to the real transactions

between

two countries.

Korean

ethnics

of America

level of income

(demand

their desire depends

desire to visit their relatives
elasticity

of income,

0.56.).

in motherland

But whether

Upon these conclusions,
foreign

the tour organizers

they could

And,

policy implications
tourists

of America

are drawn as follows.

to travel to Korea, authorities

rather than the individual

should be maintained

because

authorities

Second,

Americans

to help the Korean
program

with the long-term

refer

keep the bondages

prepare package

materialize

tourists.

focus their activities

to the tourism

with the persons

ethincs

activities

including

programs.
pattern

that tourists

have

swarmed

into,

who already visited Korea.

of America

of home-coming

on to

traveler.

The target is to the middle level income or above group. Public relations
advertise

of their

upon highly to the level of fares.

And they begin to plan several years earlier than American

First, to promote

regardless

to materialize

their

desire,

tour several years prior to their trips.

authorities
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<Table

A

A-l>

Americans

to Korea(Tourism

Purpose)

Tourists
Year

Other

Occupancy(%)

Rate(%)

1976

32013

31.32

11.40

70186

2.19

102199

1977

37465

32.95

17.03

76245

8.63

123710

1978

42420

35.94

13.23

75619

-0.82

118039

1979

55937

43.92

31.87

71418

-5.56

127355

1980

53295

43.90

-4.72

68109

-4.63

121404

198I

58475

44.84

9.72

71927

5.61

130402

1982

67089

44.36

14.73

84160

17.01

151249

1983

80776

45.77

20.40

95712

13.73

176488

1984

89893

45.21

11.29

123092

28.61

212986

1985

82388

34.41

-8.35

157035

27.58

239423

1986

112069

39.38

36.03

175502

9.85

284571

1987

136412

41.80

21.72

189918

8.21

326330

1988

1226O4

35.30

-10.12

224677

18.30

347281

1989

108454

34.20

-11.54

208679

-7.12

3171_

1990

104756

32.19

-3.41

220632

5.73

<Source

: Korea Tourism

Promotion

Association,

10

Person

Total

Person

Foreigners

Rate(%)

to Korea (Monthly

325388

Report)>

<Table A-2>

Year

American

Travelers

to Korea

Relatives)

Business

Visiting
Relatives

(Visiting

Commercial

Other

Total

Official

1976

1682

11785

42303

14416

70186

1977

1262

20860

33269

20854

76245

1978

2698

19158

33450

20313

75619

1979

5575

17505

39830

8508

71418

1980

6779

17262

36400

7668

68109

1981

7538

20761

35593

8035

71927

1982

7895

22913

44401

8951

84160

1983

11762

27750

45593

10607

95712

1984

20385

35390

50373

16944

123092

1985

33517

51376

58060

14082

157035

1986

39112

61721

59849

11820

172502

1987

43877

69975

61185

14881

189918

1988

43714

73149

63911

43903

224677

1989

48707

75304

19194

65474

208679

1990

46429

74408

17033

82762

220632

<Source

' Korea Tourism

Promotion

Association,

I1

Foreigners

to Korea

(Monthly

Report)>

<Table A-3>

Final Consumption

Expenditure

Current
Year

Expense
($billion)

Per Capita of U. S. A

Real Expense
Amount

per

($billion)

C.P.I.(%)
Rate(%)

capita

1976

1129.4

2135.0

9791

4.39

52.9

1977

1257.2

2233.0

10138

3.54

56.2

1978

1403.5

2316.0

10404

2.62

60.6

1979

1566.7

2321.0

10312

-0.88

67.5

1980

1732.6

2264.8

9943

-3.52

76.5

1981

1915.1

2266.4

9847

-0.97

84.5

1982

2050.7

2286.2

9832

-0.15

89.7

1983

2234.5

2413.1

10277

4.53

92.6

1984

2426.4

2511.8

10598

3.12

96.6

1985

2629.0

2629.0

10987

3.67

100.0

1986

2807.5

2755.2

11403

3.79

101.9

1987

3012.1

2849.7

11682

2.45

105.7

1988

3235.1

2943.7

11950

2.29

109.9

1989

3471.1

3013.1

12080

1.09

115.2

< Source

: IMF, International

Financial Statistics

12

Yearbook

(1990)>

<Table A-4>

G.D.P.

of

U.S.A.

Real GDP

Current
Year

GDP

GDP
($billion)

Amount

(Real GDP)

($billion)

per capita

Deflator
Rate(%)

1976

1761.7

3101.6

14225

3.93

56.8

1977

1965.1

3247.7

14746

3.66

60.6

1978

2219.2

3408.9

15315

3.86

65.1

1979

2464.4

3480.8

15466

0.99

70.8

1980

2684.4

3472.7

15247

-1.41

77.3

1981

3005.5

3548.4

15418

0.10

84.7

1982

3114.8

3457.0

14868

-3.57

90.1

1983

3355.9

3585.4

15270

2.70

93.6

1984

3724.8

3828.2

16153

5.78

97.3

1985

3974.2

3974.2

16609

2.82

100.0

1986

4205.4

4094.8

16947

2.04

102.7

1987

4497.2

4238.9

17367

2.53

106.1

1988

4847.3

4434.9

18004

3.61

109.3

1989

5198.4

4568.0

18315

1.73

113.8

<Source

IMF, ibid.>
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<Table A-5>

Air Fare (between

L.A. and Seoui)

(unit • $)
Normal One Way
Year

Economy

Real Fare

Fare
Amount

('Nominal)

<Source

Rate(%)

1976

581

1098

-8.19

1977

581

1033

-5.92

1978

581

958

-7.26

1979

581

860

-10,23

1980

710

928

7.91

1981

756

894

-3.66

1982

794

885

-1.01

1983

842

909

2,71

1984

842

871

-4.18

1985

842

842

-3,33

1986

842

826

-1.90

1987

884

875

5.93

1988

884

842

-3,77

1989

884

804

-4.51

1990

884

767

-4.60

" IATA, Tariff>
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<Table A-6>

Transactions

between

Korea and U.S.A

Import

Export

from

tO

Korea

Korea

Amount

1976

4297

3150

7447

27.26

1977

4973

3794

8767

17.73

1978

5994

4410

10404

18.67

1979

5466

5863

11329

8.89

1980

4547

5488

10035

-11.42

1981

5206

6217

11423

13.83

1982

5821

6052

11873

3.94

1983

8063

6312

14375

21.07

1984

10213

6820

17033

18.49

1985

10754

6489

17243

1.23

1986

14368

6480

20848

20.91

1987

17674

8528

26202

25.68

1988

19709

11608

31317

19.52

1989

17285

14105

31390

0.23

Year

<Source

• Korea Trade Association,
IMF, International

Total Amount

Foreign Trade (Monthly Report)

Finance Statistics>

\
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Rate(%)

and

Topicarea:"A4" AirportsandAviationtSIG)

<.J

f,/;z
PASSENGER'S
ROAD

CHOICE

OF AIR

COMPETITION:

THE

USE

TRANSPORT

UNDER

OF COINTEGRATION

TECHNIQUES
by
Pablo-Coto*
Jos_ Bafios-Pino"
Vicente

Inglada*

*Department

of Economics.

University

of Cantabria.

_Department

of Economics.

University

of Oviedo.

"Ministerio

de Obras iNblicas,

Public Works,

Transport,

Transportes,

Communication

Comunicaciones
and Environment).

y Medio

Ambiente

(Ministry

of

Topicarea:
"A4" AirportsandAviation(SIG).
Authors:
Pablo Coto-Milhin,
Title:
"PASSENGER'S

Jos6 Bafios-Pino

CHOICE

USE OF COINTEGRATION

and Vicente

Inglada.

OF AIR TRANSPORT

UNDER

ROAD COMPETITION:

THE

TECHNIQUES"

Abstract:
In this study,
Quarterly

we present

a theoretical

model

for passenger

data has been used for the 1980.I-1992.IV

We have used cointegration

techniques,

which

air transport

demands

in Spain.

period.

are subject

to a wide range of tests, to obtain

short- and long-run equations.
Moreover,
we have obtained the product, price and cross
elasticities of each mode of transport. These estimations may be used to analyze the effects of
transport

fares on income changes,

as well as to predict short- and long-run

traffics.

1. INTRODUCTION
The initial models of passenger transport demand were the aggregate "modal split models". In
these models, there has been an attempt to determine the number of journeys in a given set of
modes of transport for two towns, taking into account the characteristics
of the passengers.
Studies on modal split, such as Quandt and Baumol (1966), Boyer (1977), and Levin (1978),
have been criticized by Oum (1979) and Winston (1985), among others, for the few variables
used to account for the motivation
patterns in their estimations.

in the user's behavior,

Several models of aggregate passenger transport
been carried out in order to improve the previous

and for using

very simple

linear

demand based on the user's behavior have
ones. The user's utility is optimized in these

models in line with the classic theory of consumer's
behavior and demand. The work by Oum
and Guillen (1979) based on the user's behavior is a typical example in which the passenger
demand in Canada is analyzed.
Some disaggregate
research
transport demand. The most
these works, the user takes
(railway, air, road transport,
for the user.
Spanish

interurban

passenger

based on the user's behavior has also been done on
significant work on these models is McFadden
(1973,
a discrete choice of some of the different modes of
etc.) and it is assumed that the mode chosen optimizes

transport

was first studied in the "Elasticidad

passenger
1974). In
transport
the utility

de la Demanda

del

Transporte Ptiblico de Viajeros" (Elasticity of the Passenger Public Transport Demand) by the
Instituto
de Estudios
de Transportes
y Comunicaciones
(Institute
of Transport
and
Communication
Studies) (1978). This was analyzed by V_quez
(1985) in a work carried out
by the Secretarfa General del Ministerio de Transportes (General Secretariat of the Ministry of
Transport).
In addition, other studies such as that by Inglada (1991), Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia
(1994); and Coto Bafios and Inglada (1995) have been carried out on this issue. The elasticities
of the modes of transport in the main regions were studied in IETC (1978) and V_quez
(1985). Price elasticities
have been studied in Inglada (1992) for monthly data between
1980.01 and 1988.12, with time series in which the residues have been modeled with the BoxJenkins techniques.
Uniequational
models have been carried out in Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia
(1994) in order to estimate income elasticities, using the Industrial Production Index (IPI) and
the Electric Power Consumption
(CENER), for the 1980.0 l-1988.12 period, and monthly data
have been used in the estimations.
In these works, the series is also modeled by the BoxJenkins methodology.
An original model is offered in this paper in order to estimate price
elasticities for the 1980.I-1992.IV
period, applying cointegration
techniques

income and cross
and using monthly

data. Such techniques
allow the estimation
of short-run elasticities,
which add immediate
responses
to price and income changing, and the estimation
of long-run elasticities
which
allow to see the effects of the price and/or income changing produced later on.

This researchoffersa modelaccordingto the secondproposalabove,beingbasedon a
microeconomic
analysis,whichcanbeconsidered
asclassic.Its structureis verysimple.Point
numbertwopresents
thetheoreticalmodelfor Spanish
passenger
transportdemand.
In thenext
point,thedatausedaredescribed.
Pointnumberfour presents
theestimations
of thedifferent
demands.
Finally,themainconclusions
areofferedin pointnumberfive.
2. THE MODEL
Assumea typicaluserwhosepreferredgoodsverify the weakseparabilitycondition.Thus,
modelingof theof passenger
transportservicedemandconstitutes
thesecondstageof a twostage budgetprocess.Therefore,the user'sincomefirstly falls into two big spending
categories:passenger
transportservicesandtherestof the goodsandservices;secondly,the
user'sincomeis assigned
tothegoodsandservices
containedin eachof thesetwo categories.
Thatis tosay,theutility functionof therepresentative
userisasfollows:
U=U(X 1,X2....Xk;Xk+ I..... X n)
where

vector Xi= (X 1, X 2 .... Xk); with i= I, 2..... k represents

passenger

transport

services;

vector Xj= (Xk+ 1.....
Xn); j= k+l .... n represents
goods and services except for those
corresponding
to passenger transport and U represents a utility function which is continuous
and differentiable,
monotone, increasing, and strictly quasi-concave.
The consumer

balance

is reduced

to:

max U (Xi, Xj)
subjectto:Pi" Xi + Pj"Xj = Y
where the prices Pi = (PI, P2, ..., Pk) and Pj= (Pk+l,
level of income.
First order conditions

allow to obtain the following

..-, Pn), and where Y represents

typical user's Marshallian

Xi= Xi (Pi, Pj, Y)
Xj= Xj (Pi, Pj, Y)

Of these individual demand functions,
with passenger transport services.

function

[1] is interesting

the user's

demands:
[1]
t2]

for us since it corresponds

Equation [I] still presents some problems. Firstly, functions such as [ 1] should be valid for any
income distribution among the different economic agents. If this were not the case, function
[1] would provide as many values as income Y distributions
among the user were possible
and, therefore, such a function would not exist. Another assumption would be that income is
dist.ributed
under a specific rule. Once this rule has been established,
the integrability

conditionsarecheckedandthe existenceof the aggregate
Marshalliandemandfunctionsis
guaranteed,
Varian(1992).However,therearenodatato goalongtheselines.In orderto solve
thisproblemin thisstudywecanassume
thatall theusershavethesamelevelof income.
Function[1] is generalenoughtoanalyzethepassenger
transportservicedemands-Talgoand
long-distance
railway,air androadtransport-identifyingthe differentsubindexesfor the
amountsdemanded
in eachservice.
From 1980.Ito 1992.IV,passenger
transportservicesin Spainhavebeenprovidedunder
different regulationconditions.The governmentcompanyRENFE and Iberia have the
monopolyof railwayandair nationaltransportin Spainrespectively,androadtransportis
providedby privatecompanies
whichweregivena regularline aftera systemcalled"rightof
testing".It can be saidthattrumproadpassenger
transport,which hasa low incidencein
quantitativeterms,is theonlymodeof transportwhichhasnotyetbeenregulated.However,
giventheimpossibilityto obtainquarterlystatisticaldataonpassenger
roadtransport,andwith
the aim of addinginter-regionaltransporton the user'sown vehicles,we haveusedthe
premiumpetrol consumptionvariable.The premiumpetrol consumptionhas also been
regulated
by thegovernment
duringtheperiodof thisstudy.Undersuchregulationconditions
and with the aim to preventthe problemswhich may arise from the supply-demand
simultaneity,
we have assumed that supply is exogenous
and is determined by the decisions of the government.

3. SPANISH

in relation

with prices

and income

DATA

The data on the series of long distance passenger railway transport (VKF), passenger Talgo
railway (VKT), and passenger departures and arrivals in Spanish airports (AERV), have been
obtained from the series provided by the Informes de Coyuntura del Ministerio de Transportes,
Turismo y Comunicaciones.
No data on road transport passengers are available and a "proxy"
such as premium petrol consumption
has been used in order to approximate
the transport on
the user's own vehicles. The variable (QGAS) has been obtained from the Direcci6n General
de Previsi6n y Coyuntura del Ministerio de Econom/a
y Hacienda. The gas-oil consumption
variable (QGLEO) has also been used with the aim of approximating
the behavior of regular
and trump passenger
transport
on public services.
However,
the results
obtained
are
significantly anomalous and the reason for this may be that this variable shows the behavior of
road transport of goods (much more important
in terms of consumption),
rather than of
passengers.
The data on the series of long distance railway prices (PF) and air transport tariffs (PA) have
been obtained from the monthly series worked out from the tariffs of the Boletines Oficiales
del Estado (Official State Reports), evaluated within the period in which each tariff is in force.
The data on the prices of premium petrol (PGAS) have been
General de Previsi6n y Coyuntura del Ministerio de Economia
also evaluated

within the period in which each tariff is in force.

obtained from the Direcci6n
y Hacienda as monthly data,

The data on the prices of gas oil (PGLEO)

have

been obtained

From then onwards, the data from the Compafifa Logfstica
Logistic Company) have been recorded for further studies.

from CAMPSA

de Hidrocarburos

until

1992.

(Hydrocarbon

The data on the income variable have been obtained considering the Spanish quarterly GDP as
"proxy". The series used for the 1980.I-I989.IV
period is that used by Maule6n (1989) and it
was extended until 1992.IV from the series of the Contabilidad
Nacional Espafiola (Spanish
National Accounting).

4.

MARSHALLIAN

PASSENGER

OR

TRANSPORT:

NON

COMPENSATED

DEMANDS

OF

INTERURBAN

AIR AND ROAD TRANSPORT

We have estimated some equations
from the specifications
in model [I] by adjusting the
variables to each mode of transport. All variables headed by letter L are in natural logs and
those headed by letter D are in differences,
except
for the dummy variables D89.I, DS90.I,
D81.I, and D89.II, which will be properly defined tater on in this paper. The statistical "t" is
presented within brackets under each coefficient.
We have applied a cointegration
approach, which has provided the most satisfactory
results of
the various approaches previously attempted (Inglada (1992), Coto-Millfin and Sarabia (1994)
to obtain the estimations.
For more information
about the matter, see Engle and Granger
(1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990), and Osterwald-Lenum
(1992).

4.1 Air transport

demand

4.1.1 Long-run
The estimated
LAERVt

equation

=

- 1.88
(-2.13)

R 2 adjusted
DF=-4.14;

of long-run

balance cointegration

- 1.48 LPAt
(- 6.43)

= 0.91

;S.E. = 0.04 ;
DW=

1.79.

has provided

+ 1.48 LPFRt
(21.14)

DW = 1.25 ;

the following

results:

Inaddition,if Johansen
methodology
isappliedtoa VAR alongwiththreelagsanda restricted
constant,it is concludedthatthereis onlyonecointegration
vector.Thetestof the numberof
cointegration
vectorsresultsinto:
Number of cointe_ration
vectors
Under Ho
Under HI
r=0
r> 1

Trace test
41.14

Critic values 5%
34.91

r < I

r> 2

19.60

19.96

r <2

r = 3

6.83

9.24

(a) Osterwald-

Lenum

r being

the number

LAERVt

=

critic values (1992)

of cointegration

vectors.

the following

cointegration

After normalization,

(a)

- 1.76

1.41

LPAt

relationship

is obtained:

+ 1.17 LPIBt

In both estimated equations, the long-run elasticity of air transport demand with respect to the
GDP is close, somewhat
higher than the unit and takes 1.16 and 1.47 values as it would
correspond

to normal

goods and particularly

to "luxury"

price elasticity of goods is negative with values ranging
significant response of the demand to price changing.

goods. The estimated

long-run

from 1.38 to 1.40, which

reflects

4.1.2 Short-run
The short-run

DLAERVt

=

non-linear

and joint equation

- 0.51 (LAERVt.I
(- 3.92)

= 0.95
;

Serial Correlation

the following

+ 2.24
(1.96)

- 0.43 DLPAERVt.4
(-3.07)

R 2 adjusted
F= 147.13

presents

+ 0.45 DLPGASt
(2.14)

; S.E. = 0.048 ;
DW=2.10
;
: Ljung-Box

:

results:

+ 1.24 LPAt.l
(2.06)

Q(1)= 0.30
Q(2)= 0.19
Q(3) = 1.36
Q(4) = 2.44

- 0.78 DLPAt
(-2.36)

own-

- 1.47 LPIBt.t)
(- 9.8)

a

Residual Normality : Bera-Jarque: N(2) = 1.08
Heterocedasticity:
ARCH (I-4) = 1.27

D91.I is a dummy variable which accounts for the effects of an Iberia workers' strike
in the first term of 1991, and its value is i for the first term of this year and 0 for the rest of the
year.
The long-run

elasticities

obtained

for this and the previous

model do not differ from each other

significantly.
Then, long-run income elasticity is now 0.80 in comparison
with the former
values 1.16 and 1.47, as it corresponds to normal goods or services with an average elasticity
of l. 143, next to the unit. Air transport is turning into a normal goods of unitary
rather than a luxury goods, as it was stated in Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia (1994)
estimated value of an income elasticity of 1.61 from 1980.01 to 1988.12-.

elasticity
-with an

The negative value of the own-price elasticity of goods is 0.775 in comparison with the former
1.38 and 1.40 values, the variation here is more significant,
although the average elasticity is
t.185.
Short and long-run elasticities are once more slightly different. Short-run elasticities clearly
present the inelastic feature of the demand, and a substitution
effect of road transport, which
has never been revealed before, is detected. Gross and net substitution relationships
between
air and road transport result once more from these estimations.
4.2 Road transport

demand

4.2.1. Long-run
In the inter-city

passenger

amount

of premium

LQGAS

t=

transport

demand

equation,

the dependent

variable

is the

petrol, in logs, LQGAS:

- 3.80
(-3.21)

R z adjusted
DF = - 5.52 ;

Applying
concluded

road

0.13 LPGASt
(- 1.94)

= 0.94

;S.E. = 0.03;

+ 1.11 LPIBt
(8.29)

DW=

1.51 ;

DW = 2.0 i.

the Johansen methodology
to a VAIl. with a lag and a restricted constant, it is also
that there is only one cointegration
vector. The results obtained from the test of

cointegration

vectors

are as follows:

Number of cointe,_ration vectors
Under 1-1o
Under H_
r=0
r> 1
r< 1
r < 2

Trace test
41.87

r>2
r= 3

(a) Osterwald
r being

19.19
7.90

After normalization,
=

5%

(a)

34.91
19.96

I

t

- Lenum critic values (1992)

the number of cointegration

LQGASt

Critic values
53.12

the following
2.85

- 0.47

vectors.
cointegration
LPGASt

relationship

is obtained:

+ 0.3611 LPIBt

The results obtained from the long-run estimations provide elasticities of 0.361 and 1.11 with
respect to the GDP, relationships
which characterize these services as basic goods rather than
as luxury goods, always within the context of normal goods. The own-price elasticities of the
goods take the negative values 0.13 and 0.47, once more referring to essential goods with
inelastic demand and slight demand variations as a response to tariff changes (if we consider
such changes as proportional to premium petrol price changing).
The gas-oil demand equation
to the GDP variable.

QGLEO

presents

very similar values

with respect to its price and

4.2.2 Short-run
The non-linear
DLQGAS_=

estimation

in only one stage of road demand,

-0.69(LQGASt.I
(- 4.85)

+ 3.88
(2.20)

- 0.36 DLPGASt
(-2.73)

R 2 adjusted = 0.95
F=212.45
;
Serial Correlation

+ 0.34 DLPAt
(2.23)

:

Q(1)= 0.28
Q(2)= 1.91
Q(3) = 4.81
Q(4) = 4.82

Residual

Normality

: Bera-Jarque:

the following

+0.15LPGASt.I
(1.68)

; S.E. = 0.036 ;
DW=2.13
;
: Ljung-Box

provided

N(2) = 4.16

results:

- 1.11 DLPIBt.j)
(- 6.19)

Heterocedasticity:
ARCH(1-4)= 1.17
The value of the GDP long-rundemandelasticitynow obtainedof 0.765confirmsthe
inelasticityof the income"proxy",the servicesbeingconsideredas essential.The same
happenswith the QGLEO demand,which considersthe regularline inter-citypassenger
transportdemandas"proxy".Thenegativevalueof thelong-runown-priceelasticityof goods
for thismodelis0.10,whiletheformervalueswere0.13and0.47.
The estimatedshort-runown-priceelasticitiesof goodshavethe negativevalue0.36anda
crosselasticityof 0.34 with respectto air transportprice.In the short-run,it is possibleto
speakaboutgrosssubstitutionrelationships
betweenroadandair transport.However,it is not
possibleto meet any conclusionwith respectto the net substitutionor complementary
relationships
of thesetransportservices
withoutanyfurtherassumption.
5, CONCLUSIONS
In this paper,we havepresented
a theoretical
modelof air passenger
transportdemand.With
quarterlyaggregated
Spanishdata,equations
of inter-citypassenger
air androadtransport
demandhavebeenspecifiedfor 1980.Iand1992.IV.
Moreover,we havecarriedout differentdemandfunctionestimationsusingcointegration
techniques,
andhavebeensubjecttoa wideevaluationwhichallowsusto checktheadequacy
of thismethodwith respectto othersusedin earlierworksby Inglada(1992),andCoto-Mill_in
andSarabia(1994).
Eachspecificdemandmayrequiremoredetailedstudies,especiallyroadtransport.However,
havingcarriedout the estimations,
it is possibleto meetconclusionsasregardsincome,the
own-priceelasticityof goodsandcrosspriceelasticitiessuchasthefollowing:
- Long-runincomeelasticitiesareall positiveandall theservicesarenormalgoods.Income
elasticitiesarevery closeto the unit for air transport,andslightlybelowthe unit for road
transport.
- Theown-priceelasticitiesof goodsincrease
parallelto the qualityof the service,sincethey
increasewith tariffs, andpresentvaluescloseto the unit for air transport.They areclearly
inelasticfor roadtransport.
- All crosselasticitiespresentpositivevaluesandtheyarebelowtheunit.Grossandnetlongrun substitutionrelationshipsbetweenair and road transportand gross substitution
relationshipsbetweenroad and air transportcan be guaranteed,but net substitution
relationships
betweenthesecannot.
Theseestimationscan be usefulfor the analysisand predictionsof the effectsof tariff
changing,
aswell asfor trafficandshortandlong-runincomepredictions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Hub and spoke networks have become a critical part of air transport operations
since
deregulation
in the United States. This is principally
because they enable a carrier to
maximise the number of markets served with a given volume of flights. For example, 100
points linked to a common hub enables service to be provided in more than 5000 different
city pair markets. In Europe, hub and spoke networks have existed tbr many years as a
consequence
of international boundaries and the restrictions they imposed on traffic rights.
Nevertheless,
many of these were merely a collection
of uncoordinated
services that
happened to share a common terminus. It is only in the last few years that most European
airlines have started to operate and market their networks effectively to carry connecting
passengers

with both origin and destination

outside their home country.

Whereas passengers making a direct flight often have little choice as to the airport used and
typically only one or two carriers flying on the route, the situation is somewhat different for
transfer traffic. The passenger flying from Berlin to Los Angeles, for example, can choose
between eight different hubs in Europe and the Umted States that provide a one-stop
connecting
service and a multiplicity of possible airlines. Even where direct flights exist,
indirect routings can often still provide a worthwhile alternative in terms of fares or schedules
and are hence capturing an increasing share of traffic.
For airport operators, connecting traffic offers the only real oppommity to grow beyond the
traffic potential of their own local catchment area. In mm this supports a much wider range of
services than would otherwise be possible with accompanying
economic benefits as shown
by Small (1995). Amsterdam Schiphol for example sees it as vital to the Dutch economy to
become a 'mainport' (one of Europe's leading hubs) in the 21st century (Butterworth-Hayes,
1993). The 'footloose'
nature of this traffic means that it is one of the few areas in which
competition between airports can take place.
Whereas traditionally
it has been straightforward
to forecast air traffic on a route by route
basis, transfer passenger demand is very much more difficult to predict. This is because it is
driven by the supply of air services and will shift between alternative hubs and airlines
dependent on the relative quality of service and price. Data on connecting flows is scarce
outside

the US hence various models and estimates

become necessary

to analyse this traffic.

This paper considers the extent to which hub airports in Europe compete for transfer traffic
and the performance
of the major airlines. The relationship with scheduling issues, airport
facilities and geographical
constraints is addressed. A method for estimating changes in'
transfer traffic under changes in service or infrastructure
provision is suggested. Some
possible future developments of hubbing in Europe are considered, with particular reference
to the shortage of runway capacity at many of Europe's major airports.

2 MARKETS

SERVED

International
boundaries
have played a major part in shaping the present European air
networks. Most passengers from regional airports have historically had to change planes at
the national gateway (ie UK traffic would travel via London, German via Frankfurt etc).
Long-haul services have also tended to reflect linguistic and colonial links. For example,

manyLatinAmericanservices
areavailablefromMadridbut little in thewayof routesto
Asia;Montrealis well servedfromParisbut Canadianflights fromotherEuropean
cities
focuson Toronto.Deregulation
withinEuropehasmeantthatmostairportsof anysizeare
now linkedwith severalhubsin differentEuropeancountriesandfor mostjourneysthe
passenger
hastheoptionof takingconnecting
flightsthrougha varietyof hubsaswell asany
directservices.
Despitetheadventof tong-range
twinjets, thecoverageof intercontinental
servicesfrom
Europeremainsfairly thin.Forexample,Parisdoesnot havea dailyserviceto Delhiwhile
Londonis lackingoneto Rio;Brussels
hasno serviceto HongKongandAthensnoneto
Chicago.OnlyNewYork is linkedwithall themajorEuropean
capitalson a regularbasis.
Thismakestheuseof hubsnecessary
eveninsomerelativelylargemarkets.
Furthermore,
the
timetakento changeplanesis lesssignificantin thecontextof a 7000kmjourneythantbr
oneof 700km.
TableI examines
thepotentialrangeof services
fromEuropeto eachof theworldregionsvia
thealternativehubs.It is numberof flightsratherthancapacitythatis thecriticalfactoras
passenger
choiceis not increased
by merelyusinga largeraircraft.The productof the
frequencies
availableviaeachhubhasbeenusedasthebasisforcomparison.
For example,consideringall Europeancountriesto North America,althoughLondon
Gatwickhasmoretransatlantic
fli_ts thanParisCharlesDeGaulle,because
CDGhastwice
asmanyEuropean
flightsitshubpotentialintheEurope-North
Americamarketis greater:

LondonGatwick
ParisCDG

European x
frequency
(incdomestic)

North
American
frequency

=

Hub
potential

1099
2457

166
146

=
=

182434
358722

x
x

Thehubpotentialof eachairportoutof thetotalsumacrossall 18hubsis thekeyvariable
usedfor comparison
(a typeof theoretical
marketshare).This measure
takesnoaccountof
waitingtimes,distancetravelledorairlinesused.Thesewill bediscussed
subsequently.
Table1showsthatHeathrowenjoysa dominant
marketpositionin itslong-standing
roleasa
hubfor servicesbetweenEuropeandNorthAmericawith 40%of thepotentialconnections;
Frankfurtis secondwith 18%.At theotherendof thescale1%of theseconnections
arevia
Dusseldorf

and less than 0.5% via Barcelona.

Heathrow

also dominates

in the Asia and

Middle East markets. To Africa the service is more evenly spread with Paris narrowly behind
Heathrow and Rome a significant option. To Latin America, Paris moves into first place
closely followed by Madrid, while Heathrow slumps to fifth. The ranking of Heathrow in the
African and Latin American markets will have deteriorated further since this time with the
recent move of most BA services to Gatwick.

Table 1: Hub service from all European
(ill
are column
EU

IO

Africa

countries

Rest of

North

Latin

Europe

America

America

Middle

Asia

14

10

l0

10

l0

3
2

3

1

1

-

1

East

Total
intercontinental

via
Amsterdam

9

9

I0

Athens
Barcelona

2
3

2
1

1

Brussels

6

5

2

2

9

C openhagen
Dusseldorf

7
3

12
2

2
1

2

1

Fr "ank_fiart
Lisbon

9
1

13
-

18

17
2

London LGW
London LHR
Madrid
Manchester
Milan LIN

3
20
6
2
3

1
18
2
I
1

6
40
2
1
-

Munich
Paris CDG
Rome
Vienna
Zurich

4
12
4
2
4

4
12
4
5
9

- less than 0.5%
Source: Derived

2

4
-

2
1

15
1

14

22
-

17

3
13
18

2
22
3

2
39
1

38

3
35
3

1
11
2

1
23
3

3

2

2
17
10
1
4

1
13
7
3
4

I
14
3
i
5

1
14
4
1
4

from OAG data for week of 19-25 June 1995

Table 2 considers the level of provision
destinations. In each case it is Heathrow
CDG suffers

3

in the French

market

from the five major European markets to long-haul
together with the national hub that dominates. Paris

from a lack of domestic

service (most of the domestic

routes being at Orly). Madrid and Rome in contrast have large numbers of domestic flights
but poor coverage otherwise. London Heathrow makes a consistently strong showing due to
its dominance of intercontinental
services. Amsterdam is in its strongest position from the
UK (17% of services) but generally falls below 10%. There is a reasonable
spread of
provision, with at least 3 hubs exceeding 10_/oof services in each market.
The existence

of services

is however

only part of the equation.

To consider

how these relate

to a passenger's choice in practice a range of other issues have to be considered. The most
important of these are the flying time - which is essentially a function of distance travelled and the transfer time which depends on airport layout, frequencies and the level of schedule
co-ordination.

Table2:Sharebyhubof potentialconnecting
services
fromfivemajorEuropean
countries
to
intercontinental
destinations
(figuresarecolumnpercentages)
from
UK
France
Germany Italy
Spain
via
Amsterdam 17
6
Athens
Barcelona
2
3
Brussels
3
1
1
Copenhagen 1
1
1
Dusseldorf
21
Frankfurt
9
11
26
17
l
1
Lisbon
London LGW
London LHR
Madrid
Manchester

5
43
1
1

6
41
3

1
29
1

3
22
2

Ivlilan LIN
Munich
Paris CDG
Rome
Vienna

1
15
1

1
17
4

I
20
20
1

Zurich

2

1
3

3
16
2
2
5

3

3
26
23

2

- less than 0.5%
Source: Derived from OAG data for week of 19-25 June 1995

3 GEOGRAPHICAL

LOCATION

Geographical
location is critical for a hub airport. A centrally located
travelling distances and hence journey times in a large number of markets.

hub will minimise

Table 3 is based on the weighted passenger km required to interlink the 36 busiest airports in
Western Europe. Istanbul, Las Palmas, Lanzarote and Tenerife Sur are not considered part of
the core network and have been excluded._Only
one location in Eastern Europe (Moscow)
exceeded this threshold and is also excluded.
This is not simply a distance minimisation exercise; airports are given a 'weight' equivalent to
the number of passengers handled. London Heathrow with over 50 million passengers per
annum therefore exerts more pull on the outcome than Hanover (4 million), for example.
Each airport in turn is considered
airports in the system calculated.
interest.

as the hub and the passenger km required to link all the
It is the relative position of the different hubs that is of

Table3:Increase
in weightedpassenger
kmrequired to
viaa hubrelativeto the optimal
Hub
Brussels
Paris CDG
Paris ORY
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Frank_Atrt
Amsterdam
Stuttgart
LondonLGW

Increase in
travel distance
0
+2
+2
+3
+4
+6
+7
+I1

LondonLHR

+12
+12

Zurich
Geneva

+14
+16

interlink 36 major European

Lyon
Hm_over
Munich

location (%)
Increase in
Hub
travel distance
Dublin
+21
+21
Barcelona
+27
Glasgow

Birmingham
Milan

+27
+30

Rome
Palma

Hamburg
Manchester

+30
+37

Berlin
Nice

+42
+43

Madrid
Oslo
Stockholm

+83
*-93
+105
+105
+127

Marseille

+43

Malaga
Lisbon

+161
+166

Copenhagen
Vienna

+60
+65

Helsinki
Athens

+179
+196

Hub

airports

!ncrease in
travel distance
_-67
+7I
+73

The optimal location is Brussels. Paris is almost equally good (+2%) and benefits from being
a large traffic generator in its own right - these people do not need to take a connecting flight.
Northern Germany is then favoured (Cologne +3%, Dusseldorf +4%, Frankfi_ +6%). The
worst location for a European hub is, not surprisingly, at Athens where travel distances would
be trebled compared to using Brussels. In comparison with a previous study based on the EU
prior to recent enlargement
(Dennis, 1994), the centre of gravity has moved eastwards, as
Paris was then the optimal location. This is due mainly to the inclusion of additional airports
and also above average growth rates at a number of central European airports in the last few
years.
It is worth noting that the result is sensitive

to deviations

away from a north west - south east

axis. Zurich for example represents only a +14% increase
whereas Lyon is +21% and Hamburg +30%.
In terms of traffic connecting
between
similar. The southern markets of Africa
intercontinental
passengers from Europe
Asia, the Middle East and Pacific (IATA,

in travel distance

over Brussels,

long-haul and European flights the result will be
and Latin America account for only about 24% of
as against 41% on the North Atlantic and 35% to
i{@7).

Due to the dominance
of the North Atlantic a location in NW Europe (UKAreland)
is
favoured as a long-haul hub. Such an airport is also surprisingly well located in relation to the
great circle routes from the Far East and Latin America. It is only for Africa that a hub in
southern Europe provides
Europe and intercontinental
Brussels

a worthwhile
advantage.
For passengers
connecting
between
flights therefore, the best hub location moves to the north-west of

- ie the London area. There is nevertheless

a level playing field between

that extend average travel distance by only 1-2%, not a major
thousands
of miles. This would include all locations
within
Manchester-Amsterdam-Frankthrt-Paris.

many hubs

problem when travelling
the region bordered by

Other airports can still be optimal for serving more localised flows (eg Copenhagen
for
Scandinavia-Europe
or Madrid for Europe-South
America) but to offer a competitive service
in the full range of markets necessitates a central location.

The traditionallong-haulhubsof London,Paris,AmsterdamandFrankfurtwill theretbre
continueto enjoya geographical
advantage
in the yearsahead.Brusselscould probably
supportmoreservicethanit doesat present.Demandfor air travelin Europeis likely to
becomemore dispersed
over the comingyearsas the moreperipheralcountriesin the
Mediterranean
(egSpain,Italy,Portugal)andEasternEuropearelikely to havethe highest
growthrates(IATA, 1995;AEA, 1995).This will havethe consequence
of movingthe
optimalhublocationfurthersouthandeast, bringing locations such as Munich and Zurich
more firmly into the picture.

4 TRANSFER

TIMES

AND SCHEDULE

If the passenger

is prepared

CO-ORDINATION

to wait an indefinite

time at the hub, connections

can be achieved

between all services operating to and from it. In reality, long delays at the transfer airport are
unattractive especially where the actual flying time is short. If alternative routes are available,
a considerable
drain of traffic may be experienced
whilst even in a monopoly position,
optional demand will still be suppressed. The typical waiting times incurred differ between
the various hubs. This is a result of the physical design of the airport, the frequencies
available and the schedule operated by the airlines.
The lower bound for the time required to change between two services is measured by the
Minimum Connect Time (MCT). These are co-ordinated
through IATA and represent the
minimum time required between an arrival and departure for the two flights to be bookable as
a connection. The MCT takes into account the time required to relocate a passenger and their
baggage between flights. Airports with [ong walking distances will hence have a higYier MCT
than more compact facilities, although different MCTs may apply depending on the terminals
used. Baggage
handling systems are often the constraining
factor but customs and
immigration
immigration
European

or security checks can also pose a bottleneck. At Brussels, tbr example, more
desks have been opened to reduce the MCT on Sabena's connections between
flights inside and outside the Schengen

area from 40 to 30 minutes.

The speed of

unloading passengers is a further consideration
- this is generally slower for larger aircraft.
Some MCTs are artificially inflated for competitive reasons - to deter passengers from using
them as part of a connection. For example, KLM departures at Heath.row (not a KLM hub)
have an MCT of 4 hours! Finally, there is a decision to be made as to what is the acceptable
level of missed connections.
This will be :1 function of punctuality
at the hub airport. The
MCT should incorporate a contingency so that a slightly late arrival (eg 10-15 minutes) will
not destroy the connection. Increasing congestion and delays in Europe make this the main
constraint on any further reduction in the MCTs. British Airways has actually increased
certain MCTs at Heath.row and Gatwick in recent years in order to improve reliability.
Table 4 compares
and Brussels

a range of examples.

transfers

At most single terminal

can be accomplished

in 30-50 minutes

locations

such as Axnsterdam

(and as little as 25 minutes

on

Austrian Airlines at Vienna). In contrast, at multi-terminal
airports such as Heathrow the
MCT rises to 70-90 minutes when a change of terminals is required. In this difference of
time, the passenger could have flown an extra 500 km or more! The allocation of airlines to
terminals at Heathrow is particularly inefficient as 67% of passengers who change aircraft
also have to change terminals (CAA, 1997). In particular,
BA short-haul
to long-haul
passengers have to make the cumbersome
move from Terminal 1 to Terminal 4. At Paris
CDG in contrast, all of Air France's services are 'under one root'.

Table4: MinimumConnectTimesfor ten
MCT
Airport
Terminals
45
LondonHeatl-a'ow (within T1, within T4)
ParisCDG

London

Gatwick

(within T2, within T3)

60

(between terminals)
(within T 1)
(within T2)
(between terminals)
(within North term)
(within South term)

70-90
60
45
75
45

(between

terminals)

Rome

Madrid
Amsterdam
Brussels
Frankfurt
Zurich
Vienna

major European
(minutes)

airports

40-60
75
45 -60
45-60
40-50
30-50
45
40
25-30

Source: OAG World Airways Guide, July 1998
Although at face value it is the frequencies with which different routes are operated that will
also be critical to minimising the waiting time when making a transfer connection, one option
that can raise the competitiveness
of a hub is to improve the scheduling without actually
changing the number of flights. An essential element of any serious attempt to maximise the
scope of an airport as a hub involves a concentration
of activity into a limited number of
peaks or waves during the day. These should see a large number of inbound flights arriving in
a short space of time, then departing again as soon as the MCT has elapsed. The transfer time
between flights in the same wave will be close to the best attainable. The improvement from
grouping flights in this way will be most dramatic at small airports but it can nevertheless
offer important advantages to large airlines and airports also. Although the volume of flights
at a busy airport such as Heathrow ensures that many connection possibilities will exist by
chance, it is only through operating waves of flights that a consistent connecting timetable
can be provided, with services in both directions in each city-pair market and a transfer time
close to the optimal.
Figures 1-4 compare the distribution of flight activity at Heath.row and at Amsterdam (plotted
on the same scales). Heathrow has a flat pattern of activity across the day, the product of the
airport being full to capacity and one runway being used for departures and one for landings.
Furthermore,
British Airways has close to 40% of the slots in each time period. In contrast,
Amsterdam's
activity is much less smooth with KLM and its partners operating three main
connection waves centred on 0930, 1330 and 1830, together with a developing one at 1600.
An arrival at Schiphol at 1800 will connect to 80 departures within 2 hours whereas one at
1030 would manage only 20. Heathrow would offer about 30 connections
within 2 hours
from any given arrival time, which is due also to the high Minimum Connect Times that exist
between terminals. Most of the major airports in Northern Europe with the exception of
Heathrow now operate some form of wave pattern but in Mediterranean
Europe this has yet
to be implemented.
Even the best European
airports compare unfavourably
with the
concentration
achieved at major US hubs however
every flight is constrained to fall within them.

where the peaks are sharper and virtually
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Inevitably it is only the local airline and certain agreeable partners that will contbrm to this
type of schedule. Operators not based at the hub airport have less to gain from the multiplier
effects and will be more strongly motivated by requirements of the point to point traffic or
their own hub system elsewhere. The grouping of flights into waves also means that the
probability of the first outgoing service to any particular destination being by the same amine
as the delivering flight is disproportionately
high. One of the most important commercial
benefits to arise from hub and spoke operations
is the extent to which individual airline
networks can become self sufficient in meeting demand. Department of Transportation
data
in the US shows the proportion of on-line connections
(passengers
who change planes
between two flights on the same airline) has risen from 52% prior to deregulation to over
90% today. At Heathrow, with its wide variety of operators, Civil Aviation Authority (C,a_)
surveys showed that BA-BA connections accounted for only 27% of transfers in 1984. This
had risen to 43% in 1991 and is estimated to be nearer 60% today. This means that British
Airways' on-line connections at Heath.row generated 4x as many transfer passengers as those
involving any other combination of carriers in 1991 and this is likely to be closer to 6x in
1996. It is individual airline networks theretbre that increasingly
provide the focus for
competition

between

hubs.

A consequence of the move towards on-line feed is the marginalisation
of carriers that are not
hubbed at one end of the route or the other. In the US this is readily seen in the dominance of
the major carriers at their 'tbrtress' hubs. In Europe, the traditional 50:50 split between the
two national carriers is being squeezed as the hub airline, with the benefit of the connecting
traffic, can raise frequencies to a level that the other carrier(s) cannot match. This may lead to
withdrawal
of the non-core operations,
Alitalia on Turin-Frankfurt
(Table 5).
Table 5: Domination
1989

Route

Amsterdam-Gothenburg
London-Marseille
Frankfurt-Turin
A.F-Air France,
SAS

5 AVAILABILITY
To assess

and

of hub to spoke routes (daily frequencies)
1997
4xKL

lxKL, lxSK, lxAY
1,,d3A, 1xAF
1xLH, 1xAZ

AY-Finnair,

Source: ABC/OAG

as SAS have done on Gothenburg-Amsterdam

AZ-Alitalia,

BA-British

3xBA
4xLH
Airways,

KL-KLM,

LH-Lufthansa,

SK-

World Airways Guide

OF SERVICES

AND IMPACT

how these factors come together

in practice

ON JOURNEY
to influence

TIMES
a passenger's

choice of

route, schedules in 40 sample markets (Europe-long
haul) have been ranked by overall
journey time for travel starting on Thursday January 15th 1998. Thursday is the most neutral
day of the week for analysis as it generally has average traffic levels and service patterns. The
markets were chosen to give a good geographical
spread around Europe and the World in
relation to the overall patterns of demand (eg more US points were included than African
ones). None of the city pairs selected had direct service on the day chosen for study. The aim
was to ensure that all hub airlines had a comparable opportunity to compete for this traffic.
Several rules were created for this analysis. Only on-line connections (including code-shares)
have been included as these account for the majority of traffic and form the key focus of
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competition.
Thereis likelytobeaclosecorrelationbetween
therankingof themajorairlines
andthestatusof theairportasawhole.
Linkages
mustsatist}'thepublished
IATA MinimumConnectTimesbuthavebeencompiled
with referenceto all scheduled
flightson eachsector,not merelyconnections
publishedor
listedin the OAG.Only connections
betweennon-stopflightsareconsidered
as it should
oftenbepossibletousetheintermediate
callasa hubto cutoutonestop.It wouldotherwise
alsobe complicated by US routes where a large number of one-stop through services exist
that really involve an additional comlection at a US hub. Services requiring a wait of more
than 6 hours at the transfer point also have been discarded and this will eliminate
any
connections requiring a night stop. Connections via hubs outside Europe are treated on the
same basis as those within - a passenger from Stockholm to Los Angeles may well find the
best connection to be American Airlines via Chicago and it will be identified as such.
A flight cannot be counted more than once in this analysis even it carries multiple codes. If
there is more than one on-line connection possibility, it is the European airline that has been
taken. (There are relatively few cases where this an_biguity arises).
An airline that provides the fastest routing in every sample market would receive a score of
100%. If an airline has no service in a particular market it scores zero. The score could hence
be considered analogous to the position of an airline on the CRS screen.
Table 6 shows the performance

of the various airlines at their hub airports and compares

results from a similar exercise carried out tbr Thursday
Table 6: Performance

of European

intercontinental
Hub airline (airport)

hub airlines:

the

June 22nd i995.
score based on sample of Europe-

markets (optimal

Lul_hansa(Frankfurt)

Score
1998
63 %

Score
1995
70%

Air France (Paris CDG)
KLM (Amsterdam)
Swissair (Zurich)
British AW (Heathrow)
Sabena (Brussels)
Alitalia (Rome)
British AW (Gatwick)

60%
59%
50%
47%
15%
14%
13%

42%
50%
29%
55%
5%
11%
10%

service = 100%)
Score
Hub airline (airport)
1998
LuO.hansa(Munich)
13%

Austrian (Vienna)
Continental (Newark)
SAS (Copenhagen)
USAirways

(Philadelph)

American (Chicago)
Delta (Atlanta)
Others <5% in 1998

Score
1995
1%

9%
8%
6%
5%
5%
5%
18 hubs

Lufthansa at Frankfurt comes narrowly ahead of its main rivals, followed
Paris CDG and KLM at Amsterdam. Swissair at Zurich and BA at London

6%

4%
6 hubs
by Air France at
Heathrow are the

other two major players in the Europe-intercontinental
markets. There is then a 'second
division' made up of Sabena, Alitalia, BA at London Gatwick and Lufthansa at Munich. The
other hubs axe only a realistic option in a few specific markets. Although Iberia, for example,
has an attractive Latin American network it scores only 4% overall. This is because Latin
America
services
European

is a relatively unimportant market from Europe as a whole, Iberia's
are poorly scheduled
in relation to its European
flights and many
points are not linked directly with Madrid at all.

!1

long-haul
secondary

This demonstrates
the importanceof schedulingand MCTs as Heathrow'stheoretical
superiorityin numberof servicesis erodedwhenoneconsiders
thefastestviableroutingsin
practice.Similarly,KLM doesmuchbetterthanAmsterdam's
level of operations
alone
wouldsuggest.
It is importanttonotethatthefiguresin thetableabovearesomewhat
subjecttovariationsin
the sampleof marketschosen.The positioningof the majorhubsappearsto be robust
howeverandit is only in the rangebelowabout10%thatthe outcomemaybeseriously
distorted.A numberof keyprinciplesarenevertheless
clear.
Compared
with 1995,oneof the mostnotablechanges
hasbeenthe improvement
of Air
Francefrom beingthe weakestmajorhub carrierto oneof the strongest.This can be
attributedto theirconversion
toa five wavesystemin Summer1996accompanied
by a $22
million investment(in conjunctionwith Aeroportde Paris)in airportfacilities(Beechener,
1996).Swissairis theotherdramaticimproverandnowmeritsa placealongside
thebigtour.
This has been achieved by scrapping
and Geneva, in order to concentrate

the split operation of long-haul services between Zurich
on developing the Zurich hub and boosting European

feeder flights and frequencies through the use of smaller Crossair equipment.
Aggessive
scheduling gives fast connections,
especially from the Mediterranean
regions - where the
local hubs are ineffective and Zurich has a geographical
advantage over the gateways in
Northern

Europe.

The competition
has sharpened up since 1995, which accounts for the slight fall in the
rankings of Lufthansa at Frankfurt and British Airways at Heathrow. If a faster routing via
another hub is now available the position of eg Lufi.hansa will fall, even though it may be
operating the same schedule as before. This is because
service available in each market. It is likely that Frankfurt

the scores are relative to the best
and Heathrow will continue to lose

ground as they have little scope for expansion and other hubs ',vill start to catch them up.
BA's Heathrow rating may also have suffered from the transfer of thinner routes to Gatwick,
eliminating
its service altogether in certain connecting
markets or requiring a change of
airport at London which is not allowed in this analysis.
KLM has improved its score marginally thanks to very competitive European coverage. It is
more wedded to the 747 than its main rivals however and in a number of long-haul markets
(apart from the US) it fails to achieve a dally frequency, which is becoming something of a
handicap.
The secondary
hubs have generally also been improving. Lufthansa has now started to
develop Munich as a serious additional hub to its Frankfurt base (Jane's Airport Review,
1997), while Sabena has built on its extensive European network to introduce more long-haul
flights. Austrian, supported by a range of code-share deals, has moved into intercontinental
services and BA has moved more flights to Gatwick - although not in the major markets that
tend to be the focus of this analysis. A much greater number of airlines and airports are also
able to offer service in at least some markets. 18 other hubs scored 1-5% in the 1998 analysis
compared to only 6 in 1995. Newcomers include British Airways at Birmingham where they
now have one transatlantic flight and Eastern European carriers such as LOT at Warsaw who
are modernising and developing rapidly. A trend towards
additional gateways and services.
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deregulation

globally is opening

up

BeyondEurope,it is reallyonly the US hubsthathavesufficientlinksto offera serious
alternative
andthenonlyforpassengers
travellingtotheAmericas.It is interesting
to notethe
relativedeclineof JFK as morelinks to US gatewayswith betterdomesticconnections
becomeavailable.Thecompactscaleof Europecompared
to theothercontinents
meansthat
aback-track
in Europecanoftenproveshorterthanusinganoverseas
hubthatis notquiteenroute.Forexanlple,Manchester-Amsterdam-Los
,amgeles
is 9381kin whereasManchesterAtlmua-LosAngelesis 9652km.Thusalthoughthe US hubsscorehighlyon fasttransfer
times(exceptperhapsat JFK) andrangeof destinations,
thesearecounteracted
by'the
increased
flyingtimein manycases.
Thereareof courseotherwaysin which hubscancompetebesidesprovidingattractive
schedules.
Leisure passengers can be tempted by heavily discounted
fares to consider the
most tortuous

of routings

(eg consider

services

from Europe to Australia

by Air China or by

Aeroflot from Europe to the Far East). In Europe, an airline such as British Airways benefits
from being based in the UK and can afford to be aggressive on pricing in high cost markets
such as Germany. In contrast, Swissair is more dependent on high yields to balance its costs.
Business passengers are more sensitive to time than price but frequent flier progran_-nes have
added a new dimension. Someone locked in to British Airways' Air Miles or KLM's Flying
Dutchman scheme tbr example is likely to go out of their way to use them tbr long-haul
travel, even if it involves a connection through a hub.

6 INTRA-EUROPEAN

CONNECTIONS

The suitability of hubs for intra-European
traffic is more difficult to assess at the general
level. This is due to geography ruling out many hubs for particular journeys (eg few people
are likely to travel Manchester-Helsinki
via Frankfurt let alone via Athens!). This narrows the
effective competition
in each market. Secondly, because most of the larger markets in
northern Europe are of short distance (under I000 km) and have plentiful direct service,
hubbing becomes irrelevant in these cases. However, this position is likely to change over
time. The peripheral markets in Europe are the more underdeveloped
and expected to see the
strongest growth in the coming years, which will raise average stage lengths. Also congestion
at some of the capital cities will force greater use of regional airports, which will only be able
to access the whole of Europe via connections
through a hub (eg a passenger
from
Northampton
might travel Birmingham or _uton - Amsterdam - Vienna rather than going to
London to fly Heath.row - Vienna non stop).
The number

of hubs able to offer intra-European

connections

is somewhat

wider than for

long-haul. Table 7 shows the potential split of services between the realistic hubs in several
cross-Europe
markets. The pattern of services is generally more dispersed than in the longhaul context although there is still an advantage to the national hubs in most cases. Time of
day is also a key factor in short-haul markets. Services departing before 0800 or between
1600-1900
minimising

can be expected to command a premium traffic,
lost working hours in this business travel dominated

reflecting
market.

the importance

of

For the reasons outlined above it is difficult to produce a definitive ranking of the hub airlines
but some features
can be readily identified.
Brussels,
which comes nowhere
as an
intercontinental
hub, is a key competitor
within Europe, reflecting
Sabena's
strategy of
specialising
in this market. In contrast, many of the larger hubs are not optimised for short-
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haulconnections
(Blacldock,1990).SwissairatZurichbenefitsagainfromitsstrength
in the
southernEuropean
markets.BothSabena
andSwissairarealsocharacterised
by attractive
timingsmorningandevening.SAShastheScandinavian
marketwell tiedupatCopenhagen
and Olympic the Greek marketat Athens. London Heathrowis rather peripheral
geographically.
Themainmessage
seemsto bethatsmallerhubscanfulfil a usefulregional
rolebutthisisstill largelydependent
onthebaseairlinetargeting
suchtraffic.
Table7:Shareby hubof potentialconnecting
services
in fivecontrasting
intra-European
markets
(figuresarecolumnpercenta:
ies)
Hub
UKFranceSpainGermanyNorwaySweden
Greece
Austria
Italy
Portugal
Aansterdam II
13
na
6
25
Athens
36
na
na
na
na
Barcelona
na
na
23
4
na
Brussels
11
9
na
11
I0
25
na
na
42
Copenhagen
na
2
Dusseldorf
1
na
6
3
Frankfurt
6
5
26
5
na
Lisbon
na
na
na
11
na
LondonLGW 5
3
na
na
na
LondonLHR
i9
26
na
na
na
Madrid
17
na
na
8
na
Manchester 1
na
na
na
MilanLfi',l
8
na
6
3
na
Munich
2
1
na
7
2
ParisCDG
25
14
14
na
na
Rome
8
12
na
na
na
Vienna
na
na
na
na
Zurich
3
3
5
13
na
na not applicable
less than 0.5%
Source: Derived

from OAG data for week of 19-25 June 1995
¢

7 TRANSFER

PASSENGERS

- SCHEDULE

AND DEMAND

MODELLING

Transfer traffic is one of the most difficult segments
of the market to forecast on a
disaggregated
basis. Data on the demand side is non existent in much of Europe except for
surveys at specific airports. In contrast, the US has an overall 10% ticket sales sample.
Transfer flows can also be very ephemeral in nature. It is necessary therefore to devise a
model based around knowledge

of the supply side to imply patterns of passenger

There are a number of reasons why the distribution
These include:
Changes
Changes
Changes

of connecting

flows may alter over time.

to airline service provision (eg launch of new routes or frequencies)
to airline schedules (eg creation of a new or different wave system)
to MCTs (eg through provision of a new terminal facility or baggage
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demand.

system)

Changes
toairlinecommercial
strategies
(egpricingincentives
oralliances)
Thisis particularlycrucialwhenaimingtoassess
therevenueimplicationsof investments
in
newinfrastructure
or services.
Oneexample
of recentinterestinvolvedestimating
theimpact
on transferpassengers
of possiblechangesin serviceat LondonHeathrowor Gatwick,
relativeto the othermajorEuropean
airports.Thesetall into severaldifferentcategories
(MCTchanges
suchasfroma possiblefifth terminalatHeatbaow;
creationof someformof
wavesystem;
operation
ofadditionalflightsduetoenhanced
runwaycapacity).
Theprincipleis thatthecomposition
of theexistingtransfertraffic overLondonby carrier
androutegroupis knownfromtheCAA surveys.No comparable
datais availabletbr the
otherEuropean
airportshowever.Wealsoknowtheexistinglevelof servicein thedifferent
hubmarketsatHeathrowandGatwickcompared
to therivalhubs(egFrankfurt,ParisCDG,
Amsterdan_).
Thiswasachieved
by inputtingthepublishedschedules
to acomputerdatabase
andthenwritingsomespecialprograms
to interrogate
this in termsof connecting
services
for
selected
connection
windows(egMCT upto 2 hoursshort-haul,MCT up to 4 hourslonghaul).Someestimates
of airlineyieldsin thedifferentmarketsenableamonetaryvalueto be
putontheresultingtraffic.
The assumption
is that the existing London transt_r traffic is a reflection of the existing
availability of connecting services. By improving the level of service at eg Heathrow relative
to the other airports we could then imply a benefit in terms of transfer traffic. This is only at a
snapshot in time but provides a measure of the benefit of the new facilities - in practice
Heathrow may be running to stand-still as other hubs improve taster but the incremental gain
will be similar.
One of the major benefits of the proposed fifth terminal at Heathrow (TS) would be to enable
British Airways to combine all its existing T1 and T4 operations in one building. This would
hence reduce the high 75 minute MCT that currently exists for interchange between T1 and
"1"4to a figure of around 45 minutes. The impact of this on one of the (unidentified)
market _oups in the analysis is outlined below.

transfer

The base traffic

both an

is 697,000

transfers

in the year (each of these passengers

makes

arrival and departure at Heathrow). This is achieved on 543 connecting pairs of flights on an
average day: 18,1% of the total on-line col_mecting service in this market (BAv KL v AF v
LH etc). The improved MCTs from T5 increase BA's service with an unchanged schedule to
676 connecting flight pairs. This is 21.5% of the new (larger) total on-line connecting service.
We therefore expect BA's traffic to rise by a factor of 21.5/18.1 ie to 831,000 passengers an
increase of 134,000. Further gains come from passengers switching within Heathrow as the
BA-BA connection becomes a better option than their current one (some of these may already
be using BA on one leg of the journey). This brings an extra 74,000 passengers. A 'same
terminal' benefit is also included based on experience of existing connections available within
the same terminal (eg Paris-Intercontinental
which is already within T4) against those
involving
a change of terminals
(eg Brussels-Intercontinental
interchange) net of MCT factors. An additional 45,000 passengers

which requires T1-T4
are anticipated here. This

gives an overall gain in transfer passengers of 253,000 in this market group (+36%). The
same process is then repeated across each transfer market sector. The fact that Heath, row is
better located geographically
in some markets than others is reflected in the current base
transfer flows from the CAA data. For example, although there are many theoretical Europe-

3.5

Europeconnections
viaHeathrow,thesegenerate
veryt'ew

passengers

due to the circuitous

routings involved.
Applying

the appropriate

yields gives the estimated

revenue

to the airline

from these extra

253,000 transfer passengers (which then has to be adjusted down slightly as some were
already using British Airways on one leg of the journey). The balancing loss comes partly
from other carriers at Heathiow but mainly from the foreign hub rivals such as KLM and Air
France. Other scenarios can then also be tested, such as placing the Star Alliance together
T1 at an enlarged Heathrow.

in

To assess schedule changes or additional flights, a mock new schedule needs to be created
(with assumptions about how any additional capacity will be used). This then replaces the
existing schedule

in the competition

analysis with the rival hubs.

Although this is a fairly simplistic model it could be developed further - for exan_ple, to
consider different price levels between the airlines or to give different weightings to taster
and slower connections. Complexity does not necessarily guarantee a more reliable outcome
however! Further ideas are discussed by Bootsma (1997), wor'king for KLM, who suggests
methods for estimating the relative size of city-pair origin & destination (O+D) markets. TNs
can be done either by breaking down published sector flows into the underlying c W pair
markets or grossing up one airline's O+D data to the total market. An accurate Quality
Service Index (QSI) model is shown to be crucial in accomplishing
this. This can then be
used to estimate the impact of a new schedule on the true O+D flows.

8 SOME

IMPLICATIONS

8.1 Range

of connections

FOR FUTURE

DEVELOPMENT

and capacity, constraints

There are limited ways in which individual airlines and airports
can improve their
competitiveness
as hubs. The most obvious comes from developing
a wider range of
destinations or increased frequencies. This is only feasible if the airport has spare capacity which may be possible at Amsterdam or Brussels but not so easy at Heathrow or Frankfurt.
Short-haul feeder routes are being squeez_.d out at Heathrow while Schiphol continues to
build its network. It is therefore likely that the smaller hubs will narrow the gap compared to
their rivals as the airports with runway capacity constraints
can only increase passenger
throughput by using larger aircraft, which does nothing to expand the range of services.
Paris CDG has a strong local demand, is well located geographically
and new runway
infrastructure is planned. After many years of under-performing,
Air France is at last realising
the potential of this facility and is well placed to become one of the dominant European
carriers in the years ahead.
At Heath.row the scope for change is more limited; _andfather
fights to slots have been
uniformly distributed and one runway is used for take-off and one for landing (for reasons of
noise abatement) which makes it impossible to build up a wave pattern of arrivals and
departures. The proposed Terminal 5 would benefit British Airways as outlined in the
previous section. BA has tried to overcome the lack of a symmetric timetable and the need to
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depend
onrandomconnections
by movingtodoubledailyIi'equencies
onmanykeylong-haul
routes.This muchimprovesthe chancethat oneof the flights will makea reasonable
connection
in anygivenmarket.Therealsolutionis mixedmoderunwayoperations
which
wouldallowairlinestoswaparrivalanddeparture
slotstocreatea wavepattern.Thecapacity
gainsare howevermarginaland henceunlikely to offset the environmental
concerns
accompanying
sucha change.
Tocomplement
Heathrow,
BritishAirwaysis alsoundertaking
amajorexpansion
atGatw'ick
wheredespitethe limited capacity(only onerunway)wavesof flights (perhapsbetter
described
asripples!)areoperated
to offsettheproblemsof lowfrequencies
thatexistthere.
A similarpatternto Amsterdam
seesthreesetsof arrival and departure waves per day with
most short-haul

aircraft

based in Europe

overnight.

Amsterdam

slot restrictions tbr the tirst time, although it is environmental
shortfalls that are the problem here (Jones, 1998).

itself is now actually
pressures

facing

rather than capacity

Where major capacity enhancements are under way, this could provide the opening for one or
more other airports to promote itself to major hub status in the future. Milan Malpensa would
at last provide a Mediterranean
hub in the major area of business demand and Alitalia's
recently am_ounced alliance with KLM is likely to bring the experience of Schiphol to bear
upon the new airport. Munich has the capability to become a powerful rival to Frankfurt but
there maynot be room for all three of Malpensa, Munich and Zurich to flourish in this region.
A new airport in Berlin could become an important east-west cross-roads if Berlin recovers
its historic importance
and the Eastern European markets grow strongly. The new Oslo
Gardermoen is something of a long shot as a hub, being too far north but could probably
attract more in the way of North Atlantic services. Finally, in the UK, Manchester has a large
catchment within 200 km and is well located geographically
as a long-haul gateway. With
one of the very few new runways being constructed in Europe, it may overtake some of the
lesser European

8.2 Regional

capitals as a hub for scheduled

services.

hubs

Although there may be no more than half a dozen major intercontinental
gateways in Europe,
there is scope to develop a number of regional hubs. These can serve two main fl.mctions: to
relieve pressure on some of the congested _lirports by removing short-haul transfer traffic and
to facilitate journeys which may be cumbersome by surface transport but possess insufficient
demand for dedicated air services. Am example of the former is the British Airways Eurohub
at Birmingham.
An example of the latter is the 'niche' hub operated by the French carrier
Regional Airlines at Clermont Fen'and. This is a mini East-West hub linking six cities in
western
France
Switzerland,
This technique

(eg

Nantes,

Toulouse)

with

could well be applied elsewhere

points

in the

Mediterranean,

as there are relatively

Italy

and

few gaps in the market

for point to point regional services but a number of airports that are near the threshold for a
wider range of flights. If demand is attracted primarily from surface modes or the major hubs
this process can continue successfully. The Mediterranean
region still appears severely under
served tbr travel within Southern Europe - most routes running north-south to major hubs in
Northern Europe. The French regions are still rather under served due to the historical
dominance of Paris.
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8.3 Networksofhubs
In theUSall themajorcarriershavebuiltupnetworks
ofhubstocoverthemaintrafficflows
in theregion.In Europe,
nationalboundaries
havetendedto obstructthistypeof arrangement
andairlineshaveendedup dominatingseveralairportsin closeproximityin their home
country.Forexample,BritishAirwaysatHeathrow,Gatwick,Manchester
andBim:ingham;
Lufthansaat Frankfurt,DusseldorfandMunich.This is lessefficientfrom a competition
viewpointandtheseoperations
areoftendefensive
in nature(ieto blockanothercarrierfrom
gettingin ratherthanbeingviableoperations
in theirownright).Howevertheemphasis
may
be changingthroughthe creationof allianceswhich can reachadditionalmarkets.For
example,Swissairhasbuilt links with SabenaandAustrianto extendits influenceinto
northernandeastern
EuropeplusTAPtothewest:,
givinga veryefficientgeographic
spread.
BritishAirwayshasinvestedin TAT/Air Libertein FranceandDeutsche
BA in Germany.
Suchmoveshavethe potentialto increasecompetitionby offeringan alternativeto the
entrenched
nationalcarriers.Theyhavenot beenverysuccessful
financiallyhoweverand
offerfewsynergies
with BA's existingnetwork.Theopportunityto setupa hubin another
EU countryincreased
with domesticderegulation
in April 1997(previouslythwartedbv the
inabilityto providedomesticteed).Whetherthisfreedomis likely to beexercised
however
remainsto beseen.As it remainsveryunlikelythatgovernments
will allow theirnational
carrierto bedrivenout of business,
allianceswith othermajorincumbents
continuetobea
muchlower-riskmeans
of achieving
thesamegoals.
8.4 Low cost

carriers

Hubs offer the major airlines one of the stronger defences
Contrary to popular opinion, most of the heavily dominated

against low cost new entrants.
hubs in the US have been left

alone by the low cost carriers. For example, Denver has been avoided by Southwest despite
lying in the middle of its home territory. Northwest has a virtually clear run at Minneapolis
and Detroit. The new entrants tend to focus on either dense local markets, often using a
secondary airport (eg Love Field at Dallas, Midway at Chicago) and/or the busier non-hubs
eg Kansas City, Omaha.
The scope for new entrants in Europe is more limited: shortages of capacity coupled with
high airport charges make opportunities more limited. It is also rare to find the abandoned
inner city airports that have been used so successfully in the US. At London, for example low
cost airlines have been obliged to use Luton or Stansted which pushes up surface access costs
and travel times. Although British Airways is losing some market share in the London
originating traffic - not just to low cost carriers but also to growtl{ by British Midland and
Virgin Atlantic, it has been able to counteract this with an increase in hub traffic. For the
major airlines their strength
Hubbing

lies in their networks.

tends to increase unit costs and hence has been shunned

by most - but not alt - low

cost airlines. In any case, low yield leisure traffic is more willing to wait for chance
connections where necessary if the fare saving is worthwhile. In Europe, Amsterdam, Zurich
and Frankfurt will be difficult to break-into. At London and Paris it is likely to be necessary
to use secondary airports. Brussels presents an interesting situation, where Virgin Express are
operating

and marketing

a low cost hub network.
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Brussels also has quite an extensive

surface

catchment
area tbr medium distance
flights enabling
poaching
of passengers
from
Amsterdam,
Dusseldorf,
Paris etc. Sabena
has favoured
co-operation
rather
than
confrontation
with the low cost upstarts (including Citybird on long-haul routes). It appears
somewhat uncertain what the final outcome of this will be.

8.5 High speed rail services
The growth of the high speed rail network in Europe is casting a shadow over a number of
short-haul air services. Unlike point to point traffic, transfer passengers do not want to go to
city centres however and their goal is a hub airport. With few exceptions therefore it will
remain taster to travel by air feeders than rail and because airlines retain control over the
marketing of these services they can be priced and promoted more attractively. Lufthansa
finds it impossible to remove the air services that parallel its 'airport express' trains because
these passengers would be more likely to switch to alternative hubs such as ,,M-nsterdam than
take the train to Frankfurt.
Where rail services can have a complementary,
role however
relatively nearby cities (up to about 300 "kin) where air services
congested hubs. It is ironic that Heathrow is the airport that could
rail feeders but has the least planned provision of links to the long

is to bring people in from
are being fbrced out of the
probably benefit most from
distance rail network.

9 CONCLUSION
Hubs will continue to offer major geogaphic
and mathematical
advantages
to airlines
operating in a competitive European environment.
All major carriers are becoming more
cormnercially
orientated and seeking ways to attract traffic from beyond their own national
frontiers. The need to have a sizeable network and frequencies however mean that it is the
largest airlines and airports that tend to dominate this traffic. Airports such as Manchester,
Madrid or Milan are much less important as hubs than they are for local traffic. Similarly,
airlines such as Virgin, Air Liberte, TAP or Olympic are not serious contenders
tbr
passengers requiring a connecting journey.
There is vigorous competition between the_i'najor hubs for this traffic. Heathrow suffers from
poor schedules, congestion and an awkward multi-terminal
layout which counterbalance
its
unrivalled range of intercontinental
services. In contrast KLM and Swissair have been adept
at maximising the potential of their smaller scale operations in Amsterdam and Zurich while
Sabena has been quietly building a useful intra-European
hub in Brussels. Air France - for
many years the sleeping giant amongst European carriers has finally woken up and probably
has some of the best prospects for the future,, with an excellent geographical
location, a
strong traffic base and good airport facilities.
There is therefore
a tendency
for the
competitive
position to equalise between the major airports. Capacity constraints may offer
opportunities to less congested locations to develop as hubs. Few cities can support long-haul
services or an extensive European network on the basis of local demand alone. It is hence
necessary to make a strong pitch for the passengers
this is the most footloose traffic of all.
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making

a myriad of other journeys

- for

IATA AIRPORT
AMS-Amsterdam,

ATH-Athens,

ATL-Atlanta,

CODES
BRU-Bmssels,

CDG-Paris

CDG,

CPH-

Copenhagen, EWR-New York Newark, FCO-Rome, FRA-Frankfurt,
IST-Istanbul, JFK-New
York JFK, LGW-London
Gatwick, LHR-London
Heathrow, LIN-Milan
Linate, MADMadrid, MUC-Munich,
OR.D- Chicago O'Hare, ORY-Paris Orly, PilL-Philadelphia,
PRGPrague, SOF-Sofia,

VIE-Vienna,

ZRH-Zurich.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Cycles in the economy are a widely recognized
phenomenon (see for example Schumpeter,
1939). Although
the existence of long term cycles is not clearly proved, medium term
cycles, averaging a 7 to 10 year period, and formerly known as Juglar cycles, are seldom
questioned. The phenomena inducing those cycles, however, are complex and still a subject
o f research.
In air transportation,

cycles

have

been

observed

and

commented

upon,

especially

those

concerning the airlines (periodicity of financial results), and the aeronautic industry (cycles
of orders). Specialized magazines (Avmark Aviation Economist, Airline Business...) release
articles on this subject periodically, and try to prophesy when will the next downturn come
and how bad it is going to be.
Those
which

cycles seem to find their origin, at least partially, in the pattern of demand growth,
is itself linked to the evolution of economic activity. It has been indeed repeatedly

observed throughout
the world that traffic evolution is statistically correlated to economic
growth (usually measured by GDP or GNP growth). Traffic forecasts (Yearly passenger
traffic growth)
released
every year by several organizations
(ICAO l, IATA 2, Boeing,
Airbus...) are based
traffic growth

on the assumption

of a linear correlation

between

GDP growth

and

Much more, however, can be drawn from the observation
of aviation cycles, in relation to
economic cycles. The relations between economic growth, traffic growth and aviation
cycles are indeed an interesting subject of study : can a whole system a relationship be built
between the variables of interest ? How are related traffic, financial results of airlines,
aircraft

orders and deliveries

? How can minor variations

such magnitude (14 MD USD lost between
chaotic system ?

in traffic, result in airline cycles of

1990 et 1994) ? Why is air transportation

such a

As statistical analysis results provided in this paper point out, the answer comes mainly from
the behavior
of the actors of this industry. In an oligopolistic
sector, like the air
transportation
industry, strategic behavior
dynamic structure
of reactions of airlines

matters. This leads us to try to understand
the
to fluctuations
of traffic and to good and bad

fortunes. A game theory framework (D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, 1991) can be used to analyze
the interplay of the airlines decisions in tet ms of investment. Do they take a long term view,
or do they have a myopic strategic behavior ?
This is therefore the aim of this paper to analyze aviation cycles by using statistical methods,
and from there to build a model of airline behavior, using a game theory framework, to
account for observed reactions in cycles.
The outline of the paper
reviewed (part 2). Then,

is the following : First the theory of economic cycles is briefly
using long time series data on world GDP and traffic, the link

between economic cycles and traffic is discussed (part 3), as well as the relevance of other
indicators.
In a fourth part, relations and time lags between relevant aviation activity
1 International

Civil Aviation

2 International

Air

Transport

Organization
Association

variables are studied and their relations with economic cycles discussed. Finally (part 5), a
game theory framework is used to give an explanation of the airlines behavior, which resuks
in an amplification
of economic cycles in the airline industry. We conclude by suggesting
ways of smoothing the cycles through a better management of capacity investments.
Can the aviation

2. CYCLES

cycle be broken ?

AND THE ECONOMY

Historians and economists
have observed that fluctuations,
more or less important,
with
different duration, occur in the economy since the advent of the industrial era. Since Adam
Smith (1776), numerous theories have been put forward to account for economic growth,
and for cycles affecting this growth 3 (for a review of these theories see for example Boyer,
1990). Neglected
after world war II, because growth was strong and continuous,
with no
more important cycles, those theories have been considered with renewed interest in the
seventies. In those years, the economic miracle of after war decades has faded away, and
been replaced by more troubled times. Important
cyclical economic fluctuations
reappear,
and with them, attempts to find explanations
(Zamovitz, 1985).
Without explaining details of numerous and complex models, it is useful to understand
that
basically two types of explanations exist for cycles : Some explanations
state that the causes
of cycles are exogenous
events (an oil crisis for example), while at the other end of the
spectrum, others consider that cycles are inherent in capitalistic economies (Marx was the
first to provide such an explanation),
and can therefore be explained in terms of economic
mechanisms (adjustment
of supply and demand, monetary disequilibrium...).
As often when
dealing with complex phenomena,
the truth certainly lies somewhere
in between those
extreme conceptions.
More recent research concentrate
on modeling
the dynamics
of
economic systems, using complex mathematics
models (dynamic systems, chaos theory...)
and emphasize the fact that previous models of cycles, without being totally mistaken, had
only a partial view of the situation. It is now clear that no simple model can account for
such complex phenomena, even if certain models had some relevance in their times.

3. ECONOMIC

CYCLES

AND AVIATION

CYCLES

In air transportation,
strong cyclical phenomena have been noticed, and the pattern seems to
get stronger with time (see for example graph 4.1). Different situations may prevail in
different markets (Europe, USA, Asia), but since the industry tends towards globalization,
and competition
becomes worldwide,
what affects one market affects others in several
ways. It does not seem, therefore, an oversimplification
to speak about global cycles in air

_ _lost

major

economists

have contributed

to the theories

of growth

: Smith,

Ricardo,

Neumann...
Some

have tried more particularly

to explain

cycles

:Samuelson,

Schumpeter,

Hayek...

A,lalthus,

Marx,

Von

transportation.
The growing interaction of markets
amplification of cycles that seem to appear.

may also account,

at least partly, for the

As with economic cycles, two explanations
are possible : cycles can have external causes
(economic
cycles, oil crisis), or can be linked to internal
phenomena
(behavior
of
actors :supply, demand, investment...).
External causes are most of the time deemed responsible for cycles in air transportation.
is not rare to see the sequence of events represented in the following way :

It

Graph 3.1 : A too simple view
Airplane

Airplane

Airlines

Traffic

Economic

Deliveries

Orders

Profits

growth

growth

This analysis is only partly relevant, as I sl_all demonstrate in part 4. It obliterates the role of
the airlines in terms of strategies, and makes profits depend only on external factors, which
is obviously not true in an oligopolistic industry.
The first part of the sequence,
hardly be disputed.

however,

linking economic

growth

to traffic

growth,

can

The correlation
between
GDP growth and traffic growth has indeed been very oRen
remarked and widely commented
upon. GDP growth (or the like) is generally used when
traffic forecasts are computed (although GDP growth is in no way easy to forecast itself f).
Various organizations compute yearly traffic forecasts, on international
level (ICAO, IATA,
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We computed the correlation between orders and deliveries with different
much time there is, on average, between orders (Or) and deliveries(Dr).

lags, to see how

Table 4. I
Correlation
between

Orders

coefficient
and

lLag (years)

Deliveries
Values

0

Corr(Oy,Dy)

0,347

1

Corr(Oy,Dy+l)

0,643

2

Corr(Oy,Dy+2)

0,834

3

Corr(Oy,D7+3)

0,824

4

Corr(Oy,Dy+4)

0,494

Data Source :Walsh Aviation (Data from 1968 to1996)

The correlation

between

the variables

is high when the lag is two or three years (0.82

0.83), indicating that on average, it takes the airlines
years to have airplanes delivered, once ordered.

somewhere

between

and

two and three

More interesting and less obvious is the link between results (PT) and orders (07). The
peaks and troughs in orders follow by one year the peaks and troughs in results. The
correlation is very high (0.89) and there is a causality easy to understand:
most airlines,
after a good year, choose to invest in renewing and increasing their fleet.
Table 4.2
Correlation

between

Results

Lag

and Orders
values

0

Corr(Py, Or)

0,632

1

Corr(Py, Oy+1)

0,887

2

Corr(Py,

0,754

Oy+2)

Data Source :Walsh Aviation, ICAO (Data from 1968 to1996)

This does not give much time to manufacturers
to think ahead and plan their production
rhythm, since financial results are only know with certainty towards the end of the year
(some years can have good starts but bad endings )). All this explain why manufacturers
are
mostly forced to follow cycles and have very little influence on their own production
rhythm.
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that
and

4.3 Airlines

profitability

cycles

If cycles in airline profits enable us to explain the peaks and trough in orders and deliveries,
how can we explain cycles in airlines results ? Where do these cycles come from ?
Contrary to conventional
wisdom (see graph 3.1), it is not at all clear that cycles in airlines
results originate from cycles in traffic growth. The correlation between results and traffic or
traffic

growth

is weak

(Corr(Py,,ATrafficy)=0.34),

and

if downtums

in traffic

are not

generally good news in terms of results, high traffic growth does not necessarily mean good
results : in 1990 for example, traffic growth is 6.4 percent, and heavy losses (-1500 millions
$) are incurred.
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Therefore,
traffic growth is not, by far, the only relevant element in explaining airlines
results. Traffic growth is, moreover,
not independent
on the strategies of the airlines in
terms
order
external
used.
Internal
Among

of pricing. If there is over-capacity
at one given point, airlines will lower prices
to regain market shares, and traffic growth will be boosted. In order to look
determinants

of airline

results,

indicators

of economic

activity

should

rather

in
at
be

factors, like investment pattern or pricing patterns, will also affect profitability.
other variables we could analyze, we found that results are somehow
correlated

with load factors

and deliveries.

A high load factor

means full planes, indicating

that there is

no over-capacity.
On the other hand, many deliveries in one year create over-capacity
mean low prices and low yields, and therefore poor results.

and

We estimated a regression model explaining airlines results, and came up with three main
statistically significant variables : Economic activity, its variations (GDP and GDP Growth)
and Deliveries.
The estimation was made with data from 1979 to 1996. As previous data were available,
this is a deliberate choice : modem air transportation
began atier deregulation occurred and

11

marketforcescould interactmore freely.Beforethat date, priceand route regulation
prevented
airlinesfromcompeting,bothondomesticandinternational
level,andtherefore,
explaining
theworkingsof theindustryduringthatperiodis a differentbusiness.

Table4.3 • Resultsasa functionof GDPandDeliveries

Results
Data sources

= a + fl

AGDP 2 + y

Deliveries

•

Results

ICAO

GDP 8, AGDP
Deliveries

IMF (World Economy
Walsh Aviation

Multiple Regression
Dependent

GDP +8

(World Civil Aviation

Statistics),

Millions USD

Outlook)

Analysis

variable

"

Parameter

Results

Estimate

CONSTANT
IAGDp2
'GDP
Deliveries

Standard
Error

T
Statistic

P-Value

-14886,6
353,966

3249,82
90,1992

-4,58074
3,92427

0,0004
0,0015

10,4859

1,90444

5,50602

0,0001

- 17,8026

4,76903

-3,73296

0,0022

Analysis of Variance
Source

Sum of Squares

Model
Residual
Total (Corr.)

3,59273E8
6,40402E7
4,23313E8

Df Mean Square
3
14

1,_9758E8
4,5743E6

17

R-squared = 84,8717 percent
:R-squared (adjusted for d.£) = 81,6299
Standard Error of Est. = 2138,76
Mean absolute error = 1591,5
Durbin-Watson
statistic = 1,94988

percent

Sources : ICAO, IMF, Walsh Aviation

s Index 1000 in 1965

12

F-Ratio
26,18

P-Value
0,0000

This model yields good results. All estimated parameters are statistically significant, and the
adjusted K-squared is 81.6 percent. When the model is re-estimated
using only the 16 .first
years, the result of the 176 year (1996) is predicted within 10 percent, showing that the
model is stable and could be used for forecasting.
The model confirms what could be suspected, i.e. that factors internal to air transportation
are important in explaining the airlines profitability. The number of deliveries in one given
year is a good indicator of the amount of new capacity that has to be absorbed by the
market: is has a negative coefficient, indicating that more capacity means lower prices and
lower profitability.
The external factors, summarized
by DGP and GDP growth, are also important.
economic conditions are driving demand and have also an influence on costs.

The

The model, combining internal and external factors, succeeds in explaining the profitability
of airlines. It gives us the final clue to the understanding
of the airline cycle: Although
economic conditions
do matter, economic cycles are amplified in the air transportation
industry, by the pattern of investment. Good financial results mean orders, resulting in
deliveries, very otten occurring at odd times, in opposition with the economic conditions.
This leads to over-capacity,
lower prices in order to maintain market shares, and bad results.
As the economy gets better (even in bad years, world GDP growth is always positive, so
far !), growing demand gradually absorbs the redundant capacity, and airlines get better.
They start investing again ....

Graph 4.6 : The Airlines
Capacity

f

World
Economy

Demand

D(p_
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Revenues

Cycle
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Deliveries

2/3yearslag
Orders

1 yearlag

Airlines Costs

Although this description
is somehow a simplified presentation
of what really happens, it
gives a fairly good notion of the causes of cycles, explaining why they are so much more
serious in the air transportation
industry than in other sectors of the economy.
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4.4 Forecasting

profitability

Table 4.4 : Profitability

Re sults(t)
Data sources

= a + t8 AGDP(t)

2+ y

GDP(t)

model

+ 80rders(t

:

Results

OACI (World

GDP, AGDP
Orders

FMI (Perspectives
Walsh Aviation

Multiple Regression
Dependent

forecastin_

Civil Aviation

Statistics),

de l'Economie

Millions USD

Mondiale)

Analysis :

variable

: Results
Standard

T
Statistic

P-Value

Parameter

Estimate

Error

CONSTANT
Orders(t-2)
AGDP 2

-12745,9
-5,41081
415,601

3980,72
2,43044
106,154

-3,2019
-2,22627
3,9151

0,0064
0,0429
0,0016

1,7535

3,86359

0,0017

GDP

6,77481

Analysis of Variance
Source
Model

Sum of Squares

Df Mean Square

3,28936E8

3

1,09645E8
6,74_085E6

Residual

9,43719E7

14

Total (Corr.)

4,23308E8

17

R-squared = 77,7061 percent
R-squared (adjusted for d.f.) = 72,9288
Standard Error of Est. = 2596,31
Mean absolute error = 2079,85
Durbin-Watson

percent

statistic = 1,40952

Sources : ICAO, IMF, Walsh Aviation

14

F-Ratio

P-Value

16,27

0,0001

- 2)1

In termsof lbrecasting,
morecanbedone,sincewe knowthatthe patternof deliveriesis
stronglydependent
onthepatternof orders.A modelcanbeconstructed
linkingresultswith
economicconditionsandpreviousorders.It givessatisfyingresults(adjustedR-squared
of
72.9percent),considering
thatpreviousordersarea roughestimationof thecapacityonthe
marketata giventime.
It enablesto makeforecastsof airlineresultsdependingon one knownparameter,
the
numberof ordersmadetwo yearsbefore(aslongasyourestrictyourforecastto two years
ahead,whichseemsa reasonable
thingto do, considering
theuncertaintyon theeconomic
environment),and one unknown,the economicgrowth. Dependingon hypotheses
of
economicgrowth,scenarioscanthenbe elaboratedconcerningthe financialsituationof
airlines.

5. INVESTMENT
The
the
and
out

AND AIRLINES

BEHAVIOR

airline industry is an oligopoly, which means that there is a limited number of actors in
industry. The behavior of one of them has therefore consequences
in terms of pricing
total capacity on the market. The economic analysis of oligopoly (Varian, 1992) points
that behavior of such markets is fairly different from perfectly competitive
markets.

More specifically, the outcome of competition can lead to non (pareto) optimal
Such situations can be explained using models derived from game theory.
Let us imagine

a situation

where

two airlines compete

on one market

situations.

(a route or a set of

routes). They have a given market share. Even with correct anticipation
of the traffic
growth expected on this market (at current prices), it can be shown that the capacity chosen
by the airlines will almost surely be superior to the expected traffic growth.
In terms of capacity
• increase

(seats),

its capacity

each airline can have three strategies
on the market

•

by less than the expected

•

increase its capacity

on the market by the same amount

•

increase its capacity

on the market b7 more than the expected

The first strategy will never be chosen,
over you.

growth

as the expected

growth

growth

since it enables your competitor

to gain market

share

9

The second strategy is a non aggressive
same. If he chooses the second strategy,

one, reasonable as long as your opponent does the
you will loose market share, which is never a good

thing.
This can be summarized

in a table,

choosing

simple figures

airlines.

9 We assume that there was no over-capacity in thefirst place.

15

to represent

the gains of the

Table 5. l : A strategic
Airline A
Airline B
non aggressive

strategy

(follow market

growth)

aggressive
beyond

non aggressive

strategy

(follow market

growth)

aggressive

strategy

beyond market

g(A) = 2

(invest
growth)

g(A) = -1
g(B) = 2

g(A) = 3

strategy' (invest
market

behavior

g(B) = 3
g(A) = 1

g(B)= -1

growth)

where g(A) and g(B) represent

the respective

g(B)= 1

gains of airlines A and B.

In terms of collective welfare, the optimal outcome is {g(A)=2, g(B)=2} since it yield a
total gain of 4 _°. It corresponds
to each airline matching its capacity increase with traffic
growth.

They split equally the benefits

of increasing

demand.

The outcome of both airlines being aggressive is an over-capacity on the market, leading to
price cuts, in order to boost demand. Profits go down for each airline : {g(A)=l, g(B)=l }
The outcome of one airline being aggressive while the other is not, is for the aggressive one
a large gain, while the other gets less than in any other situation:
{g(A)=3, g(B) =- 1} or
{g(A)=-l, g(B)=3}. It could even be the case that being aggressive when your opponent is
not, leads to bigger
prices n

gains, since with a bigger

market

share you may be able to raise your

In any case, being aggressive is a dominant strategy, since whatever
you get more than in the other case (3 or 1, instead of 2 or -1).

your opponent

does,

This model, known as the _<prisoner's dilemma _), is very often used to characterize
this
kind of situations. However simple it may seem, it has a very wide scope, and represents in
an adequate way many real situations. We {epresented
a simple case where only two airlines
are competing, but it can be successfully generalized to several competitors (Tirole, 1988).
How can the airlines get out of this situation

where

profits

are more or less exhausted

by

competition ? Again, game theory offers us a way out : if the situation is repeated, then
getting along becomes
possible. Long term relationships
(represented
by an infinitely
repeated game) enable cooperation.
By cooperating,
airlines could share the gains from a
non aggressive

behavior.

This kind of reasoning,

however,

is only valid in a very stable

relationship:

competitors

have to remain the same all along the game. In the air transportation
industry, this is far
from the case : existing airlines can disappear (or exit a market) and new airlines can enter a
m We assume

that the consumers"

H In this case

the consumers'

welfare

welfare

goes

is more

or less unchangedin

down
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this case

market.

If an airline

thinks

one of its competitors

may exit a market

aggressive behavior, it may have as a goal to provoke
repeated games does not hold.
It may not be possible, in this case, to get out of the
investing may make sense in the long term, in order to
(short term) interest of consumers, who may benefit
however,
exits from markets may lead to monopoly
regulatory

as a result

of an

the exit, and then the framework

of

dilemma. Being aggressive and overeliminate rivals. It may even be in the
from lower prices. In the long term
power and need to be watched by

authorities.

6. CONCLUSION

: HOW TO SMOOTHE

CYCLES

If a tendency
to over-capacity,
explained by the oligopolistic
structure
of the airline
industry,
is worsened
by economic conditions,
it leads exactly to what we observe:
investments
timed in good economic periods (when airlines can afford to act aggressively)
materialize in the shape of delivered planes (and thus available capacity), a t_w years later,
usually when the economic context is not so favorable (to say the least !). This leads to
huge losses (due to a large disequilibrium between supply and demand) and airlines slowly
get better when this unbalance
is reduced by the growth in demand. Then they start
investing again.
To correct

this cyclical

imbalance

between

supply and demand,

airlines

need

to adjust

in

two ways :
First, they should improve

their forecasting

abilities : although

demand shock, like the gulf war, a model, like the one
scenarios, and predict how much capacity airlines would
situations and at different points of the economic cycle.
of desirable capacity considering economic conditions
airlines to take advantage of the economic cycles instead
a better management

no model

can ever predict

a

we estimated, can be used to build
want to have in different economic
This would give airlines boundaries
and competition.
This would help
of being hit by them, by leading to

of capacity.

Since capacity, even managed in a better way, is not as adjustable as airlines would like in
order to <_ride _ the cycles, another impoatant adjustment is to build more flexible capacity.
Ira fraction of capacity is made flexible, even a marginal one (5 to 10 percent), it may be
enough to cope with unexpected changes in demand, since demand can be predicted with
reasonable
accuracy.
For example, capacity can be gained in high demand periods by
deferring retirements,
or by using short term leases. It can be reduced in low demand
periods by returning leased aircraft or retiring old aircraft.
There are important benefits to be gained, for the individual cartier, but also for the industry
as a whole, if global capacity matches demand better. This may not be easy to achieve,
because it means changing the behavior of all airlines. It will make sense, in order to
influence
the whole industry, for airlines or groups of airlines to share insights and
information concerning the evolution of demand. This may prove a difficult evolution in a
very competitive
industry, used to the kind of behavior described above, but efforts should
be made towards

that goal.
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1. Transport and economic development:
It is established that transport

a close link

is closely related to the economic activity (Fig. 1). Both

passenger and freight transport follow generally the rate of economic development.
However,

each transport

mode has a more or less predominant

position related to the

distance traveled (Fig. 2). It can be easily seen that for distances more than 800kms, air transport
is by far the principal transport mode.
Index
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Fig. 1: Rates of development of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), passenger and freight transportfor OECD
countries.

At the era of the third technological revolution of telematics, biotechnology and airplanes
(Fig. 3), air transport has increased during the last 25 years with rates higher than the increase of
GDP (Fig. 4), [1].
Concerning elasticities, air transport is highly influenced by the level of income, as it has
been established for many countries all over the world (Fig. 5), [2].
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2. Tourism

and air transport for various countries.

and air transport

Tourism has become a highly expanding economic activity (Fig. 6, 7), with a great impact
to the economy of countries like France, Italy, Greece, etc (Table 1), [3].
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Fig. 6: Evolution

1987

1988

1989

1990

of number of tourists worldwide.

-3-

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

400

Billion US dollars ($)

350
30O
25O
200
150
100
50
0
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

r
1992

I

1993

1994

1995

Fig. 7: Revenues from tourism worldwide.

Number of tourists (in million)
Count_
1990
France

1995

52.497
37.441
39.539
26.679
10.484
18.013
20.510
17.176
3.400
19.011
15.209
7.278
17.045
13.200
8.873
6.581
8.020
7.446
4.842
5.299
338.543
459.233

Spain
USA
Italy
China
Gr. Britain
Hungary
Mexico
Poland
Austria
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
Switzerland
Greece
Hong-Kong
Portugal
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
Sum of 20 first
Sum worldwide

60.584
45.125
44.730
29.184
23.368
22.700
22.087
19.870
19.225
17.750
16.854
16.600
14.535
11.835
10.600
9.598
9.513
7.936
6.595
6.532
415.221
566.538

Range
in 1990
1
3
2
4
12
7
5
8
27
6
10
16
9
11
13
19
14
15
22
21

Range
in 1995
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O

Table 1: The 20 most important touristic destinations worldwide.
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_

The prospects,
in the past.

Europe

50,8%

of the

(Table

2), [2].

total

however,
will have
world

for Europe

lower

toudstic

rates

in the development
of develoloment

market,

compared

for

1990

2000

2010

I%)

(%)

(%)

Europe

62,6

56,3

50,8

America

20,4

22,2

22,1

Asia and Pacific

11,5

15,3

20,3

3,3

3,6

3,8

Middle East

1,5

1,7

1,9

South - East Asia

0,7

0,9

1,1

Table 2: Share of the various continents

increased

do with the medium
the number

of days spent,

of tourists

per toudst

industry

1990

and

than

and will absorb
56,3%

for 2000

is one part of the matter.

(Fig.
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[4].
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3. The airport

of Rhodes

The island

of Rhodes

one of the complex
the island
years

(Table

(Table

and its impact

(Fig.

12) is situated

of Dodecanese.
3),

[4]. The

to the economic

number

Tourism

in the south

is the principal

of tourists

4), [4].
-6-

development

of the island

- east of Greece
factor

has spectacularly

and its the greatest

of the economic

activities

increased

the last 40

during

of

Patmos"

,a.s°.
Major influence area
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_.

Minor influence area
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Fig. 12: Island of Rhodes and influence area of the airport of Rhodes.
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Percentage
(%) in 1978

Activities
Agriculture

Percentage
(%) in 1988

21,9

Year

Number of
tourists
arrivals

1952

61.148

s!aying (days)
6,6

14,9

Medium
duration of

Forest and Fishing activities

13,2

8,9

1965

130.380

8,0

Commerce

14,4

14,5

1970

213.657

8,1

26,3

36,9

1976

466.588

9,5

9,3

8,8

Hotels, Restaurant
Construction
Public services
Education,

The

contribution

saturated

and

technology

important

air

Mediterranean.
(Fig.

844.477

9,6

2,9

3,6

1992

935.067

9,6

Until

in 1977.

by 2,7. This

15), whereas

domestic

Germany
Scandinavians
As
Authority

4. A Survey
4.1. Scope

it

The

one

the total

principally

is greatly
constitute

18,3%

comes

impaired

from

from

49,2%

6 times

higher

Evaluation

the

Operation
number

compared

in the airport

is

with

high

in

East

in Paradissi
(Fig.

of intemational
(Fig.

13)

14) has

traffic

(Fig.

16).

passengers

of the airport,

and

5).
expenses

the necessary

of the characteristics

(Fig.
terminal

important

of passengers

the increase

to the

of self-financing

The

is equipped

more

the level of tariffs

(Table

land.

airport

of

of the international

for the year 1997

The airport

can

of traffic

of the

airport,

the

Airport

investment.

at the airport

of Rhodes

of the Survey

conducted

international

during

and

next pages.
•

in progress.
make

of 20 years

In order to investigate
been

of aircraft

In a period

have the possibility

for the

are

which

for this development.

majority

in Maritsa.

increase

are

works

crucial

great

was located

and England

revenues
could

the

the airport

traffic

countries

has been

to which

systems,

1977

Table 4: Evolution of number of toudsts
at the island of Rhodes and medium
duration of staying per toudst.

in the total

extension

navigation

13) began

increased

long,

9,4

1990

of the airport

of 3.260m

9,5

780.211

12,4

Health, Justice

a runway

610.827

12,0

Table 3: Impact of the vadous activities
economic development
of Dodecanese.

has

1980
1985

the charactedstic_

the summer

domestic

passengers.

We can conclude

international
help

of an agency;

whereas

•

the first impression

16,1%

for

international
of domestic

the

97,2%

The

at the airport of Rhodes,

questionnaires

questionnaire

have arranged

in contrary,

weeks

•

of traffic
1166

have

and

been

analysis

a Survey

completed

of results

are

has

by both
given

in

the following:

passengers

and only some

of 1997.

domestic

passengers

arrange

some

months

their travel

ago,

with the

by themselves

ago
passengers

passengers

international

come

have

at the moment
of

their trip to Rhodes

in Rhodes

a professional

of entrance
passengers

exclusively
motivation

in the airport
and

for

the

for

toudstic

reasons,

for their trip
is more
93,7%

or less satisfactory
of

the

domestic

passengers
=

most of the services
the check-in

of the airport are evaluated

and waiting

areas,

the information

be improved.
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as satisfactory

with the exception
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REPUBLIC
CIVIL

OF

AVIATION

GREECE
AUTHORITY

Survey
of the Characteristics
Quality
of Service
at the Airport
Responsible:

Date:l
1. Nationality:

_

Assoc.

Professor

and the
of Rhodes
V.

Profillidis

I 8 t199zl
2. Age: m

Hour: I

3. City in which you are living:

5. To which airport are you traveling?

I

4. Sex:

I
Male
Female

6. What is your final destination:

7. With which air company are you traveling?
8. When did you book your place?
9. Reason of your trip:
Professional

Non professional

m

Related to tourism
Public sector servant

Family - Personal
Medical

I

m

Private sector employee
Liberal profession
Military
Congress participant
Studies

Tourism - Vacations
m

m

I"----'--'--'1

Organised by a tourist office
Non organised by a tourist office

m

m

L__J

Other (clarify)
10. Do you visit Rhodes by air for the first time?

Yes J---']

If no, how many times have you visited Rhodes by air?
How many days did you spend in Rhodes?

_

11. Which tourist office, travel agency or air company
Tourist office

If no, approximately

Yes _

Air company:
_1o

instead of sea transport

Great distance
Travel time
Risk of sea sickness
14. How many airports have you visited?

I-----J times

has organised your trip?

how many times have you traveled

13. You have chosen air transport

No 1"---7

days

Travel agency:

12. Is your first trip by air?

I

by air? _

for the following reasons:

Total cost of trip
Other
(please clarify)
I

I airports

Which ones?
15. How did you travel to the airport?
Tourist bus
Taxi
Private car

Rented car
Car of relatives

-13-

times

16. Howmanypeopleaccompaniedyou till the airport?
17.Whatis your impressionat the momentof entranceat the airport?
Verygood [----"]
Good[-'_
Medium _
Bad
18. How do you evaluate the quality of service at the check in?
Personnel

behavior:

Good [_

Areas:

Medium _

Sufficient _

Tolerable

Bad
I_]

Insufficient

19. How do you evaluate the information from the personnel of the airport?
Good _

Medium _

Bad

20. How do you evaluate the waiting area of the airport?
Areas

Tolerable
Sufficient
Insufficient

Seats

_

Medium
Comfortable
Non comfortable

Aesthetics

Medium
Good
Bad

21. How do you evaluate the bar services of the airport?

Qua/ity

Medium
Good
Bad

Cost

_

Service

Normal
Low
_
High

Medium
Good
Bad

22. How do you evaluate the cleanliness of the airport?
Waiting areas,
Ckeck in

Good
Medium
Bad

E-

WC

_...J

Medium
Good
Bad

23. How do you evaluate the shops of the airport?
Sufficient _

More of them are required
Which ones

24. What additional services would you expe_t at the airport of Rhodes?

26. Education level:

25. What is your profession?
Public sector servant

University
Technical or Professional school

m

Private sector employee
Liberal profession
Student / Pupil
Military
Worker -industry
Farmer
Pensioner
Household

High school
Elementary school

m

We thank you for your cooperation

27. How many members has
your family?
and we wish you a pleasant
-14-

trip

members

4.2

Results

of Survey

to international

and

domestic

passengers

at the

airport

of

Rhodes

Age of passenger.
_

International

Percentage

passengers

_

Domestic

passengers

%

60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
Until 19

20-29

30-39

40-49

50_59

60 and
more

Sex of passenger.
100,0- Percentage

%

80,0 i
60,0
40,01
20,01
0,0
Male
Reason

Female

of trip:
Percentage

%

100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
!6L1_

20,0
0,0

Professional

Non professional

Related to tourism
Public sector servant
100,0 4
80,0 !

Private sectror employee
Employee in airline firm

60,0.
40,0.

Liberal profession
Military

...............

20,0
0,0

Congress participant"

Tourism
Vacations

Studies
0

10

20

30

Percentage

40

We estimate

of survey

the real percentage

Family
Personal

50

100,0
of the period

Medical

(£1 IO,.5-

%
Percentage

* Because

l

--b.0-0_0---

(summer

period).

higher.

%

98,4

80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0

-4,; .....

___
1,6

0,0
Orgnanized by
a tourist agency
-15-

Non orgnanized
by a tourist agency

Whendidyoubookyourplace*?.
_

International

passengers

_

Domestic

passengers

Percentage %

50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0

1 week
ago
* Reference
Do you
time?

visit

date:

Rhodes

3weeks
ago

1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months
ago
ago
ago
ago
ago

by air for

the first

If

no,

how

many

times

40,0

30,0
_

_-,,,.
.................. _I
,====
',-

-',.0

_

20,0l]_gg l_g=- _-d -_-

40,0

10,0
0,0

20,0
Yes

days

_

No

did you spend
Percentage

visited

-,¢........................
_

many

you

Percentage %

%

60,0

0,0

have

by air?

80,0

How

6 and
more
months ago

8/1997

Rhodes
Percentage

100,0

2weeks
ago

1

2

3

time

times

times

0,,1|

o_

-,_ ;o-_,-,_- - gg/
o_ _

__

4-s 6-7
times

times

. o_

8:9 M;.y
times

times

in Rhodes?

%

35,0
30,0
25,0
20,0
15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
1-3
days

Is your first

4-5
days

6-7
days

8-9
days

10-11
days

trip by air?

12-13
days

16-17
days

If no, approximately
raveled

Percentage

14-15
days

%

18 days
and more

hay many

times

have

you

by air?

Percentage %

60,0_

100,0
80,0
60,0

50,0 _ ......................

..
[
'=:-_
_==-

40,0 -_ .....................

=

(_

30,0 1- - - - _,._-_ ....
-m- .........
200_
=o '-,
- .... _ _- -_.-o to_ - _)- c_
_5-_: -c¢
10,0

40,0
20,0
0,0
Yes

i
time

No
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2
times

3
times

4-5
times

6;7
times

8-9 Many
times _mes

]

You

have

chosen

air transport
_

instead

International

Percentage

100,0

of sea transport

for the following

passengers

_

reasons:

Domestic

passengers

%
83,0

80,0

_- ...........
t

57,6

60,0

_

...........

56.0_ .....................

"'

....

6,_- 9,9............
0,0

0,0

Note. The passenger

Have

you visited
Percentage

_
Travel
time

Risk of

Total cost

Other

of hip

reasons

sea sickness

could

choose

other

airports?

more

than one reasons

If yes,

how

many

airports

have

you visited?

%

100,0 _- .............

89,2 .....

8o,o_............

50,0

4

6o,o

Percentage

%

I

40,0 _- ......................
m
_

=o- o5

30,0
I--_--,-,_...............-_--I
1_o_
_-_
20,0 -]-¢6E _

,2,1

20,0 _
0,0

Yes

No

did you travel

to the

Percentage

_.,._-d

...........

3

_5

_N
-_II

0,00_
I

How

0,0
I

2

_7

airport?
%

100,0
80,0

77,9

60,0
45,9
40,0
20,0

14,8- ........

....

-12,2

0,3

1§_9 ...............
8,5

9,4

8,8

2,4

0,0
Tounst
bus

Public
bus

Taxi
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Private
car

Car of
relatives

Rented
car

8-9

Many

I

How many people

accompanied
_

100,0
80,0

you till the airport?

Intemational

passengers

_

Domestic passengers

Percentage %
78,3

60,0
40,0

......

30;.8- ..........................
22,7

20,0

20,0
3,4

0,0

0,7

0,0
No one
What is your impression
100,0

1 person

2 persons

3 persons 4 persons 5 persons

at the moment of entrance

at the airport?

Percentage %

80,0 i

.................................

60,0 ..........

-53,4

t
4o,o
t--i6;3
......

59,2

20,0 _0,0
Good

Very
good

Medium

Bad

How do you evaluate the quality of service at the check in?

100,0

Percentage %

80,0

]

100,0

I

80,0

60,0 i

Percentage %

60,0

40,0.

¢

20,0

40,0
20,0

0,0

0,0
Good

Medium

Bad

Sufficient

Personnel behavior

Check in areas

How do you evaluate the information
100,0
80,0
60,0

from the personnel

of the airport?

Percentage %
.....................

........

50;7........

40,0
20,0
0,0

Tolerable

Good

Medium
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Bad

Insufficient

How

do you

evaluate

the waiting
_

100,0

Percentage

area of the airport?

International

%

1

I

pa_engers

Percentage

Domestic

%

100,0

passengers

,Percentage

%

60,0

80,01......
6o,o.....

40,0

4o,o_-- - -_ - _

80,0

......

1.

- _- _ J

20,0
Comfortable

0,0
Sufficient

Tolerable

do you

evaluate

the bar services

%

I

_

Percentage

%

...........

-_° ......

%

8o,oi...... _ -_ ......
6o,o_-.....

(_

4°'°1,oo,
o,_- _--L_I==- '20,0_ £- _- -_Good

Medium

do you
100,0

Bad

Low

the

cleanliness

Medium

%

100,0-Percentage
80,0

%

40,0
20,0

0,0

i

...................

J
60,9 58,3

60,0

20,0

0,0
Good
Waiting

evaluate

Medium
areas,

Check

the shops

Bad

Good

of the

Medium

Bad

WC

in

airport?

Percentage
100,0,
80,0-

%
95,6

............

60,040,0
20,0
0,0
Sumcient

More Of them
are required

shops

required:

Bad

of the airport?

40,0

do you

Good

Service

64,4

60,0

High

Cost

evaluate

Percentage

Normal

80,0 ....................

More

_

- oS'- o--

Quality

How

Bad

1

20,0

How

Medium

Aesthetics

40,0

0,0

Good

of the airport?
Percentage

"¢

80,0 T- .....
60,0

----

Seats

100 0 Percentage
'

0 0

Non
comfortable

Area

How

Meal Jura

Insufficient

Electrical

and

electronical

Jewels,
Pharmacy,
Books,
Cigarettes,
Clothes
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miczosets,
Newspapers,

What additional

services would you expect at the airpo_ of Rhodes?

Information
Post

about

office,

Non

flights
smoking

on

screens,

waiting

Touristic

areas,

Information

Foreign

about

exchanges

Rhodes,

services.

What is your profession?
International passengers
50,0

_

Domestic passengers

Percentage %

40,0 .........................................................
I
_c°
_(°
30,0
......
<_--_- - _ -cu.....................................
O4

20,0

(,0

_-_--

cO

-_6 .................................
u_

10,0

co

__

,n
_-

0,0
Public
sector
servant
Education

Private
Liberal
Student
sector profession
Pupil
employee

Military

Worker in
industry

o=

o_

t
Farmer

Pensioner Household

level:

50,0

Percentage %

40,0

_384! ....

..............

35,1

30,4

30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0

I

Elementary
school

How many members

60,0

High school
_

Technical or
Professional
school

University

has your family?

Percentage %

50,0
41,5 38,8

40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0

I

1 member

2 members

I

3 members
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4 members

04

5 and more
members

5. Forecasting the demand of the airport of Rhodes
5.1 Need and methods of forecast

A civil aviation
many purposes.

authority

requires demand

At the strategic level, forecasts

forecasts

at many levels of planing

ana for

are required for long term planning over a time

of 15 to 20 years. More detailed forecasts,

but over a similar time span, are required for major

investment

of terminal and runway etc. By contrast,

projects such as the expansions

range analysis,

5 to 10 years ahead,

is the element

for the annual

planning

the medium

of the aviation

authority, [5].
There are three main methods of forecasting
projections

and

methodology

econometric

of forecasting

relationships

civil aviation traffic:

(models),

has been developed;

[1],

[6].

the fuzzy

market surveys,

During

last

years,

linear or non-linear

trend
a new

regression

models, [7].

5.2. Forecasting

based on market studies

Traffic forecasting
transport

market

different

sectors

through market surveys aims at analyzing the characteristics of the air

in order to examine
of the population

combined with estimations
development

of different

how the use of an airport
countries.

about social-economic

The results

varies between

of a survey

must be

changes and may indicate the possible future

of demand of an airport, [5].

The questionnaire
to estimate

empirically

the likely

which has been presented
future development

in this paper, includes questions

of demand

of the airport

which aim

(questions

No 9, 10,

13 and 24), [4].

5.3. Forecasting

by statistical methods

A first step for forecasting

airport demand is to collect and study the historical data and

determine the trend curve of demand. When d_edving a forecast by projection
trend, we assume that all the factors which determined

the development

from the demand

of demand

at the past,

will continue to operate in the future in the same way as in the past. A trend may be stable in
absolute terms (linear)

or in percentage

curve which best fits the given historical

terms (exponential

or polynomial).

data may be determined

The type of trend

by using different

types of

curves. In any case, the period of forecast can not exceed half of the period where historical
data are available. The coefficient which evaluates
studied

is the Coefficient

of Correlation

the degree of approach

(R_, 0<R2<1).

Best correlation

curve - phenomenon
succeed

when

R_ is

close to 1, [1].
Fig. 18 gives a medium-term

forecasting

for the total passenger

Rhodes, based on the data of Fig. 14. We used the polynomial
Determination

is very close to 1 (R= =0,92).
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demand

of the airport of

trend and the Coefficient

of

Passengers peryear
A
Equation: P=-1653,97xy2+6,64911x106xY-6,67961x
3000000 - Where P: Total passengers per year, Y: Year
2750000

109

-

2500000

_

-_m___

2250000
2000000

Result of _ent proje_on

per year

1750000
J

1500000

Historical data of total
passenger demand

12500OO
J
'

1000000

I

I

I

I

i

I

I

l

I

1

t

Fig. 18: Forecasting by trend projection for the total passenger demand

5.4. Forecasting

by econometric

A future
account

airport

the way

development

in which

of demand.

between

the airport

demand.

The

causal

Forecast

of future

the

rate

country

(Table

which

of passengers.
exchange

6). All countries

Year

into

socio-economic

I

I

I

1

of the airport of Rhodes.

takes

or more

variables

one

account

equivalence

the dependent

equivalence
participate

1986

aft('# many

of the Greek

1987

1988 1989

is the selection
the

and error

efforts,

the

which
index

to the

1990

1991

type

of

variables.

we concluded

that

demand

currency

represents

is

of origin

this evolution

of 100 for the year

1992 1993

of

relevant

of the

passenger

of this indicatoratthe

the

relationship

independent

too.

(drachma)

affect

of the

specification
and

into

the development

is crucial

Indicator

we accept

in the composition

a quantitative

of the international

currency

an Equivalence

of drachma,

trials

does not take

conditions

influence

(demand)

variables

the development

For calculating

which

and

data

external

into account

in forecasting

of Rhodes,

other

forecasting

of the independent

influence

of historical

and

forecasting

between

of the airport

vadable

by projection

part of an econometric

existing

of exchange

of foreign

and

development

In the case
the critical

Econometric

to be taken

relationship

deduced

the various

difficult

I

method

demand

demand

most

variables

functional

traffic

I

percentages

1994 1995

1986

of Table 5.

1996 1997

Rate of exchange of drachma to
currencies of origin counties of 100,0 111,3 122,2 127,4 137,6 158,8 178,0 186,5 195,9 192,1 172,7 202,9
demand at the airport of Rhodes
Fig. 18: Evolution of exchange rate of drachma to currencies of origin countries of international
at the airport of Rhodes.
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passengers

The econometric

model derived is an equation of the form:

P =1/2 x [e (°'°°399537XD) x925.332+ D x (O,174746x D2 -43,2117x D +7.548,47) +906.8961
where: P: The annual number of intemational
D: The exchange

rate of drachma per year compared to the currencies

countries passengers

5.5. Forecasting

passenger of the airport of Rhodes
of origin

of the airport

fuzzy linear regression model

A fuzzy linear regression model has the following form:
Y=A

0 +A 1 .x 1 +A 2 -x 2 +...+A n .x n

where A_, i=1 ..... n, are symmetrical
membership

functions

other methods),

fuzzy numbers.

can be seen as possibility

so the fuzzy linear regression

Since fuzzy numbers
functions

(instead of probability

model becomes a possibilistic

used in the context of possibility theory to provide a new methodology
and incomplete

knowledge

models, the difference

by means

ambiguity

of relation

relationship

of possibility

structure.

Moreover,

back to the system coefficients

The fuzzy regression

in fuzzy

the proposed

Persian Gulf in 1991, which discontinued

our vague

to bring the

or our inability to construct

of the international

depends

an accurate

[7].

passenger

for the airport of

on the unpredictable

the upward development

model. The

events which affect the

event was the War in the
of the demand of the airport.

International passengers per year

2.000.000

1.500.000
:?ii_!;:2i:_i_ii_ii_!i_!i_
i:
i:/2
ii!_::ii
ii:
i_?iiiiii:.;ii:!i;
.......
.-..

1.000.000

"_

\

Limits of fuzzy
linear-re,gres-si-on......

.............

Annual number of
i5t-efn_tio-na I-p-a_,_e5 g er ....

500.000

0
1986

I

1987

I

1988

t
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I

i
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I

1992

I

I

i

I

1993

1994

1995

1996

Fig. 19: Fuzzy linear regression of the internationalpassengerdemand of the airport of Rhodes.
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of

linear regression

model seems

In the case of the airport of Rhodes, such unpredictable

2.500.000

for capturing

is based on the same variable as the econometric

range of limits of the fuzzy regression
demand.

functions

one, that can be

values is assumed to form an ambiguity

which enters directly in the model through fuzzy coefficients,

Fig. 19 gives the fuzzy linear regression
Rhodes.

distributions,

between data and the estimated

which is due to the system's

are fuzzy sets, their

1997

Thefuzzyregressionanalysis

for the airport of Rhodes gives an equation of the form:

P=(ro
+r,x,)+_(Co
+c,D,)
where: P: The annual number of international

passenger of the airport of Rhodes

D: The exchange rate of drachma per year compared to the currencies
countries passengers
ro=636.055,682

6. Concluding

of the airport

r1=7.576.650

co=0

c1=732,673

remarks

In the present paper, forecast models of demand of airports are suggested,
the airport of Rhodes. Market surveys, statistical
method
never

has been used. The accuracy
possible

examined,

to fully predict

analytical

must give precisions
forecasts

of odgin

human

methods,

of prediction
behavior.

and in depth knowledge

econometric

models and the fuzzy

proves to be satisfactory.

For this reason,

with focus at

results

However,

must

it is

be carefully

of social behavior is necessary and the forecaster

of the order of mistakes that can occur and of the assumptions

on which

have been developed.
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